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THE PREAMBLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
DR. JOHANNES VAN AGGELEN'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The First World War was fought for the ideological independence of
nationalities and for the establishment of a collective security system
and international peace. The Second World War then essentially
generated a crusade for human rights. Indeed the first part of the
twentieth century witnessed a real counter-revolution, reincarnating all
of the principles of liberty and equality without discrimination already
enshrined in the English Magna Charta of 1215' and the French
Declaration of the Rights of the Citizen of 1789.2 The preamble of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration or
Declaration) is the modem expression of these ideals.3
* Dr. Johannes van Aggelen, expert on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, holds a
doctorate from McGill University. He has wide teaching experience and has been working
with the United Nations since February 1980. The topic of this article was triggered by
the fact that he had the pleasure to work with the late Professor John Humphrey,
godfather of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The opinions in this article are
expressed in an individual capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United
Nations.
1. For the full text of the Magna Carta, see Yale Law School Avalon Project (visited
Apr. 5, 2000) <http/www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/magframe.htm>.
2. For a text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, see S.E. FINER
ET AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS 208-210 (1995).
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. These ideals permeate the text of
the Preamble of the Universal Declaration, which holds as follows:
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscious of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations
between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
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The victory of the United Nations over barbarism in 1945 could not
have materialized without a formal recognition of human rights, and
the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration gives an impetus
for reflection on the rationae materiae of the preamble. " This article
considers the birth of the Declaration and its relationship with the
United Nations Charter.5 Also examined are the contributions different
countries and individuals made to the drafting of the preamble.
Finally, this article notes many of the efforts the international
community has made to recognize and define human rights in
numerous, subsequent treaties and declarations, with attention paid to
the influence the Declaration has had with respect to those efforts.
The godfather of the Universal Declaration, Professor Ren6 Cassin,
saw the Declaration as a means to achieve a better world.' Its spiritual
mother, Mrs. Roosevelt, stated in an address at the Sorbonne that
democracy, freedom and human rights had gained a definite meaning
for the people of the world. She stressed "that we must not be deluded
by the efforts of the forces of reaction to prostitute the great words of
our free tradition and thereby confuse the struggle."7 Professor Cassin
and Mrs. Roosevelt's views reflected the optimism carried forth in the
drafting of the U.N. Charter. Additionally, when the General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration on December 10, 1948," it referred to
the idealistic concepts of the U.N. Charter and elevated the four
freedoms proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter of August 12, 1941 to a

human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger
freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation
with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the
greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,
Now, Therefore, The GeneralAssembly, Proclaims this Universal Declaration
of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and
nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping
this declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to
promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures,
national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories of their jurisdiction.
Id. at pmbl.
4. The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration was celebrated by the
United Nations, and worldwide. See United Nations Website (visited March 29, 2000)
<http//:www.unitednations. org>.
5. See generally U.N. CHARTER.
6. Rend Cassin, How to achieve a better world - The Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS REV., Sept. 1958, at 14-19.
7. Eleanor Roosevelt, Address at the Sorbonne, entitled The Struggle For Human
Rights (Sept. 28, 1948) (cited in 484 DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 10, 1948).

8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III).
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universal level.9 Thus, the Declaration became nothing less than the
definitive statement of the prevailing hopefulness and the high
ambitions in the realm of human rights at the end of World War II.
The Universal Declaration cannot, however, be regarded as having
It has tremendous contemporary
merely historical significance.
importance because it entrusts every individual and every member of
society to develop, through education, more respect for the fundamental
rights and freedoms it espouses.'0
In this regard, the Universal
Declaration stands out in that it guides and inspires the endeavors of
the United Nations in the field of human rights. The preambular
paragraphs of the Declaration reflect the basic human rights
philosophies of our times.
The importance of the Declaration has grown tremendously since it
was first signed, far beyond its role as guidance and inspiration for the
United Nations. Far beyond merely ambition, the Declaration is now
widely considered to be part of customary international law." As such
it is binding on all states,' and it continues to guide the development of

9. The four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter, included in the Joint Declaration
signed by Sir Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt were: freedom of speech,
freedom of worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear. The Atlantic Charter is
Reprinted by the Yale Law School's Avalon Project, at <http/www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/wwii/atlantic.htm> (visited July 6, 2000). Similar references were subsequently
incorporated into the so-called "Declaration of the United Nations" of January 1, 1942.
Joint Declaration of the United Nations, U.N.T.S. 1942 No.5 (Cmd. 6388).
This
Declaration was signed by the representatives of twenty-six countries, including the
United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China. Although there exists an
abundant literature on numerous aspects of the Universal Declaration, there is almost no
specific doctrine on the preamble. For further information on the aspects of drafting the
Universal Declaration, see, e.g., Rene Cassin: Quelques Souvenirs Sur la Declaration
Universelle de 1948, 15 REVUE DE DROIT CONTEMPORAIN 11-24 (1968); J. Humphrey, The
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 39-58 (Evan Luard ed. 1967), J. Humphrey, The
InternationalLaw of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT
STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 75-109 (M. Bos ed., 1973); J.
Humphrey: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and
Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION 21-37 (B.G. Ramcharan, ed., 1979); JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT (1999); HUMAN
RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS ON: AN APPRAISAL (Tony Evans ed. 1998); REFLECTIONS ON THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY
(Barend van der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Lie eds. 1998); THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND (Yael Danieli et al. eds. 1999);
10. See Universal Declaration, supra note 3, at pmbl., 8.
1L See, eg., Ian Brownlie, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 575 (5" ed.
1998).
12. Customary International Law is formed by the existence of both consistent and
widespread state practice and opinio juris. Where a principle is customary international
law it is binding on all nations except those who declare themselves persistent objectors to
the principle. Cf. North Seas Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. DenJNeth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
27 (Feb. 20).
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international human rights law, in practice as well as in aspiration.' 3

II. THE NATURE AND INFLUENCE OF THE PREAMBLE TO THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
A treaty's preamble aims at defining in general terms the parties'
purposes and the considerations that led them to agree. Likewise, the
preamble of the Universal Declaration explains why the drafters
proclaimed the list of rights that they did. 4 It is this explanation
wherein the drafters and the nations they represented came together to
express their intention and recognition that the Declaration would be
considered an expression of the past and future of international human
rights instruments. 5 Moreover, it was their intention that the rights
expressed in the Declaration would come to be seen not as a means to
peace but as a birthright."6
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a
legally binding treaty, rather a resolution adopted by the General
Assembly in the form of a declaration, this does not affect the nature of
its preamble. 7 Indeed, because the Declaration is not a treaty, but
rather customary international law, the preamble has greater
significance. The preamble has been interpreted into many of the
instruments whose use thereof constitutes the widespread practice
element of custom. Further, the preamble is an integral part of the
Declaration and defines what the original fifty-six States had in mind
when they adopted the Declaration, 8 and its words should be used as
13. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights in
National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L 187 (1995/6). Some authors
consider the Declaration's preamble and its provisions to be part ofjus cogens. See, e.g.,
W. P. Gormley: The Emerging Dimensions of Human Rights: Protection at the
Internationaland Regional Levels: The Common Standardof Mankind, 17 BANARAS L.J.
1-41 (1981).
14. MORSINK, supra note 9, at 313.
15. The second paragraph of the preamble of the Universal Declaration declares that,
... disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscious of mankind.., and freedom from want and fear has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration...." Universal Declaration, supra note 3, at pmbl.
(emphasis added). See also Morsink, supra note 14, at 319.
16. See Universal Declaration, supra note 3, at pmbl., 1 1; MORSINk, supra note 9, at
320.
17. On the formal distinction between the General Assembly resolution in the form of
a recommendation or a declaration see Use of the Terms Declarationand Recommendation
Memorandum by the Office of Legal Affairs, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610 (1962) (an early
United Nations Secretariat draft).
18. Forty-eight States voted in favor of the Declaration, with eight States abstaining.
Six of the eight abstentions were members of the Soviet Bloc. The eight abstaining States
were: the USSR, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Byelorussian SSR,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, South Africa and Saudi Arabia. Those nations did
not disagree with the notion of human rights, but felt that human rights in a socialist
state were integral with the State, since the government was in fact the collective
individual. These nations did not vote against the Declaration, but differed in how the
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evidence of these ideas and purposes in any interpretation of the
ensuing articles. 9 The influence of the Declaration's preamble thus
extends beyond the ordinary in that it serves as part of the positive
statement of international human rights law that is the whole of the
Declaration.
III. THE PREAMBLE OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The ideas expressed in the preamble of the United Nations Charter
anchored and inspired the drafting of the preamble of the Universal
Declaration. 20 The U.N. Charter itself contains seven specific references
to human rights.2 ' Article 13b, which entitles the General Assembly to
make recommendations in the field of human rights,' may even be
considered the cradle of the Declaration. By making the study and
promotion of international human rights and fundamental freedoms a
United Nations mandate, this Article laid the groundwork for the
fundamental tenet of the Declaration. Clearly, the drafters of the U.N.
Charter and then the Declaration saw the need for education to further
the common goal of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
In addition to helping lead the way to the Declaration's drafting,
the U.N. Charter's language was mirrored in the Declaration. For
example, The second preambular paragraph of the U.N. Charter reads,
"to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and
of nations large and small. .. ."2 The author of this paragraph, Field
Marshal Smuts, presented his draft to the San Francisco Conference in
a slightly different form. His proposal read, "To re-establish faith in
fundamental human rights, in the sanctity and ultimate value of
human personality, in the equal rights of men and women and of

rights should be expressed. See Official Records of the Third Session of the General
Assembly, Part I, 1948, 183' plenary meeting, at 929.
19. See Universal Declaration, supra note 3, at pmbl. (the Proclamation issued as the
last paragraph of the Preamble).
20. See Humphrey, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note

9, at 9-46.
21. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl., 1 2; art. 1,

3; arts. 13b, 55c; art. 62,

2, arts. 68, 76.

See also HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 424-28 (1950).

22. Article 13b states that,
[The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for

the purpose of] ... promoting international cooperation in the economic,
social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
U.N. CHARTER art. 13b.
23. U.N. Charter, 2' preambular para.; see Humphrey, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 41.
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Thus the spirit of his words remained

intact although the text of his proposal was changed.
The Rapporteur of Sub-Committee I on the preamble had the
following comment on the second preambular paragraph, "that faith in
fundamental human rights had actually never faded, but although it
was one of the most important factors which had moved men and
women in all lands to accept the sacrifices by which victory was
achieved, it needed reaffirmation in the U.N. Charter."' The U.N.
Charter's reaffirmation then became the Declaration's call to action.
In the Declaration's preamble, Field Marshal Smuts' proposal was
renewed and integrated into the final version. Although some words
were changed, in the text of the Declaration adopted on December 10,
1948, the gravaman of his proposal remained as the fifth preambular
paragraph. 26 The final version deleted a second reference to human
rights in the preamble, namely. "... by the establishment of conditions

under which justice and respect for the obligations of international law
and treaties and fundamental human right and freedoms can be
maintained...."2

The Coordination Committee proposed to substitute the word
"value" in the Smuts draft for "worth", indicating that "value" had an
economic connotation that was inappropriate with reference to human
beings.'
It is fortunate that no action was taken on the draft
amendment proposed by the Colombian delegation; because of its vague
formulation it could have opened anew the Pandora's box. It read, " ...
to declare that the international recognition and protection of the
essential rights of the individual is a necessary condition of peace, both
within States and in their relations with each other."'
IV. PROPOSALS FOR THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS OF THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION; INFLUENCE BEYOND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Influences on the Declaration were not limited to the U.N. Charter
24. Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations submitted by the South African
Delegation, UNCIO, Vol. III, p. 476, document 2, G/14 d(1) May 3, 1945.
25. Report of Rapporteur, Sub-Committee I//A (Farid Zeinneddine, Syria), UNCIO,
Vol. VI, doc. 785 [1/1/281 dated 5 June 1945, p. 359.

26. Therefore, this proposal is referred to as "The Smuts Preamble." See RUTH B.
RUSSEL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 912 (1958). See also Mr. Smuts'

observations in the Steering Committee, UNCIO, Vol. V, Doc. 1213, ST/23, 28 June 1945,
at 307.
27. Without the reference to human rights, this paragraph as revised became the
third preambular paragraph in the final version.
28. UNCIO, Vol. V, Doc. 1213, ST/23 dated 28 June 1945, p. 307. This reading
therefore superseded even the draft second preambular paragraph as approved by
Committee II/A. See UNCIO, Vol. VI, doc. WD 62 L1/A/18 dated 31 May 1945, p. 694 and
UNCIO, Vol. XVII, doc. WD 441 CO 205, dated 13 September 1945, p. 379.
29. UNCIO, Vol. III, doc. 26/14 (1) dated 6 May 1945, p. 587.
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and its drafters. Fifty-six nations participated in the Declaration's
drafting and coordination, and each nation contributed-although some
nations took a lead role. The French government in its comments on
the preambular paragraphs of the draft Declaration did the groundwork
and paved the way for the adoption of the final text in December,
1948.' Preambular paragraph 1 uses the words "whereas ignorance
and contempt for human rights are one of the root causes of human
suffering ...... ' This was the only draft where a negative connotation
comes first. In all the other drafts a positive statement preceded the
clause on disregard and contempt for human rights.32
The final draft of the first preambular paragraph was taken from
the American proposal, which read: "Whereas recognition of the
inherent dignity and the equal rights of all the persons is the
foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the world. " 33 Not all of the
proposals were included in the preamble, however. The proposal by the
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did not land in the
30. Commission on Human Rights, Third Session, Observations of Governments on
the Draft InternationalDeclarationof Human Rights, The Draft InternationalCovenant
on Human Rights and Methods of Application, Communication received from the French
Government. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4182/Add.8 (1948).
31. U.N. Charter pmbl., 1 3.
32. One of the noblest proposals for the first preambular paragraph came from the
late Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who wrote, "Whereas the enthronement of the rights
of man was proclaimed to be a major purpose of the struggle out of which the United
Nations was born...." Human Rights Committee, 'Human Rights, the Charter of the
United Nations, and the InternationalBill of the Rights of Man", PreliminaryReport by
Professor Hersch Lauterpacht. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/89, at 36 (1948). The Chinese
amendment to the Drafting Committee's text was akin to the final reading of the second
preambular paragraph. Compare the Report of the DraftingCommittee to the Commission
on Human Rights, at 5, U.N. Doc. EICN.4195, (1948) with China:Amendments to the Draft
InternationalDeclarationon Human Rights, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.41102 (1948) (the final
second preambular paragraph). The first draft preambular paragraph prepared by the
United Kingdom reading, "Whereas it is the purpose of the United Nations to achieve
international cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all .... " became the basis for the final version of the sixth
preambular paragraph of the Declaration. United Kingdom: Draft Preamble to the
International Declaration of Human Rights U.N. Doc. E/CN.41124 (1948). This was
mainly due to the serious work of the Sub-Committee on the Preamble of the Universal
Declaration on the amendments to draft preambular paragraphs 4 and 5. Report of the
Subcommittee consisting of the Representatives of Australia, China, Philippines, United
Kingdom and United States of America on Paragraphs4 and 5 of the Preample on the
Draft InternationalDeclaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/146 (1948). The
American Federation of Labour submitted that "international cooperation can be effective
for the peace of the world only when based on respect for the human person. Suggestion
for a Preamble to the Draft InternationalDeclarationon Human Rights (submitted by the
American Federationof Labor), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/129 (1948).
33. United States of America: Proposed Alternative for the Preamble of the Draft
InternationalDeclarationof Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/119 (1948). See also the
almost identical proposal of Lebanon, Lebanon: Suggested Preamble for the Draft
International Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. EICN.41132 (1948). The final
version was drafted by the Sub-Committee based on these ideas. See Preamble, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/138 (1948).
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preambular part of the Declaration. Rather, it became the so-called
"non-discrimination clause" of Article 2, substituting the words
"proclaimed by the Charter" for "set forth in this Declaration."'
Apart from drafts prepared by members of the Commission on
Human Rights, the United Nations Secretariat had an important input
into the final product. The first director of the Division of Human
Rights, the late professor John Humphrey, presented the final
Secretariat draft to a drafting committee on June 9, 1948. The drafting
committee was composed of representatives of the Commission on
Human Rights from Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the
United Kingdom, the USSR and chaired by Mrs. Roosevelt.3 A short
comparison between the Secretariat draft and the draft adopted by the
General Assembly shows the excellent work that can be done by the
United Nations in the field of human rights. If one compares the two
preamble drafts in their entirety there is a striking similarity in words.
In the final version a new fourth preambular paragraph was inserted,
which reads, "whereas it is essential to promote the development of
friendly relations between nations."36
The second preambular paragraph adopted by the General
Assembly specified the words "fundamental freedoms" of the Secretariat
draft, and reiterated the four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter.37 That
the "fundamental freedoms" were included is significant because their
inclusion demonstrates the inclusive nature of the Declaration.
Originally signed by Winston Churchill and President Franklin
Roosevelt, the four freedoms were reiterated by the twenty-six nations
that signed the Declaration of the United Nations on January 1, 1942.
Additionally, the last preambular paragraph appeared in the drafts
submitted by such diverse nations as the United Kingdom and
Lebanon, in the final Secretariat draft and in the version adopted by
the Third Committee in the General Assembly. 39 The drafting Sub34. Union of Socialist Soviet Republics: Draft Preamble to the International
Declarationof Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/139 (1948).
35. See Humphrey, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
9, at 48. See also, HUM. RTS. BULL., (U.N. Ctr. for Hum. Rts,), 1986, at 18-26 (an erudite
article by Charles Malik on the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
a publication issued by the United Nations Centre for Human Rights). The Secretariat
draft is contained in Draft Report of the Commission on Human Rights to the Economic
and Social Council, U.N. Doc. ECN.41148/Add.1 (1948).
36. The clause "development of friendly relations among the nations" appeared in the
second preambular paragraph of the USSR draft, supra note 34.
37. The four freedoms were also contained in the third preambular paragraph of the
draft submitted by the American Federation of Labor, supra note 32
38. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
39. See United Kingdom Draft, supra note 32; Lebanon's Suggestion, supra note 33;
Final SecretariatDraft in Annex A; Draft Declaration of Human Rights (Annex to the
Draft Report of the Commission of Human Rights to the GeneralAssembly and Secretary
Counsel), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/148/Add.1 (1948); Draft InternationalDeclarationof Human
Rights, Report of the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
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Committee on the preamble left several alternatives, proposing,
"Whereas a definition (common understanding) of these rights and
freedoms is necessary (of the greatest importance) for the fulfillment of
this pledge."'
This consideration of diverse draft submission further
indicates the democratic nature of the drafting process.
The operative clause of the preamble expressis verbis states that
every individual and every organ in society "shall strive by teaching and
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms." 1 The
proclamation that the Universal Declaration is a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and nations also bears witness of the
democratic nature of the Universal Declaration. By comparison to
another evolving democratic system, the philosophy of the Universal
Declaration is inimical to the "separate but equal" doctrine that was
shattered by operation of democracy in the United States. In retrospect
one may be proud that the United Nations Human Rights Programme
in fifty years did so much to achieve this common standard, given the
incredible divergence of viewpoints regarding human rights worldwide.
Indeed, despite the progress the Declaration has compelled, there still
are very challenging tasks ahead. Paraphrasing the wise words of Mrs.
Roosevelt, we should never overestimate the efforts of the forces of
reaction."2
V.

THE IMPACT OF THE PREAMBLE OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON
THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAMME

This article is not the appropriate place to dwell on all aspects of
the impact of the preamble on the United Nations Human Rights
I would nevertheless like to offer some trends and
Programme.'
developments in international law that have been directly inspired and
influenced by the Declaration.
First and foremost, the International Covenants on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, and on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in
1966 and in force since 1976, breathed the spirit of the Universal
40. Report of the DraftingSub-Committee on the 6' Paragraphof the Preambleof the
Draft Declarationon Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.41152 (1948).
41. Universal Declaration, supra note 3, at pmbl.
42. The American draft referred to "the obligation" of the United Nations to promote
universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, a clause that does not
appear in any of the other drafts, nor in the final text. United States of America: Proposed
Alternative for the Preamble of the Draft International Declaration on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/119 (1948). The final text of the operative clause was inspired by a
Philippine amendment. See PhilippineAmendment to OperativeClause ofPreamble, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.41143 (1948).
43. A very useful survey may be found in the publication United NationsAction in the
Field of Human Rights, STIHR/2Rev.4, (Centre for Human Rights Geneva), Sales No.
E.94.XIV.II. See also, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights website,
at http://www.unhchr.ch
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Declaration."
They also recognize directly in their preambular
paragraphs the pivotal role the Universal Declaration plays as a bridge
between the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter and the
provisions in the two Covenants.* The Universal Declaration is even of
more paramount importance in those countries not yet party to the
Covenants.
The importance of the Declaration to those countries not party to
the Covenants is due to the influence it has had with related
international instruments that have broader acceptance than the two
Covenants. Influence of the second preambular paragraph may be
found in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 4 which was adopted by the General Assembly one
day before the Universal Declaration. The Draft Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance 47 submitted to the
General Assembly in 1967 led to the adoption of a Declaration on the
Elimination of All forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief." The influence of the Declaration is thus expanded
by its inclusion into instruments beyond the Covenants. Indeed, each
44. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCRI; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
45. The Preamble to the ICESCR recognizes, in paragraph three, "that in accordance
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of human beings enjoying
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and
political rights." ICESCR, supra note 44, at pmbl. The fourth paragraph then considers
"the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal
respect for, and observance of human rights and freedoms." Id. at pmbl., 4. Similarly,
the Preamble to the ICCPR recognizes, in paragraph three, "that in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are
created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic,
social and cultural rights." ICCPR, supra note 44, at pmbl. The fourth paragraph then
considers "the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote
universal respect for, and observance of human rights and freedoms." Id. at pmbl., 1 4.
46. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12,1951). See also the second and seventh
preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M.
1002 (1998).
47. See Discussionsof Draft Declarationon the Eliminationof all Forms of Religious
Intolerance, U.N. ESCOR 39' Sess., Supp. No. 8, U.N. Doc. E/4024, E/CN.4/891 (1965);
Draft Declarationon the Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance:Report of the
Secretary General[replies received from governments],U.N. Doc. A/9134 (1973).
48. Declaration on the Elimination of All forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, Nov. 25, 1981, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 GAOR Supp. No. 51, at
171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982). This Declaration states in the second paragraph of its
preamble that "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Human Rights proclaim the principles of non-discrimination and equality
before the law and the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief...." Id.
at pmbl., 1 2.
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preambular paragraph is represented in some way in a great number of
international human rights instruments. Considering that Article 1 of
the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid defines apartheid as a crime against
humanity,49 one could validly see the influence of the second
preambular paragraph.
As far as the third preambular paragraph is concerned we could
refer to the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery
the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery,' and
to the work being undertaken by a working group of the Sub
Commission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery."
The International Convention
Against the Use of Mercenaries, 5 2 adopted by the General Assembly,
could be considered an important step in persuading mankind not to
resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, a central tenet of the
third preambular paragraph.
The fourth preambular paragraph on the need to promote the
development of friendly relations between nations as a means to protect
and promote human rights was incorporated by the international
community into the Declaration of Principles on Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States on October 24, 1970. Its incorporation
49. "The States Parties to the Present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime
against humanity... ." International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244, at art. 1 (entered into
force July 18, 1976). The Convention also considers in its second Preambular paragraph
"the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that all persons are born free
and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color
or national origin...." Id. at pmbl., 1 2.
50. "Consideringthat the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, states that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude and that
slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms...." Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, at pmbl., 1 3 (entered into force Apr. 30,
1957) (entered into force for the U.S. Dec. 6, 1967).
51. See Report of the Working Group to the 4e Session of the Sub-Commission on
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1993/45, at sec.
I(A)(I) (1993) (The Report on the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery is
reprinted at University of Minnesota Human Rights Library Web Page at
<http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/demo/1993min .html>. Note that the 1999 session of
ECOSOC, at the recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights, the title The SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities was changed to
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. For resolutions,
reports, decisions & chairperson's statements of the Sub-commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, please visit the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights' document web page at <httpj/www.unhchr.ch/huridocs.nsf/FramePage/
External?OpenDocument> (visited July 6, 2000).
52. InternationalConvention Against Recruitment, Use, Financing and Trainingof
Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34, Annex (1989).
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marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations."
The second preambular paragraph of the U.N. Charter became the
first part of the fifth preambular paragraph in the Declaration, as
discussed earlier. These paragraphs can be said to have catapulted
human rights work on the prohibition of discrimination. For example,
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination of 1965" and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination Against Women' adopted by the
General Assembly on December 18, 1979 both emphasize the crucial
importance of the dignity and worth of the human person. The
Declaration on Social Progress and Development adopted in 1969" and
the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and
Malnutrition in 197457 are additional examples of expanding the ideas
contained in the latter part of the fifth preambular paragraph.
The sixth preambular paragraph breathes very much the same
spirit as its predecessor, going a step further to call for cooperation to
achieve universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. This pledge constitutes a conditio sine qua non
for an effective promotion of universal respect for the observation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Cooperation became one of
the cardinal principles of inter-governmental relations in the second
quarter of the United Nations' existence as underscored by the 1970
Declaration of Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. s
Another pertinent example of the Declaration's influence is the
Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.59 The last paragraph of Section
VII of the Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
including the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief,
appeals to the participating States to act in conformity with the

53. GA. Res. 2625(XXV) (1970). See G. Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the
General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declarationof Principles on Friendly
Relations, in COLLECTED COURSES, HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 134-II, 419742 (1972).
54. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
55. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1980).
56. Declarationon Social Progressand Development, G.A. Res. 2542 (XXIV) (1969).
57. "The grave food crisis that is afflicting the peoples of the developing countries
where most of the world's hungry and ill-nourished live... actually jeopardizes the most
fundamental principles and values associated with the right to life and human dignity as
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...." UniversalDeclarationon
the Eradicationof Malnutrition and Hunger, Nov. 16, 1974, G.A. Res. 3180 (XXVIII), at
pmbl., 1 1 (1974); endorsed by G.A. Res. 3348 (XXIX) (1974).
58. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
59. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, 1975, 14 I.L.M.
1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Conference].
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principles of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration.' Even
more explicit is section IX on Co-operation among States to strive for,
interalia, international peace, security and justice.61
VI. THE IMPACT OF THE PREAMBLE BEYOND THE UNITED NATIONS
The ideals expressed in the Universal Declaration are not apparent
solely in United Nations-sponsored multilateral instruments. They
have had a profound impact on regional organizations as well. The
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the
Ninth International Conference of American States in Bogota in May
1948,6 although preceding the Universal Declaration, in its preamble
thoroughly reflects the ideas and principles of the Declaration.6
Since the Declaration was adopted, many regional instruments rely
specifically on the preamble's words for direction. For example, the
American Convention on Human Rights adopted on May 22, 1969,6

60. The final paragraph of Section VII of the Helsinki Conference reads, in pertinent
part, "[iun the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States
will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Id. § VII.
61. Paragraph two of Section IX of the Helsinki Conference reads, in pertinent part,
"[The participating States] will endeavor, in developing their co-operation as equals, to
promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighborly relations
among themselves, international peace, security and justice." Id. § IX.
62. American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948f, Res. XXX
Final Act, Ninth Int'l Conference of American States, BogotA, Colombia, March 30-May 2,
1948, at 38, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/v/II.23/Doc.21/Rev.6; reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L.
See also, United Nations: Human Rights: A Compilation of
Supp, 127 (1948).
InternationalInstruments, v. II, Regional Instruments, at 5-13, U.N. Doc. STIHR/Rev.5
(Vol. II), 1997.
63. See H. Gros Espfell, Le Syst~me Interamericain comme Rggime regional de
Protection Internationaledes Droits de l'Homme, COLLECTED COURSES, HAGUE ACADEMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 145, 1-56 (1975-I).
64. American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The third, fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs state as
follows:
"Recognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived from one's
being a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the
human personality, and that they therefore justify international protection
in the form of a convention reinforcing or complementing the protection
provided by the domestic law of the American states,
Considering that these principles have been set forth in the Charter of the
Organization of American States, in the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
that they have been reaffirmed and refined in other international
instruments, worldwide as well as regional in scope,
Reiterating that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ideal of free men enjoying freedom from fear and want can be
achieved only if conductions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his
economic and social rights, as well as his civil and political rights...."
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refers in its preambular paragraphs twice to the Universal Declaration.
It is beyond any doubt that this Convention was adopted to cover the
American region; however, although regional in application, the
Convention is universal in its setting."
The Declaration's influence is not limited to the Western regions
most active in the promotion of human rights today. The Banjul
Charter on Human and People's Rights ' demonstrates the African
peoples' recognition of the Declaration's importance. In the Banjul
Charter's third preambular paragraph, due regard is given to the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights with an aim to enhance international cooperation.' The Protocol
to establish an African Court on Human Rights ' is a further proof of
this trend. Finally, The Arab Charter on Human Rights approved by
the League of Arab States on September 15, 1994,69 reaffirms in its
penultimate paragraph, inter alia, the principles of the United Nations'
Charter and the Universal Declaration.
And the Kuala Lumpur
Declaration on Human Rights 0 approved by the Second Plenary Session
of the 14'h General Assembly of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary
Organization in October 1993, states that "the peoples of ASEAN
reaffirm the observance of the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights Charter."7
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration, the decolonization
process gave birth to a great number of new independent countries.
65. See, e.g. Th. Burguenthal, The Revised OAS Charterand the Protectionof Human
Rights, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 828-36 (1975).

66. Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
Jan. 19, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB.LEG/67/3/rev.5 (entered into force Oct. 27, 1986),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1981).
67. The second and third preambular paragraphs of the Banjul Charter state:
Considerin the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which
stipulates that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives
for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples;
Reaffirming the pledge they solemnly made in Article 2 of the said Charter
to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to coordinate and intensify
their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa
and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Banjul Charter, supra note 70, at pmbl., II 2-3.
68. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Dec. 12-13, 1997,
O.A.U. LEG/EXP/AFCHPRIPROT(iii), reprinted in 9 AFR. J. INT'L &CoMP. L. 953 (1997).
69. Reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE: CASES,
TREATIES, AND MATERIALS (Francisco Forrest Martin et. al., eds. 1997).
70.Human Rights Declaration by the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO),
14' AIPO General Assembly, Kuala Lampur, reprinted in Aurther M. Weisburd, The
Effect of Treaties and Other InternationalActs on the Customary Law of Human Rights,
25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 142 (1995-96) [hereinafter Kuala Lampur Declaration].
See
also
Working
Group
for
an
ASEAN
Human
Rights
Mechanism<http:www.rgmechanism.conaipo.html> (visited May 3, 2000).
71. See Kuala Lampur Declaration, supra note 70, at pmbl., 1 7.
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This process was accelerated by the adoption of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960.72
These new governments were eager to adhere, in their constitutions, to
the lofty principles enshrined in the preamble of the Universal
Declaration. In their comments on the draft International Declaration
of Human Rights, many governments indicated that they considered
themselves bound by the principles enunciated in the preamble and
they were ready to adopt them in their respective national legislation. 3
Thus, those laws that affect humans most directly are influenced by the
Declaration and the education called for in its preamble.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
If the Declaration is now part of positive international law and
therefore binding on all States, it is not because the Declaration was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, but because of the
emergence of a consensus evidenced by the practice of States that the
Declaration is now binding as a part of international law whatever the
intentions of the authors may have been in 1948. 7
In 1968 we celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration with the Teheran Proclamation on Human Rights.75 In
1993, The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights adopted a
Declaration,76 which emphasized that the Universal Declaration
constitutes a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations, and a source of inspiration for advancing the Human Rights
Programme of the United Nations.77
72. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A.Res. 1514 (XV) (1960). Operative paragraph 7 of this document states that "[alli
States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations, [and] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the basis of equality, noninterference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all
peoples and their territorial integrity." Id. at decl. 7.
73. See, e.g. Collation of the Comments of the Governments of Canada,Netherlands,
Australia, United States, Mexico, Brazil, United Kingdom, South Africa, Egypt and
Norway, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/85 (1948); Comments from Governments on the Draft
Declarationon Human Rights, Draft International Covenant on Human Rights and the
Question of Implementation, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/82, Add.1-12 (1948) (individual comments
from governments).
74. Cf. Juan Carrillo Salcedo, Human Rights, Universal Declaration (1948), in

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW II, 922-925 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1995).
75. Teheran Proclamation on Human Rights in the Final Act of the International
Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. No. A/conf.32/41, U.N. Sales No. E.68.XIV.2

(1968).
76. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (1993). See also United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights Home Page (visited May 3, 2000) <http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda.nsg>.
77. For information regarding the United Nations Human Rights Program, see
generally United Nations High Commissionerfor Human Rights Home Page (visited May
3, 2000) <httpJ/www.unhchr.ch/>.
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In 1998, we celebrated the 50I anniversary of the Universal
Declaration with a wide variety of educational activities. As academics
we should be guided by the provisions of the Universal Declaration,
including its preamble, as a beacon of light shining over our educational
path; providing a better understanding of the whole human rights
panacea for future generations in the twenty-first century.
The United Nations issued a teaching booklet "ABC, Teaching
Human Rights"78 aimed at the roots of our educational system namely
providing practical activities for primary and secondary schools. The
United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education 79 proclaimed for
the period 1995-2004 not only provides for primary and secondary
school activities, but makes also room for "teaching the teacher"
activities.8"
It is my firm belief that the jurisprudence of international tribunals
can be a valid teaching tool in this respect and I hope to submit an
article with some proposals in this regard in the near future to this
Journal."'

78. A full text of the teaching booklet may be found on the United Nations High
Commissioner for
Human Rights Home Page (visited
May
3,
2000)
<http://www.unhchr.ch/htm menu6/2/abc.htm>.
79. U.N.Decade for Human Rights Education, G.A.Res. 1994/184, U.N. Doc.
A/49/610/Add.2 (1995).

80. The Declaration "[ukrge governmental and non-governmental educational
agencies to intensify their efforts to establish and implement programmes of human
rights education, as recommended in the Plan of Action, in particular by preparing and
implementing national plans for human rights education...." Id. at art. 6.
81. JOHANNES vAN AGGELEN,
TEACHING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, A GUIDE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
DECADE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION (forthcoming).

ISLAMIC LAW ACROSS CULTURAL
BORDERS: THE INVOLVEMENT OF
WESTERN NATIONALS IN SAUDI MURDER

TRIALS
HOSSEIN ESMAEILI AND JEREMY GANS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On 11 December 1996, a 51-year-old Australian nurse, Yvonne Gilford was found dead in her room in the King Fahd Military Medical
Complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.! Within days, two British nurses,
Deborah Parry and Lucille McLauchlin, were detained by Saudi authorities and later tried and convicted for Gilford's murder.2 These incidents spawned a familiar tale of international diplomacy: two governments, facing conflicting domestic pressures when the nationals of
one country are subjected to the laws of another, solve their problem at
the executive level once the criminal justice system proceeds to the punitive stage. This culminated in the release of both nurses and their
deportation to Britain on May 19 1998. s
However, the outcome of the Gilford trial also turned on an unusual
legal circumstance: the eventual resolution was dependant on a decision
by a citizen of a third country, Frank Gilford, a resident of Australia,
whose only connection to the events was that he was the victim's
* Dr. Hossein Esmaeili, LL.B (Tehran), M.A. (UTMtehran), LL.M, PhD (New
South Wales), is an Associate Lecturer in Law, School of Law, University of New England,
Australia. Jeremy Gans, B.Sc, LL.B (Hons) (Australian National University), PhD (New
South Wales), M.A. (Criminology) (Toronto), is a lecturer in criminal, procedural and constituional law at the Faculty of Law, University of New south Wales, Australia.
1. Trudy Harris, Envoy Investigates Nurse's Murder,AUSTRALIAN (Sydney), Dec. 16,
1996, at 2.
2. Des Burkinshaw, British Nurses Held Over Saudi Hospital Murder, TIMES (London), Dec. 23, 1996, at 1; Bill Frost et al., Nurses Could Face Public Execution, TIMES
(London), Dec. 24, 1996; Roger Maynard et al., Nurse's Killers Should be Beheaded, TIMES
(London), Dec. 26, 1996, at 1; Michael Theodoulou & Joanna Bale, Saudi Judges Urges
'Blood Money' Deal for Nurses, TIMES (London), May 26, 1997, at 1; Michael Theodoulou
et al., British Nurse Sentenced to 500 Lashes, TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 1997, at 1; Jojo
Moyes, King Fahd's Dilemma: Islamic Justice Verses Western Values, INDEP. (London),
Sept. 24, 1997, at 1.
3. Peter Foster & Annie Flury, Saudi King's PardonFrees Murder Nurses, TIMES
(London), May 20, 1998, at 1. Steve Boggan & Paul McCann, Nurses Fly in to 'Blood
Money'Row, INDEP. (London), May 21, 1998, at 1.
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brother. In a country where the death penalty had long been abolished,
Gilford was involuntarily required to exercise the power of life or death
over a British citizen. A further step in the nurses' release involved the
movement of $A 1.7 million ($US 1.3 million) between a number of
other non-Saudis.
In this article, we examine the Saudi law of murder and the way in
which non-Saudis can become involved in the punishment stage of a
criminal trial. The significance of these principles extends beyond the
facts of the Gilford trial and the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, because
they arise from general features of Islamic law, the world's third legal
system after common and civil law. The Gilford trial demonstrates a
number of ways in which Islamic law can affect foreigners, including
non-Muslims who have no connection to any Islamic nation." There are
now more than six million foreigners, including tens of thousand of
Westerners, living in Saudi Arabia. A consideration of the plight of the
non-Muslims drawn into the Gilford trial suggests that the potential for
Islamic law to operate across national and cultural borders is problematic.
We will begin by briefly setting out the salient aspects of the Saudi
criminal justice system. Then, we will consider the issues that governed the convictions of McLauchlan and Parry and discuss Islam's
unique provisions for the punishment of convicted murderers. Finally,
we will assess the cross-cultural operation of Islamic criminal justice
and suggest a preferred approach.
II.
A.

THE

SAUDI CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The Saudi Legal System
Article 1 of the Saudi Nizam Al-Assasy (Basic Law of Government)5

4. That the circumstances discussed in this article are not unique to the Gilfords,
Saudi Arabia or ex-patriot employees of a foreign of a foreign government is demonstrated
by a report of an incident in 1998. An Italian citizen, Maria Pepe Calo, has been asked by
the Taliban to send a close male relative to behead two Punjabis convicted of killing the
woman's husband, who was serving as a United Nations peacekeeper in Kabul. Jason
Burke Peshawar & Philip Willan Rome, Agony for Widow as Taliban Asks if Killers
Should Die, OBSERVER, Oct. 25, 1998. Calo's reaction to the request was to say, "We do
not want revenge, but justice. And we are not ready to forgive, I'd like to see them dead.
But I wouldn't have the courage to give the order to take their lives." Id. The law applied
in this instance is likely to be slightly different to that discussed in this article, because
Afghanistan follows the Hanafi, rather than the Hanbali, school of jurisprudence.
5. The NIZAM AL-ASSASY was enacted by a Royal Decree on March 1 1992. See
Rashed Aba-Namay, The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia, 42 INTL. &
COMP. L. Q. 295, 303-04 (1993) [hereinafter Aba-Namay]; GEORGE N. SFEIR,
MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES 165-74 (1998); Ahmed A. Al-Ghadyan, The
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declares that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab Islamic state
with the Quran, the holiest text of Islam, and the Sunna, the sayings
and practice of the Prophet, as its constitution.6 By Western standards,
Saudi Arabia is a non-constitutional monarchy. The Majils AI-Shura
(consultative council),7 the closest Saudi equivalent to a parliament, is
limited to expressing opinions on general policy matters, such as the interpretation of laws.8 The traditional subjects of law, such as family
law, inheritance, trusts, contract and criminal law are exclusively defined by the Sharia (traditional Islamic law). All other matters, including modern legal subjects such as corporations and broadcasting law,
are regulated by royal decrees.!
The Islamic legal system differs from both common law and civil
law in that it is based on divine revelation and is neither subject to development through a hierarchy of judicial decisions nor developed primarily by written law."0 Although it is based in principle on set texts, it
is nonetheless a detailed juristic system, which has developed over the
centuries through the work of Muslim jurists.'" The main sources of Islamic law are the Quran, the Sunna (sayings and practice of the
Prophet), the Ijma (consensus of Muslim jurists) and the Qiyas (juristic
analogy).' Although the Quran is considered the most important source

Judiciaryin Saudi Arabia,13 ARAB L. Q. 235-51 (1998).
6. International Constitutional Law's English translation of the NIZAM AL-ASSASY
[IRAN CONST.] is, reprintedin (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <httpJ/www.uniwuerzburg.delaw/saOOOO0.html> [hereinafter NIZAM AL-ASSASY 1.
7. The Majils A1-Shura is provided for in Article 68 of the NIZAM AL-ASSASY. International Constitutional Law's English translations of the various statutes concerning the
Majils Al-Shura, enacted by royal decree simultaneously with the NIZAM AL-ASSASY. Id.
See also Aba-Namay, supra note 5, at 303.
8. Article 15 of the CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ESTABLISHMENT ACT provides:
The Shura Council will express opinions on the general policy of the state, which will be
referred to it by the Council of Ministers. In particular, it can do the following- (a) Discuss
the general plan of economic and social development. (b) Study international laws, charters, treaties and agreements, and concessions and make appropriate suggestions regarding them; (c) Interpret laws; (d) Discuss annual reports submitted by ministries and other
government bodies, and make appropriate suggestions regarding them.
See CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ESTABLISHMENT ACT (visited Feb. 11, 2000) <http://www.uniwuerzburg.de/law/sa01000.html>.
9. Article 48 of the NIZAM AL-ASSASY states, "The courts will apply the rules of the
Islamic Shari'ah in the cases that are brought before them, in accordance with what is
indicated in the Book and the Sunnah, and statutes decreed by the Ruler which do not
contradict the Book or the Sunnah." See NIZAM AL-ASSASY, supra note 6.
10. RENE DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 456 (John E. C. Brierley trans., Stevens & Sons, 3rd ed. 1985).
11. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 5 (1964); C. G.
WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 46 (1988)
[hereinafter WEERAMANTRY].
12. See generally Farooq Hassan, The Sources of Islamic Law, 76 PROC. OF ANNUAL
MEETING - AM. SOC. OF INT'L L. 65 (1982). Supplementary sources of Islamic Law include
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of law, fewer than 100 of its roughly 6300 verses deal with legal issues
(in the Western sense) such as family and criminal law. The bulk of its
prescriptions concern Islamic rules such as prayer and fasting, and subjects such as theology, morality and history.
Islamic law is applicable, at least in part, in fifty-three Muslim
countries and a number of non-Muslim countries such as India."3 However, few countries apply traditional Islamic criminal law. Of those that
do, two, Iran and Sudan, have systems that are blended with the civil or
common law systems. Saudi Arabia is unique in that it has applied Islamic criminal law in its traditional form since then advent of Islam.14
Modern Islam and, hence, its legal system is not monolithic. Saudi
Arabians, together with nearly ninety% of Muslims, are Sunnis; the
remainder are Shia, notably the majority of Iranians. 5 Within Sunni
Islam, there are four jurisprudential schools: the Hanafi, the Shafe'i,
the Maliki and the Hanbali.6 Saudi Arabia follows the least popular of
these schools, the Hanbali." Saudi judges must refer first of all to six
Istihsan (equity), Maslaha Mursalah (consideration of public interest) and Urf (custom
and usage). See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
chs. 12-14 (1991).
13. For the role of Islamic law in India, see M. HIDAYATULLAH & ARSHAD
HIDAYATULLAH, MULLA'S PRINCIPLES OF MAHOMEDAN LAw (19th ed. 1990); DAVID PEARL
& WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW (3rd ed. 1998).
14. In light of these unique circumstance, it has been noted that Saudi Arabia has,
according to some claims, one of the world's lowest crime rates. See Sam S. Souryal, The
Role of Sharia Law in DeterringCriminality in Saudi Arabia, 12 INT'L J. COMP. & APP.
CRIM. JUSTICE 1 (1988); Badr-El-Din Ali, Islamic Law and Crime: The Case of SaudiArabia, 9 INT'L J. COMP. & APP. CRIM. JUSTICE 45 (1985); FREDA ADLER, NATIONS NOT
OBSESSED WITH CRIMES ch. 9 (1983).
15. Shia Muslims are also a majority in Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain. See YANN
RICHARD, SHI'ITE ISLAM, POLICY, IDEOLOGY AND CREED 2-5 (A. Nevill trans., Blackwell,
1995).
16. See generally CHRISTOPHER MELCHERT, THE FORMATION OF THE SUNNI SCHOOLS
OF LAW, 9TH-10TH CENTURIES C.E (1997); Daura Bello, A Brief Account of the Development of the Four Sunni Schools of Law, and Some Recent Developments, 2 J. ISLAMIC &
COMP. L. 1 (1968) [hereinafter Bello]; George Makdisi, The Significance of the Sunni
Schools of Law in Islamic Religious History, 10 INT'L. J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 1 (1979); A.
M. Haj Nour, The Schools of Law: Their Emergence and Validity Today, 7 J. ISLAMIC &
COMP. L. 54 (1977); George Makdisi, HanabaliteIslam, in STUDIES ON ISLAM 216 (M.
Swartz ed., 1981); Abdurrahman A. Doi, The Muwatta of Imam Malik on the Genesis of
the Shari'a Law: A Western Scholar's Confusion, 4 HAMDARD ISLAMICUS 27 (1981); SEYED
MOHAMMAD HOSSEIN TABATABA'I, SHI'ITE ISLAM (Seyed Hossein Nassr trans., 1975).
17. SOBHI MAHMASSANI, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM, 32 (Farhat J.
Ziadeh trans., 1961) [hereinafter MAHMASSANII; Bello, supra note 16, at 1. The legal system of Saudi Arabia is also guided by the principles of the Wahhabi doctrine, which calls
for a return to The Quran and the Sunna as the exclusive sources of law (although some
other sources can be used where the Quran and Sunna are silent). Id. The Wahhabi doctrine does not recognize non-textual sources of law such as Qiyas and strongly rejects any
innovation in Islam. Id. The Wahhabi movement emerged from the Hanbali School and
was influenced by the Hanbalijurist, Ibn Taymiyya. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE OXFORD
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prescribed Hanbali jurisprudence texts."8 Then, if those texts do not
provide adequate guidance, they may refer to other Hanbali texts and
to the other schools. 19
B.

The Saudi CriminalCourts

The organisation of courts in Saudi Arabia was established by a
1927 royal decree and is administered by the Saudi Ministry of Justice. 20 Murder trials are initially the province of the general courts,
which have jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters except for
minor matters. In cases involving the death penalty, stoning or amputation, the court consists of a three-judge panel. 21 The trial of Parry and
McLaughlin was commenced in the general court in A1-Khobar.
The 1927 royal decree also created appeals courts, which hear appeals from general courts. At the apex of the Saudi court system is a
further body, the Supreme Judicial Council, which, amongst other matters, reviews all penalties involving death or amputation.n If the Council confirms the lower court's verdict, then the case is submitted to the
King for his endorsement as the King is Saudi Arabia's supreme judicial
authority.n For reasons to be discussed below, in capital murder trials
the courts only review the determination of guilt or innocence; no government body, including the King, has authority to commute a death
sentence in a murder trial.
Traditional Islamic law provides for a very simple criminal proceENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD 307-08 (1995); MAHMASSANI, supra note
17, at 32-33. See also AYMAN AL-YASsINI, RELIGION AND STATE IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI
ARABIA (1985); MUHAMMAD ASsAD, THE ROAD TO MECCA (1954); H. ARMSTRONG, LORD OF
ARABIA: IBN SAUD (1934).
18. Six Hanbali texts, including Ibn Qudamah's Al-Mughni [The Enrichment] were
made mandatory for courts by a 1928 resolution of Saudi Arabia's Supreme Judicial
Council. See S. H. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 312-13 (1985) [hereinafter AMIN).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 319; MOHAMED M.J. NADER, ASPECTS OF SAUDI ARABIAN LAW 3 (1990) (Article 71 of the SAUDI JUDICATURE LAW provides that "without prejudice to the neutrality of
the judiciary and independence of judges, the Minister of Justice shall have the right of
supervision over all courts and judges.")
21. AMIN, supra note 18, at 320.
22. NADER, supra note 20; Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Hewesh, Sharia Penalties and
Ways of Their Implementation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in THE EFFECT OF
ISLAMIC LEGISLATION ON CRIME PREVENTION IN SAUDI ARABIA: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS
351, 376 (1980) [hereinafter Al-Hewesh].
23. Article 44 of the NIZAM AL-ASSASY declares that the King is the point of reference
for the executive, regulatory and judicial authorities. NIZAM AL-ASSASY, supra note 6.

There is no separation of powers under Islamic law. However, Art. 46 of the NIZAM ALASSASY states that: "The judiciary is an independent authority. There is no control over
judges in the dispensation of their judgements except in the case of the Islamic Shari'ah."
Id.
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dure. There is no jury system. There is no prosecutor, in the common
law sense.2' Instead judges conduct the investigation, the examination
and, finally, issue the verdict. The Sharia sets down the qualifications
of judges.'
Legal representation for defendants is neither required nor prohibited under the Sharia. However, the Sharia generally entitles individuals and legal entities to a wakil (representative), who may be a lawyer.26
It appears that Parry and McLaughlin are the first defendants in Saudi
legal history to be defended in court by a lawyer.' Not surprisingly, the
defendants' lawyer, Salah A1-Hejailan, had a much more limited role
than his counterparts in Western trials. For instance, he complained to
the Western press that he was not permitted to present the court with
any evidence collected by the defence.'
Islamic law provides for open trials and, ordinarily, Saudi criminal
trials are public.2 However, the trial of Parry and McLaughlin was
closed and the proceedings before the appeal court were so secretive
that the court's verdict, if there was one, remains unknown. It seems
likely that the court closed the proceedings to protect public morals and
individual privacy which, under Islam, would be offended by the disclosure of sexual matters, such as the alleged lesbian relationship that was
offered as a motive for the murder.' The media and, indeed, ourselves,
when writing this article, have been forced to rely exclusively on the
24. In Iran, which also applies Islamic criminal law, the separation of the roles of
prosecutor and judge was considered consistent with Islamic law until 1994, when it was
abrogated by the 1994 Law For the Formationof the Revolutionary and Public Courts,
ROOZNAMA RASMI JOMHOORI ISLAMI IRAN [THE OFFICIAL GAZET=E OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] No. 14383, July 25, 1994. The abrogation of this approach and the
transferal of the prosecutor's role to the judge is a matter of current controversy in Iran
and possible law reform, as a result of the public attention given to the trial of the Mayor

of Tehran under the post-1994 law. See Pishnehad Mo'awen Egra'i Qovva Qadhaiya
Bara'ye Rafe Naqa'es Qanoon Dadgaha'yeAam [The Proposalof the Executive Deputy of
the Judiciary to Reform the Law of Public Courts], HAMSHAHRI (Tehran), Oct. 4, 1998, at
2.
25. A Qadhi (judge) has to be a Muslim, mature, sane and just person who has a
sound knowledge of Islamic Sharia.According to majority of traditional Muslim scholars,
a judge has to be male. However, Imam Abu-Hanifa permits judgments by women in matters related to property. AI-Tabary permits a female to be a judge in all courts and in all
legal matters. See 2 SEYED SABIQ, FIQ AL-SUNNI [THE SUNNI JURISPRUDENCE] 224 (1981)
thereinafter SABIQI; Joseph Schacht, Law and Justice, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
ISLAM 539-68 (P. Holt et al. eds., 1970).
26. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 11, at 77; NADER, supra note 20, at 14.
27. Wealthy Lawyer is Key Player in Trial, TIMES (London), Sept. 25, 1997, at 5;
Kathy Evans, In the Shadow of Chop Square, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 17, 1997, at 23.
28. Evans, supra,note 27, at 23.
29. SYED ABULALA MAWDUDI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM 26 (1980).
30. The Quran 24:19 (" Those who love to see sexual scandal circulate among the believers will have a grievous chastisement in this life and in the hereafter"); See also The
Quran 4:148; 24:4; 24:23. Cf NIZAM AL-ASSASY, supra note 6, at art. 163.
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statements of the defendants themselves, their lawyer and the Saudi
ambassador in London for details of the trial. There is no public record
where these assertions can be verified.3'
During the murder investigation, the trial and its aftermath, much
Western media attention was focussed on the rights of the accused under Saudi law in comparison to common law trials.32 The Islamic concept of human rights differs philosophically from its Western counterpart.." Nonetheless, Islamic law does provide for some of the procedural
safeguards familiar in Western trials: the presumption of innocence,34 a
high standard of proof in criminal matters,
a right to crossexamination and a right to appeal." Additionally, under Saudi law,
compelled confessions are forbidden and accused persons have a right
31. The only official Saudi document published on the matter is a press release consisting of two short paragraphs from the office of the Saudi Ambassador in London dated
May 19, 1998:
In response to a petition from the family of the two British persons convicted of murder in
Saudi Arabia the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, issued
an order commuting the sentence of the two nurses to the period they have already spent
in jail and ordering their release. According to the judicial laws of Saudi Arabia, when
the next of kin in a murder case waives the right to retribution, the Court can impose a
discretionary jail sentence, which the King can commute. This is what happened in this
case.
Peter Foster & Annie Flury, SaudiKing's Pardon Frees Murder Nurses, TIMES (London),
May 20, 1998, at 6; The Saudi Embassy's Announcement that the Nurses Would Be Released, ADVERTISER (Adelaide), May 21, 1998, at 6.
32. See, e.g., Ross Dunn, Justice Goes On Trial In Saudi Arabia, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Dec. 28, 1996, at 16; Kathy Evans, Saudi Justice, OBSERVER (London), June 15,
1997, at 7; Lin Jenkins & Shirley English, Relatives Claim Saudis Misled Them Over
Trial, TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 1997, at 3; Robert Fisk, What is yhe House of Saud Really
After?, INDEP. (London), Sept. 24, 1997, at 5.
33. In Islam, the life and dignity of individuals, the family and property of each individual and certain freedoms are protected. However, the individual and the state are not
separated. Rather, they are combined in the concept of the Umma (the Islamic nation).
Thus, "the individual does not stand in an adversary position vis a vis the state but is an
integral part thereof." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law and the Protectionof
Human Rights in the Islamic CriminalJustice System, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 3, 23 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982) [hereinafter Bassiounil. A defined list of
rights against the state does not exist. Rather, the appropriate question under Islamic
criminal law is "what qualitative standards of administration of justice are required?" Id.
For a discussion of the areas of conflict between Sharia and universal standards of human
rights see ABDULLAH AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 161-81 (1990).
34. The Arabic principle is 'Bara'atA-Dhimma'. See SHARAF AL-DIN, TARIKH ALTASHRI'A AL-ISLAM [HISTORY OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE] 323 (1978); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Protectionof Diplomats Under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L. L 609, 622 (1980).
35. See infra text accompanying notes 79-6.
36. Saleh I. M. AI-Laheidan, Means of Evidence in Islamic Law, in THE EFFECT OF
ISLAMIC LEGISLATION ON CRIME PREVENTION IN SAUDI ARABIA: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS
151, 161 (1980); Bassiouni, supra note 333, at 29.
37. Bassiouni, supra note 33, at 31.
38. Al-Laheidan, supra note 36, at 183; R. Moore, Courts, Law, Justice and Criminal

DENy. J. INT'L L. & POLY

VOL. 28:2

to confront those who testify against them. 9 The real divergence from
Western criminal procedure, and the basic weakness of Saudi law's protection for accused persons, is the absence of any mechanism to ensure
that these procedural safeguards are enforced in practice in a meaningful way. In particular, the simplicity of Saudi trial procedure and the
lack of a formal role for lawyers in both the trial and appeal courts
leaves the protection of accused persons entirely in the hands of Sharia
judges and the Saudi King.
C.

The Structureof Islamic CriminalLaw

Islamic criminal law has a crucial structural difference from the
criminal law in the common law system. Under the common law, substantive, evidential and sentencing law are largely independent doctrines. However, under Islamic criminal law, the definition of crimes,
their proof and the punishments that are available are intimately related. The most important determinant of the legal rules that govern an
Islamic criminal trial is the type of punishment under consideration.
There are three broad categories of punishment set out in the
Sharia.' The first, Hudud, are punishments that are fixed by the
Quran and Sunna and cannot be altered by any judicial authority. '
Such punishments include lashing, life imprisonment, hand amputation
and stoning to death.42 Although this category receives most media attention in the West, it only attaches to a limited set of crimes."3 The
gravamen of this category of crimes is that, under Islamic law, they are
regarded as crimes against God."
The second type of punishment is Qisas (retaliation), the prescribed

Trials in Saudi Arabia, 11 INT'L. J. COMP. & APP. CRIM. JUST. 61, 66 (1987).
39. Moore, supra note 38, at 66.
40. See generally 5 ABDURRAHMAN AL-JAZIRI, KITAB AL-FIQ ALA AL-MAZAHIB ALARBA'A [BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE ACCORDING TO THE FOUR JURISTIC SCHOOLS] (1999)

[hereinafter AL-JAZIRI]; Mohammed EI-Awa, Ta'azir in the Islamic Penal System, 6 J.
ISLAMIC & COMP. L. 41 (1976); SAYYID A. N. SANAD, THE THEORY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL

RESPONSIBILITY IN ISLAMIC LAW: SHARI'A 50 (1991).
41. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 9.
42. Four of the punishments are set by The Quran: §5:41 (hand amputation for theft),
5:32 (death penalty for armed robbery); 24:2 (100 lashes for fornication); S24:4 (80 lashes
for slander). The remaining punishments are set by the Sunna. See 3 AHMAD HASAN,
SUNAN ABU DAWUD: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES 1212 (1984)

(other punishments include 80 lashes for drinking and death for apostasy).
43. These are theft, armed robbery, illicit sexual relations, slanderous accusation of
unchastity, drinking alcohol and apostasy. The number of Hudud crimes is a matter of
controversy amongst the various Islamic schools. See id. at 8-9; 4 MUHAQIQ AL-HELLI,
SHARAI AL-ISLAM [LAWS OF ISLAM] 149-89 (1983).
44. The Quran 2:229 ("These [Hudud] are the limits ordained by Allah, so do not
transgress them.").
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response to personal crimes, such as murder and assault. Like Hudud,
Qisas is provided for in the Sharia and, accordingly, the courts have no
initial sentencing role (although, as will be seen, they may have a residual role in some circumstances). Qisas will be discussed in detail in
Part IV, below.
The third category is Tazirat (discretionary punishments). This
category, which applies to the balance of crimes, is Islamic criminal
law's closest analogy to common law sentencing. In theory, Tazirat punishments are dispensed by the Hakim (state leader). However, in the
case of Saudi Arabia, Tazirat punishments are dispensed by the King.
In practice, a list of Tazirat crimes and their associated punishments,
which can include lashing, prison, banishment or capital punishment, is
specified in written form. 45However, Sharia judges can also, at their
discretion, punish any person considered to have committed a sin under
Islamic law.'
The same crime may be subject to several categories of punishment.
This is because the definition of crimes attracting certain Hudud and
Qisas punishments and the rules governing their proof are more stringent than those attracting Tazirat punishments. Thus, a criminal who
is deemed not liable to receive a Hadd47 or Qisas punishment may still
be found guilty of a Tazir" crime and sentenced to a discretionary punishment. For example, a person may be found not guilty of the Hadd
crime of theft, because of the stringent conditions that Islamic law attaches to the fixed penalty of hand amputation, but may nonetheless be
found guilty of sinful conduct and receive the Tazir penalty of lashing.
In the case of murder, the crime the defendant may be subject to the
Qisas punishment of retaliation, if strict definitions and rules of proof
are satisfied, or a Tazir penalty, such as imprisonment, if less strict
conditions are met. This complication is crucial to understanding the
Islamic law of murder and the outcome of the trial of Parry and
McLauchhn.
45. In Saudi Arabia, Tazirat crimes are gleaned from the prescribed texts of Islamic
jurisprudence or through the fatwas (juristic opinions of religious scholars) based on the
Quran and the Sunna. Also, they may be prescribed by royal decrees for the breach of
rules related to modern issues such as tax, immigration and banking. In Iran a list of Tazirat crimes, from the Shia Jurisprudence texts, have been codified in 231 articles by the
Majlis (parliament) as Qanoon Mojazat Islami, Tazirat wa Mojazat'haye Baz Darranda
[the Islamic Punishment Act: Tazirat and Preventive Penalties] in 1996. ROOZNAMA
RASMI JOMHOORI ISLAMI IRAN [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN],
No. 14943, (June, 26 1996).
46. Ithm (sin), also termed dhanb, khati'a and sayye'a, consist of both acts prohibited
under Islam (Haram)and omission of acts required by Islam (Wajib). However, people can
only be held accountable if they commit a sin intentionally. See generally AL-DHAHABI,
KITAB AL-KABAIR [THE BOOK OF GRAvE SINs] (1993).
47. Singular of Hudud.
48. Singular of Tazirat.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 28:2

Even though the distinction between a defendant's guilt and the defendant's sentence, central to the common law criminal justice system,
is blurred under Islamic law, we nonetheless find it convenient to divide
our discussion of the application of Saudi murder law into these two
stages. We will be careful, however, to indicate the inter-relationship
between the two stages in the discussion below.
III. PROOF OF INTENTIONAL MURDER
A.

Definitionof IntentionalMurder

Like other legal systems, Islamic law recognises that there are degrees of homicide, only some of which attract the highest available penalties. The Hanbali school, followed in Saudi Arabia, divides Qatl (murder) into three categories: Qatl Al-Amd (intentional murder), Qatl AlShabih A1-Amd (non-intentional murder) and Qatl Al-Khata (accidental
murder.)"9 Only the first of these categories attracts the possibility of
the Qisas retaliatory measure of capital punishment, although the other
categories may still result in the lesser Qisas remedy of Diyya (monetary compensation).
The Hanbali school defines Qatl al-Amd as occurring when a killer
intends to kill and uses mimma taqtulughaliban (some means likely to
lead to the killing).50 The requirement that the killer use a means likely
to kill is, presumably, a safeguard to ensure that the killing was, indeed, intentional. Thus, modern Saudi courts are occasionally faced
with the problem of defining which weapons are 'deadly', even when
they are otherwise certain that a killing was intentional. In the Parry
and McLauchlin trial, there is no doubt that the murder alleged, which
reportedly arose through the use of a knife, a hammer and suffocation,
satisfies the Hanbali school's criteria for intentional murder.
B.

Evidence of IntentionalMurder

Islamic law restricts the free proof of facts in criminal trials to a
much greater extent than the common law. Whereas evidence law in
common law jurisdictions consists of a set of limited exclusionary rules
and, otherwise, permits all evidence that satisfies the low threshold of
49. MOHAMED S. EL-AWA, PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 74
(1982). Cf (describing the Maliki School's position). Ahmed I. Ali, Compensation in Intentional Homicide in Islamic Law, 9 J. ISLAMIC & COMP. L. 39 (1980).
50. EL-AwA, supra note 49, at 75; 2 SABIQ, supra note 25, at 346. BAHA AL-DIN A.
IBN IBRAHIM,

AL-UDDAH SHAR AL-UMDAH FI FIQ IMAM AL-SUNNAH AHMED IBN HANBAL

[THE PREPARATION, A COMMENTARY ON JURISPRUDENCE OF IMAM AHMED IBN HANBAL]
560-61 (no date).
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relevance, Islamic law exhaustively defines all categories of evidence
that can be used to sustain a criminal conviction.
The Islamic rules of proof in criminal trials are greatly complicated
by the intersection between Islamic sentencing and trial law, which can
mean that the boundaries of each category of permissible evidence will
vary according to the punishment being contemplated in court. For
some crimes, the restrictions are a practically insurmountable barrier
to any conviction, for example the preconditions for the proof of Zina
(adultery), a Hadd crime that attracts the fixed penalty of stoning.1 Because murder can result in beheading, there are tight (though not impossible) restrictions on the evidence that can be used to prove a murder charge. A further complication is that there is a high degree of
controversy, both between and within the various Islamic juristic
schools, about the details of these restrictions.
1.

Testimony of eye-witnesses

The classic method for proof of criminal charges under Islamic law
is the oral testimony of two pious Muslim males.52 The required content
of such testimony varies according to the punishment being sought. To
justify a conviction for capital murder, considerable detail is required.
Each witness must describe the precise nature of the murder, including
such facts as the portion of the victim's body that was struck by the
murder weapon.' If the witnesses contradict each other on these details, then their testimony is not acceptable." If the witnesses can only
specify a lesser degree of detail, then murder may still be proved, but
capital punishment will be unavailable.'
The requirement of Adala (piety) of each witness provides a further
obstacle for use of this category of evidence in Saudi courts. ' The Hanbali school requires the court to make a positive inquiry into the good

51. The Quran 4:15. Zina exceptionally requires either four confessions in open court
or the testimony of four Muslim males who must testify that they had a full view of the
precise act of sexual penetration. Id. If one of the witnesses fails to testify satifactorily,
then the remaining witnesses will be found to have committed the Hadd crime of slander.
The Quran 24:4 (and those who launch a charge against chaste women and produce not
four witness [to support their allegations] flog them with eighty strips). See also BAHA ALDIN A. IBN IBRAHIM, AL-UDDAH SHAR AL-UMDAH Fi FIQ IMAM AL-SUNNAH AHMED IBN
HANBAL [THE PREPARATION, A COMMENTARY ON JURISPRUDENCE OF IMAM AHMED IBN
HANBAL] 560-61 (n.d.).
52. The Quran 2:282 ("and get two witnesses out of your own men").
53. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 242.
54. Id. at 244.
55. Id. at 245.
56. The Quran 65:2 ("and take witness two persons from among you possessing justice").

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 28:2

character of every witness. 7 Witnesses must have obeyed the demands
and prohibitions of the religion of Islam and have a sense of honour.'
It is not surprising, therefore, that there are no reports that eyewitness accounts were considered by the court in the Gilford trial. In
sex-segregated Saudi Arabia, and especially in the sheltered environment of foreign nursing quarters, pious Muslim men would have no
business being in the company of three unmarried foreign women.
2.

Confession

Perhaps the most practical and effective method of proof allowed
under Islamic law is confessional evidence. It seems certain that this
category of evidence was crucial in the trial of Parry and McLauchlin,
because it was widely reported that both women provided a detailed
confession to the crime of intentional murder.59 The two nurses signed
written confessions after being held in custody by the Saudi police for
several weeks. However, Islamic law provides two significant barriers
to the use of confession as evidence in criminal trials.
First, nearly all Islamic schools, like common law courts, require a
voluntary confession.' Accordingly, a confession that resulted from torture, beating, threats, deception or any inhumane treatment will not be
accepted, even if the court has reason to believe that the confession is
true. 1 At the Gilford trial, the two defendants insisted that their confessions were coerced, as they followed threatened and actual violence
from the police and the police's false promise that a confession would
result in the defendants' immediate deportation. The British media
published expert analyses of the written confessions which concluded

57. Ma'amoun M. Salama, General Principlesof CriminalEvidence in Islamic Jurisprudence, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 109, 117 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1982).
58. EL-AWA, supra note 49, at 125. The Maliki school requires that a witness be
Muslim, mature and wise, not do immoral things, not innovate in religious matters, not

interpret religion to suit personal needs, be generous and be of good character. Training
homing pigeons, playing chess and musical instruments, saying silly things or committing
minor sins will disqualify a witness. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 242.
59. The media obtained copies of the confessions when they were submitted as part of

the defendants' proceedings against Frank Gilford in the Supreme Court of South Australia. See, e.g., Mark Steene, Confessions Tell of Rift in Lesbian Love, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Sydney), Sept. 25, 1997, at 4.
60. Some schools allow the use of coerced confessions in exceptional cases where the
defendant is known for acts of inequity or immorality. See Ahmad Fathi Bahnassi, Criminal Responsibility in Islamic Law, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 171, 191

(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982); Al-Laheidan, supra note 36, at 189-90.
61. SANAD, supra note 40, at 102 (If a judge accepts a confession without investigating whether or not it was issued by free will, then the judge may be charged with a Tazir

crime).
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that the confessions must have been coerced, although it is extremely
unlikely that such evidence was brought before the Saudi court.6 The
AI-Khobar court investigated the defendants' claims and, according to
some reports, received medical evidence that contradicted some of the
defendants' assertions.U
A second limitation on confessional evidence under Islamic law goes
well beyond the protections offered to accused persons subject to police
interrogation in Western countries. A general principle of Islamic
criminal law is that an accused person can withdraw a confession, even
a voluntary one, at any time. Much of the juristic writings on this point
concern crimes that attract the Hudud punishments. The prevailing
view is that a confession to a Hadd crime can be withdrawn up until the
moment of punishment." Thus, for example, a defendant's retraction of
a confession to theft, instants before her or his hand is amputated, will
prevent the completion of the punishment unless other permissible evidence was available to prove the crime. Indeed, even the defendant's
abscondment from legal custody can be regarded as an implicit withdrawal of a confession.' These principles are clearly of potential importance in the trial of Parry and McLauchlin, who explicitly withdrew
their confessions on receiving legal advice.' However, the position of
withdrawn confessions in relation to Qisas crimes such as murder, as
opposed to Hudud crimes, is uncertain. One view is that the same rules
should apply in both cases. 67 Arguably, withdrawn confessions should
not be available to justify the application of the death penalty, which
generally attracts the strictest rules of proof. On the other hand, some
of the aspects of the Islamic law of withdrawn confessions, for example
the recommendation that Sharia judges positively encourage defendants not to confess or to withdraw their confessions in relation to some
crimes, seem to sit more comfortably with Hudud crimes, seen as
crimes against God or society, than Qisas,personal, crimes.'
It is not known whether the A1-Khobar court ultimately relied on
the defendants' confessions to the police in reaching its verdict. If the
confessions were used, then the court must have rejected the claims
that the confessions were coerced and refused to apply the Islamic law
62. Evans, supra note 27, at 23; Steve Boggan, Saudi Nurses Say They Were Tortured
Into Confessing, INDEP. (London), May 22, 1998, at 1.
63. Doctor'sDeny Nurses' Torture, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), May 25, 1998, at 6.
64. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 66; Salama, supra note 577, at 120.
65. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 66; Salama, supra note 57.
66. Philip Cornford & Agencies, MurderVictims BrotherHolds Fate of Two Nurses in
His Hands, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 22, 1997 at 4.
67. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Qisas Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
203, 208 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982) [hereinafter Bassiouni , Qisas Crimes].
68. This approach is based on a Hadith where the Prophet tried to encourage a
woman not to confess to adultery. See AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 66.
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of withdrawn confessions to the crime of murder.
3.

Other evidence

According to media reports, the case against the defendants in the
Gilford trial was not based solely on their confessions. The two defendants were targeted for police interrogation after security cameras at
an automatic banking machine revealed that they had used the victim's
credit cards to withdraw cash on several occasions days after the murder.6 Also, accounts of the night of the incident provided some support
for an opportunity for the defendants to murder Gilford and, perhaps,
were consistent with the apparent motive detailed in their withdrawn
confessions, a dispute involving a sexual relationship between the victim and defendants. 0 Finally, given that expatriates in Saudi Arabia
live in small, isolated compounds, guarded by Bedouins who double as
informers for the police, and that movement between the compound and
the outside world is restricted, a murder by outsiders would have been
difficult.71 Clearly, in a Western trial, these matters would have been
crucial in establishing a circumstantial case against Parry and
McLauchlin.
However, the use of evidence other than eyewitness testimony and
confession is controversial in Islamic law. A number of jurists take the
view that to permit other methods of testimony would be to allow a
judge to become a witness in a trial where he is supposed to reach a
verdict. In particular, the Hanbali school, followed in Saudi Arabia,
specifies that Ilm A1-Qahdi (the judge's personal observation) cannot be
evidence of serious crimes, including murder.72 This prohibition extends
to the judge's use of inferences from Al-Qrain (circumstantial evidence)
where they are unfavourable to the accused.73 (The Hanbali school does
permit the use of such evidence in a murder trial to reach a verdict that
would result in a non-capital punishment, such as the payment of blood
money)."
A minority of Muslim scholars reject the ban on personal observation, citing a Quranic verse.75 Some jurists argue that it is wrong to re69. Daniel McGrory, Confused Defendants Baffled by Court Rules, TIMES (London),
Sept. 24, 1997, at 2.
70. Steene, supra note 59, at 4.
71. Ziauddin Sardar, The Saudi Judges Are Not Fools, NEW STATESMAN, May 29,
1998, at 9.
72. El-AwA, supra note 49, at 129.
73. Bassiouni, supra note 33, at 26.
74. Id.

75. "0 ye who believe! Stand firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even as against
yourself, or your parents, or your kin, and whether they be rich or poor." The Quran
4:135.
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strict evidence in criminal trials to testimony and confession.76 Other
jurists argue that the ban on the use of the judge's personal observation
should be limited to Hudud, the most serious crimes in the Islamic calendar, and should be permitted to prove Qisas crimes such as murder.77
Indeed, in Iran, one of the main modern jurisdictions that practice Islamic criminal law, the judge's personal observation can support any
criminal charge.7 8
It seems clear that, if the defendants' disputed and withdrawn confessions were not used, then the judges that heard the Gilford trial
must have relied upon circumstantial evidence to support Parry's conviction for capital murder. That would mean that the judges followed a
minority juristic view on the use of circumstantial evidence in murder
trials.
C.

Doubts About Guilt

All Muslim jurists agree that Shubha ('semblance of doubt'), will
result in Dar'a (nullification) of Hudud punishments. In one Hadith
(saying), the Prophet said: "Nullify the Hudud if there is doubt and lift
the death penalty as much as you can."79 In another, the Prophet said
(long before common law jurists)': "If the judge makes a mistake in
amnesty it is better than a mistake in punishment."8' The jurists do not
specify a particular degree of doubt that will result in nullification, such
as the common law standard of reasonable doubt. Rather, the texts
speak in terms of examples, such as a man accused of adultery, who
thought his sexual partner was his wife or did not realise that adultery
was a crime. 2 (This example indicates that Islamic law lacks the common law's delineation between exculpatory defenses and deficiencies in
the evidence. Shubha may, thus, also an analogous role to some common law criminal defences.)

76. Salama, supra note 57, at 110-11 (These include Ibn Taymiyya, a famous jurist
from the Hanbali school).
77. Salama, supra note 577, at 111-12.
78. According to Iran's ISLAMIC PUNISHMENT ACT 1991, Article 105, "the Islamic
judge can decide in Hudud based on his knowledge in criminal cases related to both
crimes against God and people. However, the judge is required to mention the basis of his
knowledge in the judgment." See GHOLAMREZA HOJJATI ASHRAFI, MAJMU'A KAMIL
QAWANIN WA MUQARRAT JAZAE'I [THE COMPLETE COLLECTION OF CRIMINAL LAWS AND

REGULATIONS] 26M (1997).

79. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 70.
80. See Alexander Volokh, 'n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997), for a discussion of common law pronouncements of this sort.
81. AL-TERMAZI, SUNAN [THE TRADITIONS], sec. Hudud, Hadith no. 1344; AL-JAZIRI,
supra note 40, at 70.
82. ABU AL-HASSAN AL-MAWARDI, THE LAWS OF ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE 317 (Abdullah
Yate trans., 1996).
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Despite the circumstantial case against the defendants, a number
of other features of the evidence in the Gilford trial appear to raise factual doubts about the defendants' guilt. In particular, the defendants'
account of police coercion and their denials of any involvement in the
murder would be the central planks in a defence to the charge. In addition, the murder lacks a plausible motive. It is unclear why the mere
fact of a sexual relationship between the defendants and the victim, as
detailed in the disputed confession, would amount to a motive for murder. The motive of theft, suggested by the use of the credit cards, is also
unconvincing, given that the defendants would have been generously
paid to be nurses in Saudi Arabia and would have had few outlets to
spend money in that country. The alleged behaviour that led to the defendants' arrest, the use of the victim's credit cards days after the killing, suggests that, if the defendants did kill Gilford, they were improbably foolish. Obviously, in a Western trial, such matters would be
discussed at length by the lawyers, the judge and the jurors. However,
given the lack of formal status for lawyers' arguments in Saudi courts,
we cannot be sure to what extent such arguments were aired at the Gilford trial.
In any case, like the ban on withdrawn confessions and circumstantial evidence, there is controversy about whether Shubha has a role in
non-Hudud crimes, such as murder. The first of the Prophet's sayings,
above, was limited to Hudud. However, it could be argued that his use
of this Arabic word was equivocal, as it can be to refer to both the limited set of crimes with fixed punishments and the general concept of
criminal sanction, which would include Qisas." Arguably, its concluding
words mean that Shubha should apply all cases concerning the death
penalty, so that the doubts in a capital murder case will limit the Qisas
penalty to lesser forms of retaliation. Finally, it could be argued that
the second Hadith, above, while not as explicit as the first, nonetheless
implies a role for Shubha in all crimes.
One option for Shariajudges faced with doubts in the evidence is
the possibility that weak evidence can be supplemented by a procedure
called Qasama (oath). Qasama has no parallel in the West. The procedure requires that the judge have a high, albeit not itself sufficient, degree of certainty that an accused person is guilty. In this circumstance,
termed Lawth, the judge may ask fifty members of the family of the victim to swear that the defendant murdered their relative.Y Where fifty
83. In most Islamic Jurisprudence texts the Kitab Al-Hudud generally means the
chapter on punishments (Uqubat) which consists of Hudud, Qisas and Tazirat. See ALJAZARI, supra note 40, at vol. 9.
84. ALA AL-DIN I. M. AL-DEMESHQI, AL-AKHBAR AL-ILMIYYA MIN AL-IKHTYYARAT ALFIGHHIYYA MIN FATAWI SHEIKH AL-ISLAM IBN TAYMIYYA [A SELECTION OF THE LEGAL
IDEAS OF IBN TAYMIYYA] 295 (n.d., n.pub.); 6 MUHAMMAD AL-SHAFIE, KITAB AL-UMM [THE
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relatives are unavailable, the oath of just one, made fifty times, will suffice. This procedure can apply even when the evidence falls short of the
strict requirements of proof set out above, for example because a confession has been withdrawn and there was only one eyewitness. However,
Qasama was not applied in the Gilford trial. It is likely that Frank Gilford, the sole competent relative connected to the proceedings, would
have refused to make the oath, as he repeatedly denied having any
opinions about the defendants' guilt, instead declaring that he would
simply accept any verdict that the court brought down." In addition,
some Muslim jurists have argued that Qasama should not be used in a
trial for a capital crime.6 Indeed, some other jurists do not consider it to
be a part of Islamic law."7
D. Parry'sConviction For CapitalMurder
In September 1997, the media reported rumours that the AlKhobar court had pronounced Deborah Parry guilty of intentional murder and declared her subject to the Qisas death penalty." It should be
obvious from the above discussion that this is a surprising result given
the applicable Islamic law, especially the Hanbali school followed in
Saudi Arabia. Assuming the media accounts of the evidence before the
court were accurate and comprehensive, the judges must have followed
a minority juristic viewpoint in relation to the applicability in capital
trials of either the law governing withdrawn confessions or the law governing the use of circumstantial evidence. Also, the court must have rejected, on either factual or legal grounds, the arguments that Parry's
guilt was doubtful. Further, if circumstantial evidence was not used,
then the court must also have rejected the defendants' assertions about
the coercive circumstance of their confessions.
Clearly, if the accounts of the trial are correct, then Parry was unlucky to be convicted by a Sharia court. Whether this misfortune arose
from the idiosyncratic views of the judges of the A1-Khobar court or domestic pressures that demanded the appearance of strict justice for foreign nationals is a matter for speculation.

BOOK OF MAIN SOURCES] 79 (1968); AL-HELLI, supra note 43, at 224; Al-Laheidan, supra
note 36, at 159.
85. Anthony Keane & John Ferguson, Show Them No Mercy, Brother's Verdict on
Death Sentence for Nurse's Killers, ADVERTISER (Adelaide), Dec. 27, 1996, at 1; Clare
Kermond, No Budging on Death Penalty, Says Brother,AGE (Melbourne), June 6, 1997, at

A3.
86. AI-Laheidan, supra note 36, at 187.
87. SABIQ, supra note 25.
88. Michael Theodoulou et al., Death Penalty Fearsfor Colleague as Saudi Court Verdict is Condemned, TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 1997, at 1.
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IV. PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER

A.

The Death Penalty

Capital punishment is available for a number of crimes under Islam, both as a fixed punishment (for example, for adultery) and, occasionally, as a discretionary Tazir punishment. However, its role under
Islam as a punishment for murder arises from the wider principle of
Qisas. Qisas, from the Arabic, qassa (to follow) describes a method of
punishment whereby the offender is punished in the same way, and by
the same means, as the crime that she or he committed. 9 If the crime is
murder, then the punishment is the death penalty, Qisas-al-Nafs (Qisas
for life.) For lesser personal injuries, Qisas Ma Doon Al-Nafs (Qisas for
less than life) is available. However carrying out the lesser punishment
is sometimes difficult because of the strict requirement that the retaliatory wound be exactly the same as the original injury. '0
Some Islamic schools have held that, like Qisas for non-fatal injuries, the death penalty for murder should be performed in a way that
matches the original method of killing. 9' If this applied in Saudi Arabia,
then Parry would have been liable to be killed by a combination of stabbing, assault with a hammer and suffocation. However, the Hanbali
school, following a Hadith that "there is no Qisas except by the sword",
requires that all executions be carried out by beheading, regardless of
the method of the murder. 92 At present, Saudi Arabia is alone in performing executions by beheading.
Qisas is a refinement of the biblical and pre-Islamic Arab notion of
punishment for personal crimes. In pre-Islamic Arab culture, revenge
for murder often involved escalating tribal warfare where, typically,
several lives were taken in response to a single killing.' The advent of
89. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 182; A. SHARABASI, AL QISAS FI AL-ISLAM [QISAS IN
ISLAM] 17 (1954); Bassiouni, Qisas Crimes, supra note 67, at 203; EL-AWA, supra note 49,
at 69; ABDURRAHMAN A. Doi, SHARI'AH, THE ISLAMIC LAW 232 (1984). The principle of

Qisas is based on The Quran 2:178, 5:48 and a Hadith that "the life of a Muslim is sacred
except if he commits adultery after marriage, kills somebody or abandons Islam." See ALJAZIRI, supra note 40, at 185.
90. The Quran 5:45 states, "We ordained therein for them, life for life, eye for eye,
nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal."
91. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 225-27. This view is based on The Quran 16:126, "if
you punish, let your punishment be proportionate to the wrong that has been done to
you."
92. The Quran 16:126; EL-AWA, supra note 499, at 72. The sword is favored because,
at the time of the Prophet, it was regarded as the quickest and most efficient method of
execution. Ahmad Abd A1-Aziz AI-Alfi, Punishment in Islamic Criminal Law, in THE
ISLAMIC CRiMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 227, 232-33 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982).
93. EL-AWA, supra note 49, at 70.

2000

ISLAMIC LAW ACROSS CULTURAL BORDERS

Islam limited this pattern in two ways. First, Qisas was restricted to "a
life for a life" and could only be used against an intentional killer. Second, the death penalty could only be applied at the request of the victim's heirs, who are provided with and encouraged to utilise alternative
methods of retaliation.
1.

A life for a life

In Western countries, the principle of 'a life for a life' is a popular
rationale for the introduction or maintenance of the death penalty for
murder. However, in common law jurisdictions where capital punishment is available, this principle has no formal role in individual sentencing decisions. In Islam, on the other hand, the 'life for a life' principle plays an everyday role in the administration of capital punishment.
The Gilford murder provides an example of the special role of the
'life for a life' principle in Islamic criminal justice. In that case, two defendants were on trial for a single murder. A number of juristic Muslim
schools, including the Hanbali school, require strict equality between
the number of people murdered and the number put to death under
Qisas." To accommodate this requirement, the courts distinguish between primary and secondary parties to a crime, even though Islamic
criminal law contains no formal rules governing participation in crimes.
For example, one text declares that, if one person holds the victim while
the other deals the fatal blow, the latter will be put to death, while the
former will be subject to life imprisonment." When the AI-Khobar court
held that Parry, but not McLauchlin, was subject to the Qisas death
penalty, it presumably relied upon the confessional or forensic evidence
before it to find Parry primarily responsible for Gilford's death.
A further complication of the 'life for a life' principle is that some
jurists, including the Hanbali school, are not prepared to equate a Muslim life with a non-Muslim one." This principle caused no difficulty in
the Gilford trial, as both victim and convicted murderers were nonMuslim. However, it is interesting to note that, under the law prevailing in Saudi Arabia, the option of capital punishment would not have
been available if a Muslim had been found guilty of killing Yvonne Gilford.'
94. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 219.

95. SABIQ, supra note 25, at 223-24.
96. Id. at 354; but, ef at 355; EL-AWA, supra note 499, at 79.
97. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 210. Qisas would be available if a Muslim was killed
by a non-Muslim. By contrast to the Hanbali approach, the Hanafi school, the most popular juristic school, distinguishes between Harbi, enemies of Muslims, who are treated as
not equal to a Muslims, and Mustamans (non-Muslims granted asylum by an Islamic
State) and Dhimmis (Jews or Christians living in an Islamic territory). Modern examples
of Harbi are few, although the Soviet Union soldiers who once occupied Afghanistan
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The rights of the victim's heirs

The right of Qisas is held exclusively by the heirs of the victim."
This means that Sharia judges' involvement in Qisas capital punishment is limited to reaching a verdict that the death penalty is available.
Even the Saudi King has no power to commute the death penalty in
these circumstances. The procedural requirement that all such matters
be referred to the King does not connote the need for approval of the
sentence, only confirmation of the guilty verdict pronounced by the
courts." In theory, the victim's heirs even have the right to perform the
death penalty personally. However, in Saudi Arabia, lay persons' lack of
expertise in efficient beheading means that, in practice, the sentence
will always be carried out by a headman appointed by the Saudi government.'0°
Where the victim is Muslim, the heirs are defined by the Sharia.
However, the position in the Gilford trial was more complicated. The
lawyers for Parry and McLauchlin at one stage reportedly challenged
the right of Frank Gilford, Yvonne's next of kin, to exercise Qisas, because he was not mentioned in his sister's will. This argument would
not have been tenable if the Gilfords were Muslim, because Islamic law
does not permit a property holder to bar heirs from inheritance.'! 1 However, because the Gilfords were not Muslim, the Sharia court would
have had to apply South Australian succession law to resolve this issue.
Given his continuing role in the proceedings, it must be assumed that
the Sharia court satisfied itself of Frank Gilford's status as the victim's
legal heir under South Australian law.
Under the Hanbali school, the victim's heirs have three options under Qisas.'02 First, they can ask for the death penalty. Second, they can
seek monetary compensation. Third, they can ask for forgiveness. Leniency is preferred as a matter of principle under Islamic law, which dewould have been considered Harbi if an Afghan Islamic state had existed at the time. See
SOBHI MAHMASSANI,
AL-QANUN
WA AL-ALAQAT
AL-DOWLIYA F1 AL-ISLAM
[INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS IN ISLAM] 89-124 (1982); MAJID KHADDURI, WAR
AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 162-69 (1955).

98. The Quran 17:33 states "and if anyone is slain wrongfully, we have given his heir
authority [to demand Qisas or to forgive]." An exception permitted under some schools,

including the Hanbali School, is that the dying victim can forgive the killers. AL-JAZIRI,
supra note 40, at 200. It is even possible that this forgiveness can be given prospectively,
by a legal will. Also, under the Hanbali School, if the victim has infant heirs, then the
defendants must be imprisoned until the infant reaches puberty. Id. at 203-04.
99. Al-Hewesh, supra note 22, at 376.
100. Id. at 377.
101. A Muslim can only dispose of one third of her or his property by will. The remaining two-thirds of the property is distributed to the heirs as defined by Sharia inheritance
law. JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 244 (1986).
102. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 194.
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mands that Muslims respect all life." Both the Sharia and Saudi authorities are committed to trying to convince the victim's family to
waive their right to the death penalty.M In the past, the Saudi Royal
family itself has interceded in such matters and, sometimes, has succeeded where other attempts at persuasion failed."° However, ultimately, the decision remains a personal matter for the victim's heirs.
Where there is more than one heir and they disagree, the most lenient
position is applied."~
The defendants' lawyer repeatedly petitioned Frank Gilford to
waive the option of the death penalty before, during and after the
trial." Gilford resisted these pleas at various times, arguing that the
verdict should precede the determination of any punishment"0 After it
was reported that Parry was liable to beheading, Gilford formally
waived the death penalty.'" However, as will be discussed below, this
did not conclude the defendants' punishment.
B. Monetary Compensation
1. Non-capital murder
As discussed earlier, a defendant may be convicted of murder under
conditions that fail to satisfy the requirements for capital punishment.
For example, the murder may not have been intentional or not committed with a deadly weapon, or it may have been proved by eyewitnesses
who nonetheless could not give sufficiently detailed accounts of the
murder. Under such circumstances, the victim's heirs' rights under
Qisas are limited to two options: to forgive the defendant completely or
to receive a fixed amount of monetary compensation, termed Diyya
(blood money.) ° Diyya has a dual role in Islamic law: as a punishment
in some criminal matters and as a compensation device in civil mat-

103. The Quran 5:32 states, "[Ilf anyone saved a life it would be as if such a person
saved the life of the whole people."
104. Al-Hewesh, supra note 22, at 377.
105. Id.

106. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 197.
107. The defendants' lawyers provided Gilford with a seventeen-page document setting
out moral, philosophical and religious objections to the death penalty and appealing for
mercy for female defendants. Andrew Ramsey, Slain Nurse's Brother Rejects Clemency
Plea, AUSTRALIAN (Sydney), Apr. 2, 1997, at 8.

108. Id.
109. Dominic Kennedy, Saudi Nurse is Spared After Death Right Waived, TIMES (London), Nov. 17, 1997, at 1.
110. The Quran 4:92 provides, "Never should a believer kill a believer, except by mis-

take, and whoever kills a believer by mistake it is ordained that he should.., pay blood
money to the deceased's family, unless they remit it freely."
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from the defendant's
ters." Under the Hanbali school, Diyya is payable
112
estate if the defendant dies before punishment.
The value of Diyya is usually one hundred camels. Under the Hanbali school, this can be paid in gold or silver, rather than camels.13 In
1987, the Saudi government, by royal decree, set the value of one hundred camels in Saudi currency as 140,000 Saudi riyals (about
£17,000).14 However, this amount would not be applicable in the Gilford
case, because Diyya is halved for women."' Indeed, under non-Saudi
versions of Islamic law, the amount would be further halved because
the victim was not a Muslim." 6 However, the Hanbali school
sets the
7
payment of Diyya as equal for Muslims and non-Muslims."
2.

Capital murder

The prescribed value of Diyya nominally applies to all murders.
However, under the Hanbali school, where capital punishment is available, the victim's heirs have the right, under Qisas, to bargain with the
accused for any monetary amount."8 Obviously, the defendant in such a
circumstance will be in an extremely poor bargaining position. Thus,
only the defendant's financial resources and the heirs' desires will limit
the amount of Diyya payable.
Frank Gilford fully utilised his rights under the Hanbali school. Before waiving the death penalty, he entered into a contract with the defendants' lawyer requiring the defendants to pay approximately A1.7
million ($US 1.2 million)."9 Gilford formally waived the option of capital
punishment once the money was deposited with the Supreme Court of

111. Bassiouni, Qisas Crimes, supra note 67, at 206.
112. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 197 (The obligation to pay Diyya does not survive
death under the Hanafi and Maliki schools).
113. Id. at 271.
114. Jeffrey K Walker, The Rights of the Accused in Saudi Criminal Procedure, 15
Loy. L.A. INT'L. & COMP. L. J. 863, 881 (1993).
115. SABIQ, supranote 25, at 378.
116. Id. at 379-80.
117. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 274. This accords with a verse of the Quran and the
practice of the Prophet and the Righteous Caliphs. The Quran 4:92 orders Muslims to pay
blood money to the family of a non-Muslim with whom they have a treaty of mutual alliance. The Righteous Caliphs ruled the Islamic Caliphate for 29 years after the Prophet's
death. Muaawiya, founder of the Omayyed Dynasty in 661 AD, ordered that half the Diyya of non-Muslims be paid to the Bait al-Mal (treasury). AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at
274.

118. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 201. The situation is different under the Hanafi and
Maliki schools, which limit the family's rights to demanding the death penalty or forgiving the killer. Diyya is only provided if the defendant agrees to pay. Id. at 201.
119. Daniel Mcgrory & Michael Theodoulou, Nurses Agree to Pay $1.2m Blood Money,
TIMES (London), Sept. 25, 1997, at 1.
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South Australia by the defendants' lawyers. " ' Shortly after the defendants were released, the money the defendants authorised the payment
of the money to Gilford.
C. Other Punishments
As noted earlier, Qisas capital punishment is not available for accessories to murder under the Hanbali school. There is considerable debate over the punishment to be given to secondary parties. Most jurists
leave the punishment of lesser accomplices to judicial discretion 2 1 ,
though some dissenting schools maintain that all accomplices should be
executed."2 The AI-Khobar court apparently followed the majority approach when it sentenced McLauchlan to eight years jail and 500
lashes.'
Additionally, under the Hanbali school, where the victim's heir has
waived the right to the death penalty, a Sharia court may sentence a
murderer to a discretionary, non-capital, punishment if it feels that the
killers are wicked, of bad character or lack a sense of honour.14 Clearly,
the purpose of this rule is to provide for heirless victims, to compensate
for what might be regarded as an overly forgiving heir or, perhaps, to
provide a more flexible punishment option than those permitted under
Qisas. It is not known whether Parry received an additional sentence
for the crime of murder once Frank Gilford waived the death penalty. 25
D. Review Proceedings
Saudi appeal courts may overturn Tazirat sentences pronounced by
the general court and substitute their own sentence. In the Gilford trial,
no details of court proceedings following the general court trial are
available.

120. Paul Ravenscroft, Blood Money for Murdered Nurse Sent to Australia, TIMES
(London), Oct. 3, 1997, at 3.
121. Id. Co-operation criminal and sinful acts is prohibited by The Quran 5:2 ("help ye
one another to righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancour").
Thus, participation in crime is subject to a Tazir punishment.
122. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 217-18.
123. Michael Theodoulou et al., supra note 2, at 1.
124. AL-JAZIRI, supra note 40, at 196. In Iran, the ISLAMIC PUNISHMENT ACT 1993, Article 205, provides, "In intentional cases where there is no complaint or the family of the
victim has waived the demand for Qisas, if the act of the killer has endangered the public
order of society or promotes the killer or others to commit further crimes, then the killer

should be sentenced to a discretionary jail sentence from three to ten years." Id.
125. It is also possible that both McLauchlan and Parry were convicted and sentenced
for a number of crimes other than murder. Given some of the evidence before the court,
both parties might have received discretionary Tazirat sentences for the crimes of theft
and lesbianism. Again, whether or not this occurred is presently unknown.
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However, according to the Saudi Ambassador to Britain, Parry and
McLauchlan's sentences were commuted by King Fahd to the period
they had served in jail.'26 It is obvious that this followed diplomatic efforts by the British government. It is important to recognise that the
King's right to commute sentences, like the appeal courts, is limited to
Tazirat punishments. So long as a guilty verdict for Qisas crime stands,
no-one other than the victim's heirs can determine whether or not the
defendant is to be executed. Accordingly, King Fahd's release of Parry,
and the accompanying diplomacy, were dependent on Frank Gilford's
decision to waive the death penalty for his sister's murder.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the Gilford matter, there were many non-Muslims who were affected by the operation of Islamic criminal law.
Obviously, the two British nurses were the most directly affected.
Despite perceptions of arbitrary justice in some Western circles, the
trial of Parry and McLauchlan was governed by a complex set of legal
rules. Although the procedural standards of the trial obviously fell below those that the defendants would have received had they been tried
for murder in Britain or Australia, many of the substantive and evidential rules demanded by Islamic criminal justice in fact worked in their
favour. Parry was unfortunate as it would seem that she ultimately was
made subject to a punishment that was only be justified under a minority approach to the Saudi version of Islamic law. It could be argued
that, in light of this, Parry may have been the victim of a Saudi court's
desire to demonstrate that all persons, foreign or Saudi, Muslim or nonMuslim, are equally subject to Islamic criminal justice for acts performed in Saudi Arabia.'
While unfortunate for Parry, this circumstance does not suggest a
particular critique of Islamic law. Similar doubts about the overly strict
application of criminal justice arise throughout the world whenever foreigners are alleged to have committed crimes when visiting another
country. Given that all criminal laws are open to judicial interpretation,
this situation is probably unavoidable, although the opaqueness of
Parry's trial certainly contributed to the appearance of injustice. It
should be noted, however, that, ultimately, Parry and McLauchlan cannot complain too loudly. It is obvious that their status as British sub-

126. Peter & Flury, supra note 3, at 1.
127. Reportedly, in response to British media portrayals of the Saudi judicial system
as barbaric, the AI-Khobar judge declared, "this case is an appropriate occasion to acquaint the non Muslim world with the basic characteristics of Sharia...law in healing
wounds and in ensuring fairness between disputing parties." Theodoulou & Bale, supra
note 2, at 1.
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jects in the end caused them to be released after serving a much lesser
punishment than would have been experienced by Saudi citizens in the
same position.
On the other hand, the application of Islamic criminal justice to
non-Muslims other than defendants does support a compelling critique." We believe that the Gilford trial raises important questions
about the desirability of involving non-Saudi, non-Muslims in the punishment stage of the Islamic criminal justice system.
The prime difficulty is most clearly demonstrated by the plight of
Frank Gilford, who was given the extraordinary role of arbiter of life or
death of Deborah Parry. This role was inconsistent with the approach to
criminal justice in Gilford's own country, Australia, for three reasons.
First, sentencing in Australia is the responsibility of judges, applying
legislative and common law rules. Second, despite recent reforms increasing the involvement of victims of crime in the criminal justice process, victims are never given any decision-making role in Australian
criminal trials.' Third, Australia's states abolished the death penalty
in practice three decades ago and the country is a signatory to the 1989
second optional protocol to the 1966 InternationalConvention on Civil
and PoliticalRights, which bans capital punishment. In the aftermath
of his sister's murder, these legal incongruities translated into a very
real nightmare for Frank Gilford.
Because of the gap between Islamic and Australian sentencing law
in relation to intentional murder, Frank Gilford was required to perform a legal role predicated on a culture and law that he did not understand. When first asked to comment on his role in the potential punishment of Parry and McLauchlan, Frank Gilford told the media that he
desired no involvement in the matter and would not intervene to save
the defendants from an Islamic sentence.13 In making these remarks,
he incorrectly assumed that Islamic law, like Australian law, placed the
primary responsibility for sentencing in the hands of the courts or legislators. Thus, he assumed that any decision-making role given to him
would be of a compassionate nature, pardoning or commuting the strict
legal punishment. Once he had been informed of the correct position, he
found himself reluctantly involved in the sentencing process without his
consent because, if he had continued his 'hands off approach, Parry
would have received no Qisas punishment. In this situation, Frank Gilford repeatedly stated his desire that both defendants receive a pun128. For a discussion of the status of religious minorities under Islamic law see, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural
Relativism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1987).
129. See Jeffrey Miles, The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Process:Fairnessto the
Victim and Fairnessto the Accused, 19 CRIM. L. J. 193 (1995).
130. Keane & Ferguson, supra note 85, at 1; Maynard et al., supra note 2 at 1.
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ishment of approximately twenty years in prison or life imprisonment,
equivalent to what they would have received if the murder had been
committed in Australia.'3 1 This assumption, that sentencing under Islamic law would have the same range of options as sentencing under
Australian law, was a further error. Confronted with the reality that a
prison sentence, being a state punishment, was unavailable under
Qisas, he then openly contemplated demanding capital punishment to
ensure that Parry did not escape with what would be regarded in Australia as an inadequate punishment.1n Frank Gilford's difficulties were
compounded by hostile media and public opinion in both the United
Kingdom and Australia, galvanised by the possibility of punishments
regarded in both countries as cruel." He repeatedly complained of intrusive media coverage at a time of considerable personal grief and anguish." 4 However, the media could hardly ignore the issue, given the
possibility of a beheading of a British subject and the doubts about the
procedural standards of the trial and the defendants' guilt. Gilford's repeated statements that he would accept the verdict of the Al-Khobar
court and consider all the lawful options for punishment under Qisas
correctly stated the appropriate stance of the victim's heirs under Islamic law.'3 However, given that Gilford, in setting Parry's punishment, was performing a role that, in Australia and other Western countries, would be performed by a judge, it is not surprising that the
Western media expected him to also adjudicate on the propriety of the
convictions and the appropriateness of the available punishments
Equal to the difficulties caused by the availability of the death penalty were those posed by the alternative punishments for murder provided by Islamic law. Despite the availability of victim's compensation
in Australia, the Australian public understandably regarded the payment of 'blood money' by the defendants as macabre and a wholly inappropriate financial gain as a result of tragedy. Gilford found himself
with a choice between the death penalty and two remaining options,
blood money and forgiveness, that, in the view of the majority of Australians, would sully the memory of his sister. Thus, unlike Saudi citizens, who would regard all these options as generally acceptable, Gilford was faced with a choice between the lesser of three evils. Muslims
are required to exercise Qisas by following the Quranic principles of

131. Alex Kennedy, Eye for an Eye, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 11, 1997, at 33.
132. Id.
133. E.g., Colin James & Paul Starik, Gilford 'Cash for a Life' Blood Money, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Sep. 26, 1997, at 4; Pamela Bonne, Choosing Mercy is Better than
Deadly Vengeance, AGE (Melbourne), June 6, 1997, at A15; Daniel McGrory, Nurses
Afraid of 'Bullying Tyrant,' TIMES (London), Sep. 24, 1997, at 2.
134. Kermond, supra note 85, at 3.

135. Keane & Ferguson, supra note 130, at 3 (Gilford's position would have been less
tenable if he had agreed to participate in a Qasama proceeding).
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compassion and respect for life. However, it is like that Gilford's choice
was based on a combination of personal grief and beliefs, pressure from
the public, the media and diplomats, and, significantly, his own possible
financial exposure.
The defendants' lawyers primarily pursued their clients' case
through legal avenues in Saudi Arabia and, presumably, British diplomatic circles. However, they also pursued court actions against Frank
Gilford himself in the Supreme Court of South Australia including (as
mentioned earlier) disputing his status as heir." At one stage, the defendants' lawyer suggested that Frank Gilford may be personally sued
in Australia for his conduct. 37 Facing a possible risk of personal liability
and also the burden of understanding Saudi criminal law, Gilford hired
his own lawyers, both in Australia and Saudi Arabia. The resultant legal bills must have influenced him in choosing the option of Diyya.
Eventually, $A700,000 ($US 434,000) of the money he received from the
defendants was used to meet his personal legal expenses.3
Frank Gilford resolved the dilemma of the Australian distaste for
the notion of 'blood money' by donating the bulk of the remaining payment, $A1 million ($US 620,000) to an Adelaide hospital, as a memorial
to his sister. 3 9 Oddly, in an apparent attempt to comply with the Diyya
principles, he also reserved for himself the amount of $A50,000 ($US
40,000) and $A9,000 ($US 5580) for his invalid mother, which total to
roughly the same amount that is fixed for non-capital murder cases in
Saudi Arabia. 4"
It is possible to speculate that Frank Gilford's solution to his dilemma may have left further Australians with an unwanted quandary
concerning the clash between Islamic and Australian notions of criminal justice. Surely, the board of the Adelaide hospital, selected by
Frank Gilford as the recipient of the Diyya, did not feel uncomfortable
with accepting would have felt uncomfortable in accepting 'blood money'
for use in an institution devoted to preserving life. However, presumably, there was overwhelming pressure on the hospital to accept the donation, given the impact of a refusal on its own fund-raising programmes and the sense that such a rejection would involve disrespect
towards Yvonne Gilford, who was to have a hospital wing named in her

136. Mark Steene, Beheading May Be Averted by SA Court, ADVERTISER (Adelaide),
Aug. 9, 1997, at 1.
137. Philip Cornford, Nurses Sue Gilford's Brother for Damages, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Aug. 19, 1997, at 3.
138. John Huxley, Frank Gilford Has Been a Media Victim, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, June 10, 1998, at 2.
139. Nick Paps & Paul Starik, With Relief Gilford Hands Over $1m to Finally Put His
Sister'sMurder behind Him, ADVERTISER (Adelaide), June 10, 1998, at 2.
140. Huxley, supra note 138.
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memory.
The Supreme Court of South Australia, drawn into the events because of the defendants' efforts at securing their freedom, almost found
itself at the centre of a diplomatic storm because of its role as the custodian of the Diyya payment, pending the defendants' release from prison.
Following the defendants' return to Britain, the nurses' Saudi lawyer
called on Parry to refuse authorising the payment to Frank Gilford and
to instead sue him for causing her mental anguish. 41 The Australian
Foreign Affairs Minister condemned the lawyer's suggestion and called
on the British High Commissioner in Canberra and the Australian High
Commissioner in London to lobby for the prompt payment of the
money. 2 Saudi authorities would probably have responded similarly, as
the lawyer's call is contrary to the Islamic principle of Awfu bil-Uqud
(fulfillment of agreements) and the Arab tradition of Wafa bil-Ahd
(keeping of promises)."
One reason the Supreme Court was spared a controversial legal decision was because the ultimate source of the money deposited in the
court was not the defendants, but British industrial interests. Their obvious motivation was to prevent the diplomatic tension that would have
resulted from the execution of a British subject." These final nonSaudis involved in the proceedings obviously deserve little sympathy.
Their role was, uniquely amongst the various non-Muslims drawn into
the Gilford trial, a voluntary one. It is of interest to note that these
companies' cynical motivations are unlikely to be regarded by Sharia
courts as compatible with the compassionate purpose of Diyya.
In total, a consideration of the plight and motivations of the various
non-Saudi individuals involved in the punishment phase of the Gilford
trial suggests that the application of the Islamic law of Qisas to nonMuslim foreigners is unsatisfactory. We do not intend to criticise the
continued use of the ancient tradition of Qisas in Saudi criminal justice
141. Roy Eccleston, Nurse Frees Blood Money for Gilford, AUSTRALIAN (Sydney), May
27, 1998, at 1. The basis for refusing the payment was not specified, although it is possible that Salah Al-Hejailan was contemplating arguing that the contract between Frank
Gilford and the defendants was illegal or immoral under Australian law or vitiated by duress or pressure. The position of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm in
Australia is doubtful. See FRANCIS A. TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN
AUSTL. 72-76 (2" ed. 1993).
142. Eccleston, supra note 141, at 1. The Minister described the lawyer's suggestion as
"disgraceful" and said, "Frank Gilford did do the right thing.., he did negotiate an
agreement which led to those women being spared. The fact is he still hasn't had his part
of the bargain fulfilled." Id.
143. The Quran 17:34. "and fulfill [every] agreement; for every agreement will be inquired into [on the day of judgment]." Id. at 2:177 ("it is righteousness ... to fulfil the
contracts which you have made"); compare id. at 5:1; 23:8; 4:90; 8:55-56; 8:73; 9:4; 9:7.
144. Lin Jenkins & Shirley English, Defense Contracts Worth Billions Could Be at
Risk, TIMES (London), Sep. 24, 1997, at 2.
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that is predicated on the particular tribal and religious culture and familial and social structure of Saudi Arabia. However, for exactly this
reason, we doubt whether the purpose of Qisas is fulfilled in circumstances where neither victim nor defendant is Saudi nor even Muslim,
so that religious, social, cultural and familial predicates of Islamic retaliatory punishment are almost certainly lacking. Indeed, it is evident
that imposing the right of Qisas on a foreign victim's non-Muslim heirs,
where they have no knowledge or understanding of Islamic law and
principles, will almost always represent an unwanted and weighty burden at a time of personal grief. Far from showcasing Islamic justice,
such an imposition will feed the West's negative perception of Islamic
law. Additionally, those heirs' performance of their role under Islamic
law will inevitably be corrupted by personal and external pressures
from their own culture.
Accordingly, we recommend that this situation be reformed. One
approach would be for those countries that prohibit the death penalty or
impose due process requirements on its application to legislate to prevent their nationals from exercising a retaliatory right of capital punishment arising from a foreign legal system. However, this approach
would probably lead to diplomatic tensions between Islamic and Western governments, difficult legal quandries for non-Islamic courts and
uncertainty about the penalty for murder of foreign nationals in countries such as Saudi Arabia.
The better solution is that Muslim scholars re-interpret the law to
restrict the role the victim's family in murder trials where the victim's
heirs live outside of the Islamic world." In practice, this would create a
different result only in the rare circumstance when non-Muslims were
convicted of murdering non-Muslim foreigners in an Islamic country'4
In such trials, discretionary Tazirat punishments should be the primary
response to a murder. This approach is consistent with the principle of
Qisas, which the Quran makes clear has the purpose of saving life. 47 In
a global economy where international travel is commonplace, Islamic
145. It should be noted that, in the Gilford trial itself, the judges of the AI-Khobar
court saw the involvement of non-Muslims as a reason to break with certain Saudi legal
traditions. See Theodoulou & Bale, supra note 2. As mentioned earlier, they allowed the
defendants to be represented by a lawyer in court, presumably in deference to British procedural standards. Id. In addition, they also took the unprecedented step of adjourning
the trial (for three weeks) prior to the verdict to urge Frank Gilford to waive the death
penalty and settle the matter contractually with the defendants. Id. This latter step is
significant as it specifically took into account the fact that the victim's heir was nonMuslim. Indeed, the defendants' lawyer described this procedure as one that accords "to
the spirit and dictates of Islam which are relevant to settle cases and disputes between
non-Muslims living in the Islamic world". Id.
146. As noted above, Saudi law already bars non-Muslims from the right to Qisas if
the murderer is a Muslim. KHADDURI, supra note 97, at 162.
147. The Quran 2:179 ("In the law of Qisas there is [saving of life").
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authorities should apply the law with Hikma 48 (wisdom) and reconsider
the application of Islamic criminal justice across national and cultural
borders.

148. The Quran 3:81 ("Allah took the covenant of the Prophets saying: I give you a Book
and Wisdom"); compare id. at 54:5; 3:8; 17:39; 16:125; 43:63; 2:23; 33:44; 2:269; 31:12;
38:20; 2:251; 3:48; 3:164; 4:54; 4:113; 5:110; 62:2.

THE PERILS OF PINOCHET:
PROBLEMS FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND A SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE
SOLUTION
ANTONIO F. PEREZ*
A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM - PRO-DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
AMNESTY
Many other situations are possible - involving Milosevic, Hussein,
Kabila, and several others - but imagine for now just one scene on a
Caribbean stage: Fidel Castro at the dock, joined perhaps by other sinners such as Raul Castro but also perhaps by some "saints" such as Ricardo Alarcon. They are all called upon to defend themselves, to explain away their responsibility for crimes against humanity, including
extra-judicial killing, torture, and forced disappearances
At that moment, more than history would be Castro's judge. Would it be a glorious
opportunity for revenge for Cuban exiles, for truth, and finally for justice? Indeed, there is a case for insisting on individual accountability to
assure the purging of the bad blood that would otherwise poison any attempt to construct a new order our of the ashes of Cuba's failed Communist revolution.2

* Associate Professor, Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America; J.D. 1985, Columbia Law School; A.B. 1982, Harvard College. I would like to thank
Robert Delahunty and Maria Christina Garcia for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts
of this paper, as well as Kelley Taglieri (CUA Class of 1999), Reed Russel (CUA Class of
1999) and John Cody (CUA Class of 2000) for excellent research assistance. All errors of
are mine alone and of course are not, I hope, attributable, if an author may be permitted a
personal reflection, to my heritage as a Cuban refugee.
1. See generally Department Of State: Cuba Country Reports On Human Rights
Practicesfor 1998, (visited April 5, 1999) <http//www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights
/1998_hrpreporttcuba.html>; Cuba's Repressive Machinery: Human Rights Forty Years
After the Revolution, HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 1999.
2. See Juan E. Mendez, In Defense of TransitionalJustice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 8 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997) [herein-

after RULE OF LAW] ("The perception of collective guilt only fosters new cycles of retribution, and it is imperative that it be corrected"); see also Lawrence Weschler, Inventing
Peace, NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 1995, at 56-64 (citing Richard Goldstone, South African
judge and first Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda).
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But there is another, albeit morally more ambiguous, side to this
question - a perspective considering the real-world consequences of an
absolutist ethic of moral accountability.' Would some relaxation of the
demand for justice through accountability undermine the greater goal
of a more just and lasting Cuban government, through a transition that
more fully satisfies all the claims of justice connected to Cuba's past and
its future? These claims would include rectification of wrongs done to
all Cubans, both those still living in Cuba and former Cubans now in
exile. Such claims, however, could not be pursued entirely without regard to the task of achieving a just and lasting regime in Cuba now and
assuring prospects for its sustainability in the future. In turn, these
goals would require constructing a relationship with the United States
on terms that would avoid the dysfunctional patterns in CubanAmerican relationships that played no small part in driving Cuba toward its current path.4
Currently, there is little evidence that a transition is near. It is
even questionable whether senior levels of the Cuban government recognize that a transition is inevitable or that it will need to account for
reconciliation both within Cuba and some kind of modus vivendi with
Cuban exiles in the United States and the U.S. Government. The recent crackdown against human rights activists may cause the regime to
recognize that the benefits of opening to change epitomized by the Papal visit are simply not worth the risks, even if at the price of the continuation of sanctions.5 Over time, the fear of revenge might well pre3. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 77, 120 (Gerth & Mills eds., 1976) (distinguishing between an "ethic of responsibility" and an "ethic of ultimate ends").
4. See JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION 139-49 (1978) (examining the role Cuba's failed relationship with the United States played in driving it into the
Soviet orbit and domestic socialism).
5. The Havana Four, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at A16 (editorial arguing that
prosecution of human rights activists for holding press conferences with foreign journalist
urging, among other things, that Cubans boycott one-party elections in Cuba calls into
question constructive engagement policy of states permitting foreign investors in Cuba).
Indeed, the May 28, 1999, sacking of Cuban Foreign Minister, Roberto Robaina, may have
been connected to Cuban elites' siege mentality. Official Cuban statements concerning
the need for a more vigorous foreign policy suggest that Robaina's downfall may have
been the price of failure in Cuba's attempt to defeat the U.S. sponsored resolution at the
United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva on April 23, 1999 condemning
Cuba's human rights practices. See Denis Rousseau, Cuba'sDynamic, Moderate Foreign
Minister Fired, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 29, 1999, available in LEXIS. See also
Fidel Tales Control of Foreign Policy: Robaina Sacked After Human Rights Setback at
U.N., LATIN AM. REG'L. REP.: CARIBIAN & CENT. AM., June 15, 1999, available in LEXIS.
But another, perhaps related explanation is that Robaina was closely associated with an
effort to begin a dialogue with the Cuban exile community. See Alfredo Corchado &
Nancy San Martin, Meeting Called 1" Step in Cuba Dialogue;Dallas Talks Establish Civility, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 6, 1998 at 10 (describing meeting between representatives of the Cuban government and members of the exile community, including lawyer
for the National Association of Sugar Mill Owners seeking compensation for the revolu-
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clude the initiation of intra-Cuban reconciliation before a transition is
fully activated, even if Cuban elites do not believe they have done anything for which they justly could be held accountable. This could ultimately lead to a more violent and unjust transition when one finally
does occur. Without assurances, Cuban elites may instead do whatever
is necessary to avoid losing political power, even perhaps at all costs,
both for themselves and anyone else who would stand in their way. s
Even more important, and equally imperiled, would be the opportunity
to rebuild the relationship between Cuba and the United States,
thereby potentially avoiding a second century of mistrust. Revisionist
historians have argued that the United States' intervention in Cuba
during the Spanish-American War of 1898 was intended not so much to
free Cuba from Spanish oppression, as to prevent Cuba's liberation,
unless as a dependent of the United States.7 Revisionist historians further argue that perhaps the United States was attempting to avoid the
emergence of another, black-ruled Caribbean republic.8 Thus, Castro's
removal at the hands of United States policy along with the triumphant
return of Cuban exiles previously victimized by the Castro regime may
well trigger the beginning of yet another pathological cycle in which
Cuba plays out the consequences of Cuba's traumatized national birth
in national psychology.
Maybe it would be better to give Castro, and at least some of his
comrades, a way out before too much damage is done? Even Senator
Jesse Helms, a deadly opponent of Fidel Castro, "would gladly trade
Fidel Castro a comfortable exile in Spain for his decision to step down
and allow Cubans to live in exile. 9 Indeed, a broader amnesty may be
in order to encourage Cuban elites to take steps now to support Cuba's
transition toward a democratic, prosperous, and just future. In sum,
there is a plausible case that avoiding criminal accountability will be a
policy tool of some importance either in stimulating a Cuban transition
or facilitating an ongoing transition's orientation toward more construction-era expropriations; and reporting a subsequent private meeting in New York between
Robaina and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, president of Cambio Cubano, a Cuban exile group
calling for dialogue with Castro as well as democracy in Cuba). If so, Robaina's demotion
signals a rejection of dialogue with the exile community.
6. As former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Elliot Abrams
writes: "Having negotiated with several dictators concerning their departure from power,
I can vouch for the fact that future safety is indeed one of their major preoccupations. If
they are unsure of it, will they not hang on until the last bloody moment?" Elliot Abrams,
Justice for Pinochet?, 107 COMMENTARY 42, 44 (1999).
7. See generally Louis A. Perez, Jr., An Ocean of Mischief Between Meanings and
Memories of 1998, 42 ORBIS 501 (Fall 1998) [hereinafter Between Meanings]; LOUIS A.
PEREZ, JR., CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY (1990).
8. See Perez, Between Meanings, supra note 7, at 512 (citing President McKinley's
Minister to Spain Stewart Woodford's obsession with the predominance of blacks among
the leadership of the Cuban insurgency).
9. Jesse Helms, And After Pinochet,WASH. POST., Dec. 10, 1998, at A31.
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tive directions.
Yet, in the best circumstances, negotiating amnesty would be a
gargantuan task, particularly in a rapidly changing situation once a
transition is activated. There may be no incentive for status quo elements in Cuba to concede that amnesty may be required, for this would
be to acknowledge fimdamentally the illegitimacy of the regime. Moreover, as international human rights pressure rises for the new government to satisfy its international obligations to prosecute for past human
rights violations, it is debatable whether or not the emerging forces
could credibly promise to members of the ancien regime that they would
be free from domestic prosecution."

10. Compare Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to ProsecuteHuman
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 375, 384 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter
Duty to Prosecute] ("[Authoritative interpretations of [the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, inter alia,] make clear that a State Party fails in its duty to ensure the cluster of
rights protecting physical integrity if it does not investigate violations and seek to punish
those who are responsible."), with John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South
African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 306 [hereinafter Reconciliation] ("[Sitate practice at this time is too unsettled to support a rule of customary international law obliging a successor regime to prosecute those alleged to have committed
crimes against humanity in all circumstances.... ."). The difference between Orentlicher
and Dugard may be less than appears to be on the surface, however, since both would
carve out exceptions from the general thrust of their positions. Compare Duty to Prosecute, supra at 402-16 (discussing criteria for exceptions from the general rule), with Reconciliation, supra at 307 (criticizing South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
for missing an "opportunity to show that although there may be an emergent norm in favor of prosecution, it is not absolute, provided that the course followed in lieu of prosecution meets internationally accepted standards"). In sum, both may well call for some
minimum level of criminal accountability. See also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S.
ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 81 n.16, 301 (1997) [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY] (arguing that international law imposes some minimum obligations on states not to grant
amnesty and that amnesty does not prelude prosecutions elsewhere for violation of international law); accord Jordan Paust, Individual CriminalResponsibility for Human Rights
Atrocities and Sanction Strategies, 33 TEx. INTL L.J. 631, 641 n.95 (reviewing
ACCOUNTABILITY). Ratner recognizes, however, that in the special case of transitional
societies, subsequent practice as a matter of treaty interpretation and state practice as
matter of customary international law suggest that the nature of these minimum obligations may take a less categorical shape and, therefore, accommodate at least some TRCs.
See Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in InternationalLaw
87 GEO. L.J. 707, 724-26 (treaty law) and 728-29 (customary international law) (1999)
[hereinafter New Democracies]. Ratner further acknowledges that the international
community's "unequivocal condemnation" would, in some cases at least, be "ill-advised
and unrealistic." Id. at 747. On the other hand, he does not categorically rule out a
minimum requirement of criminal accountability even in a transitional context. Even a
minimum requirement, however, could radically destabilize the prospects for employing
amnesty as a transition-forcing device.
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I.

INTRODUCTION: PINOCHET, INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY, AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION

Now, however, with the advent of the Pinochet precedent, utilizing
amnesty as a transitional policy tool may be completely outside the
reach of the Cuban factions who, ultimately, must bear the lion's share
of responsibility for Cuba's future. Neither could this option be employed by Cuba in cooperation with any manageable group of interested
nations who represent the external claimants on Cuba's future. For
Cuba, as well as for other states, transition and transitional justice
have become infinitely more complicated because of Spain's recent request for Augusto Pinochet's extradition from the United Kingdom, assessed by the House of Lords in Ex Parte Pinochet," and the adoption of
2
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute).
It will be the incalculable risk of foreign or international prosecution, a
risk totally outside the control of the most interested parties, which will
destabilize negotiating the narrow corridor between the Scylla of violent
or impermanent transition and the Charybdis of transitional impunity.
Thus, reclaiming the carrot of amnesty as a policy instrument will
now require international governance. It will, no doubt, demand exceptionally nuanced governance as well, because the policy requires a careful balancing of the gains to be derived from constructing an internationalized amnesty power against the potential losses in future
deterrence of international human rights violations. There is no doubt
that deterrence has increased as a result of Ex Parte Pinochet and will
be further strengthened by the soon to be established International
Criminal Court (ICC). But, unlike earlier international criminal tribunals exercising jurisdiction in cases of transitional justice, such as the
Security Council-authorized tribunals for civil wars in the former Yugo-

11. Regina v. Bartle and the Comm'r of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte
Pinochet, 37 I.L.M. 1302 (H.L. 1998) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet] (by 3 -2 vote of a
panel of the House of Lords, overturning the Divisional Court's quashing of an extradition
warrant against Pinochet, finding that he was not entitled to immunity as a former Head
of State for the offenses for which Spain had sought his extradition); Regina v. Bow St.
Metro. StipendiaryMagistrateand Others, Ex Parte Pinochet(No. 2), 1 All E.R. 577 (H.L.
Jan. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Ex PartePinochet II] (granting petition to set aside House of
Lords's ruling in Ex Parte Pinochet, because of the appearance of impropriety raised by
the relationship between Lord Hoffman's indirect relationship with intervener Amnesty
International); Regina v. Bartle and the Comm'r of Police for the Metropolis and Others,
Ex Parte Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet III] (modifying Ex PartePinochet by holding that Pinochet is extraditable only for extradition crimes
that occurred after all relevant states had become parties to the Torture Convention).
12. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
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slavia 13 and Rwanda,"' national prosecutions will not necessarily be
grounded in a prior political decision by the international community
where moral and prudential gains of prosecution exceed the costs of accommodation. Indeed, the ICC Statute recognizes Security Council assessments of these questions only to the extent of deferring to a Security Council "request" that an investigation or prosecution be delayed
for a year upon the adoption of a Chapter VII resolution "to that effect." 5 Setting aside whether it is permissible for the ICC Statute to
purport to ignore a Chapter VII resolution making a "decision," rather
than merely issuing a "request,"6 surely an ICC prosecution would no
more reflect a judgment of the international community of the merits of
the particular case than would a purely national prosecution. 7 In any
event, the assumption in the ICC Statute that a prosecution may only
be delayed for an incremental periods leaves open the possibility that
13. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217 mtg.,
U.N.Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. S/25704, Annex (1993),
32 ILM 1192 (1993).
14. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/RES/955 (1994).
15. See ICC Statute, supra note 12, 37 I.L.M. at 1012, art. 16 ("No investigation or
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12
months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.").
16. See infra text accompanying notes 132-43 (discussing the legal basis for Security
Council supremacy).
17. In a sense the ICC is no more than a multilateralized extradition treaty combined
with a choice of forum clause for prosecution of offenses in which states would ordinarily
have jurisdiction to prosecute. Because the exercise of decision-making authority by the
ICC Prosecutor and other ICC bodies is de-politicized, its work product cannot possibly
reflect the factoring of criteria that might inform, for example, a national prosecutor's decision. See John Bolton, CourtingDanger:What's Wrong with the InternationalCriminal
Court, 54 NAT'L INTEREST 60 (Winter 1988/89) [hereinafter CourtingDanger] (former Assistant Secretary of State objecting to ICC precisely because there is no international government that makes prosecution through the medium of an international criminal court
consistent with fundamental notions of governmental accountability necessary to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
18. It may even be in that case that Article 16 could be invoked by the Security Council for an indefinite number of 12-month periods. This is not the necessary interpretation,
however. For example, in interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the
United States appears to have taken the position that the right to extend the NPT for an
additional 25-year period, after the expiration of the NPT's initial 25-year period, could be
exercised only once. See Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes, Correspondence,Epstein and Szasz Do
the NPT No Favor, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 247 (1993) (arguing, contrary to noted international
arms control experts, that the NPT is unambiguous on this point). However, the relevant
language there provides for a conference to "decide whether the Treaty shall continue in
force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." Treaty
on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, art. X, para. 2,
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there will be no timely resolution in the context of a transition to democracy of a prosecution by a third state seeking to vindicate universal
interests regarding human rights.
A proposed solution, in brief, would be to construct and legitimize
internationally-authorized and binding amnesty. In the short term, it
may be possible to rely on the Security Council's exercise of prosecutorial discretion on behalf of the international community in the cases of
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as precedents for Security Council authorization on a case-by-case basis of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs)."9 Although Security Council-authorized TRCs would need
to be constructed in accordance with emerging international practice for
national amnesty,2 they would benefit from the power of the Council to
confer an internationally-binding amnesty based on its power to render
decisions under Chapter VII as well as the political legitimacy that
would flow from the exercise of supranational authority." However, because of concerns regarding the Security Council's legitimate exercise of
its Chapter VII powers, a long-term solution to this problem may well
require the Security Council to delegate this responsibility, perhaps to
Secretary-General, as well as a revision of the ICC Statute to harmonize multilaterally-authorized prosecutions with supranationallyauthorized prosecutorial discretion and amnesty.
In brief, this article considers the implications of the Pinochet affair
for transitional justice and supranational governance. It will describe,
first, the changing context in which the case arises, including among
other things the adoption of the ICC Statute. Next, it critiques the
opinions of the House of Lords in light of their implications for transitional justice, as well as their central tendency toward a synthesis of international law and politics at both the domestic and international levels. Then, the article examines the role the Security Council or its
21 U.S.T. 483, 493, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 175 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
19. But see Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a PermanentInternationalTruth Commission, 7 DuKE J. COMP & INT'L L. 375, 401-02 (1997) [hereinafter Permanent International Truth Commission] (proposing a commission either as a stand-alone organization
or as an adjunct to the, at that time proposed, ICC); see infra text accompanying notes
129-31 (supplying objections to this proposal).
20. Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing JurisprudenceofAmnesty,
20 HuM. RTS Q. 843 (1998) [hereinafter Developing Jurisprudence].
21. See infra notes 132-43; see generally Antonio F. Perez, On the Way to the Forum:
The Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and the Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations
Charter,31 TEx. INT'L L. J. 353 (1996) (arguing for treating recent UN peace-enforcement
and peace-keeping through regional organizations as the exercise of quasi-constitutional
supranational authority). This exercise of authority by the Security Council would be
consistent with the focus of the leading modern understanding of the characteristics of
supranational legal authority because of its direct effects on the rights of individuals. See,
e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory ofEffective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287-90 (1997) (focusing on direct links with subnational entities).
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delegees could play in mediating these syntheses through enabling policy flexibility in this area. Finally, this article will reconsider the problem of Cuban transition as a possible, and arguably hardest, trial case
for internationalized amnesty.

II. Two NEW REALITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Henceforth, transitions to democracy will take place in a wholly
new political and legal international environment for addressing questions of transitional justice. This change now seems irreversible given
the international response to the Pinochet case on the heels of the apparent willingness of most states to forge ahead, despite plausible arguments for caution,n and to create a permanent International Criminal Court, notwithstanding United States objections.'
A.

EmergingPractice in InternationalHuman Rights Enforcement

The international unwillingness to tolerate impunity for the sins of
the past stems from a variety of factors. As a practical matter, the generations that experienced the Holocaust and similar abominations in
the post-war years began dimly to perceive the connections between
human rights and universal peace.' The deeper meaning of the Holocaust has been finally internalized by a generation of international lawyers who began their professional training in a world where state sovereignty was no longer a credible answer to the universal and
22. See John R. Bolton, The Global Prosecutors:Hunting War Criminalsin the Name
of Utopia, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 157 (JAN.IFEB. 1999) [hereinafter The Global Prosecutors](essay reviewing ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1998)), MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Bolton,
Courting Danger,supra note 17 at 69; Jeremy Rabkin, InternationalLaw vs. The American Constitution:Something's Got to Give, 55 NAT'L INTEREST 30, 34-35 (Spring 1999)
[hereinafter InternationalLaw].
23. David J. Scheffer, Deterrence of War Crimes in the 21" Century, Speech by Department of State's Ambassador-at-Largefor War Crimes Issues at Twelfth Annual Pacific
Command International Military Operations and Law Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii
(Feb. 23, 1999), (visited Apr. 5, 1999)
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy-remarks/
1999/990223_scheffer_hawaii.html> (detailing U.S. objections). Significantly, in relation
to the question of immunity, Scheffer noted: "One of our proposals was to exempt from the
court's jurisdiction conduct that arises from the official actions of a nonparty state acknowledged as such by that nonparty. This would require a nonparty state to acknowledge responsibility for an atrocity in order to be exempted, an unlikely occurrence for
those who usually commit genocide or other serious violations of international humanitarian law. Regrettably, our proposed amendments to Article 12 were rejected on the premise
that the proposed take it or leave it draft of the treaty was so fragile that, if any part were
reopened, the conference would fall apart." Id.
24. For the locus classicus of this view, see Immanual Kant, PerpetualPeace, in KANT
ON HISTORY 85, 117-35 (Beck ed., 1957); see also FERNANDO TESON, A THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION (1998) (espousing a neo-Kantian position).
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indivisible claims of the human rights revolution.' Indeed, the force of
human rights even became a tool in the Cold War struggle between the
United States and Soviet Union, when the Helsinki Accords and the
rise of Charter 77 validated Western claims to demand respect for human rights behind the Iron Curtain.2 Furthermore, these developments
gave rise to an institutional expression, whereby networks of international human rights activists in the context of an emerging transnational civil society organized domestic and transnational political processes to enforce international human rights norms, most notably in
Latin AmericaY These developments led to widespread recognition
that human rights have become a concern of the international community in which all members of that community have an interest and, po28
tentially an internationally-recognized right to seek their enforcement.
But perhaps most important is the realization that toleration of
human rights and humanitarian law violations is no longer necessary
for the purpose of maintaining Cold War alliances. For example, General Pinochet's role in serving as a bulwark against the spread of socialism in South America may once have constrained Washington's, and
even London's, policy options. Setting aside the potential rise of revolutionary populism in Venezuela, Drug Lords have in recent years posed a
greater threat to U.S. security interests in the hemisphere than Marxism.2 9 And for London, gratitude for Chilean support during the Falk25. See Richard Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law, reprinted

in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 866, 867 (1991) (modern
human rights law emerged "with the implications of the holocaust and other Nazi atrocities very much in mind").
26. See, e.g., HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTExT: LAW, POLITICS AND MORALS 371 (1996) (noting the connection between the Helsinki process and Cold War developments, particularly the contraction of the "domestic
jurisdiction" limitation evidenced in 1991 Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Helsinki
process); cf. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)
(treating paradigm shifts as a function in part of generational succession); see also BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 95-102 (1991) (extending Kuhn's concept to
domestic constitutional analysis)
27. See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) (addressing a range
of example, including human rights); Kathryn Sikkink, Principled Issue-Networks and
Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993) (discussing case of human rights).
28. See, e.g., MAURIzIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA
OMNES (Clarendon Press ed., 1997) [hereinafter ERGA OMNES] (analyzing origins, development, and potential applications of concept of rights held and opposable by all members
of the international community); see also Juan-Antonio Carrillo-Salcedo, ERGA OMNES, 92
AM. J. INT'L. L. 791 (1998) (book review) (calling for a more expansive view to take into
account the ethical dimension of international law). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. 0 & Reporters' Note 11
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (limiting erga omnes obligations to only a few
cases that are recognized jus cogens ).
29. The Mission Statement of the State Department's Bureau for International Nar-
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land's crisis may have been necessary so long as Argentine revanchism

posed a threat, but a series of successful transitions in Buenos Aires
now minimizes the risk of renewed efforts to direct Argentine nationalism toward Las Islas Malvinas.n Indeed, it may even be no longer out

of the question that the U.S. would find its way to assist Spanish authorities seeking to prosecute Pinochet by providing information in the
possession of the U.S. intelligence community concerning the junta's
human rights violations, including assassinations arranged by the Chil-

ean intelligence agency in the United States and perhaps elsewhere.31

It may be relevant that, for the United States, the Democratic party in
power today bears no responsibility for the Chilean crisis in the early

1970s.3

Today it seems clear that the central and bipartisan goal of

cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs leads notably with the following claim: "[Niarcotics
control has been an important U.S. foreign policy issue for many years." Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Mission Statement (visited April 5,
1999) <http://www.state.govtwww/ global/narcoticslaw/mission.html>.
30. See Jack Straw and GeneralPinochet, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1998, at 66 (discussing
U.K. political cleavages in relation to debt of gratitude felt by those in power in the U.K.
during the Falklands War).
31. U.S. Department of State Press Spokesman James Rubin seemed to suggest as
much in response to press inquiries:
QUESTION: Has the United States received any requests for documentation
or any other sort of assistance from Judge Gar[zion in Spain who's working
on the Pinochet matter?
MR. RUBIN: There has been contact and cooperation between the Spanish
judges investigating General Pinochet and the US Department of Justice for
over one year. In February and July 1997, the Spanish judges initiated
broad, formal requests for US assistance under the 1990 US-Spain Legal Assistance Treaty in connection with their investigation of General Pinochet.
The State Department has provided hundreds of documents through the Justice Department to the Spanish court, including pertinent unclassified and
declassified documents, and we continue to review our files. The Justice Department is the designated central authority of the United States under the
treaty and is, therefore, the US Government agency responsible for handling
these requests. Therefore, any specific questions about the details of that
ought to be directed at the Justice Department.
U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Oct. 26, 1998 (transcript available at Department of State, Daily Briefing (visited on April 5, 1999) <http://secretary.state.gov/
www/briefings/ 9810/981026db.html>). Governments, even such as the United States, can
no longer afford to appear indifferent to international scrutiny. For example, in response
to an Amnesty International Report criticizing U.S. failure to comply with international
human rights norms, State Department Press Spokesman James Foley stated: "We welcome their scrutiny." Survey, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1998, at 13.
32. Yet even this factor has not prevented a reversal of U.S. policy of denial in other
cases, such as Guatemala, where President Clinton recently apologized for the U.S. role at
a time when Democrats were responsible for U.S. foreign policy of propping up a military
dictatorship that committed egregious human rights violations. See Douglas Farah, We've
Not Been Honest: '68 Memo Assails U.S. Role in Guatemalan War, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
1999, at A25 (quoting contemporaneous memorandum by Embassy officer Peter Vaky,
asking: "Is it conceivable that we are so obsessed with insurgency that we are prepared to
rationalize murder as an acceptable counter-insurgency weapon?"). It may be, however,
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U.S. foreign policy is the construction of a peaceful world through respect for international human rights accorded by a community of democratic nations.3
In sum, the drive toward vindication of human
rights has become an overwhelming force in international politics.
B. An Emerging Practiceof Domestic TransitionalAmnesty
The emerging demand for justice has expressed itself in a recent
series of cases dealing with transitional justice, particularly in Latin
America. These cases suggest that some accountability for the past is
an instrumental part of the transition to democracy, also including
some measure of amnesty as a carrot to induce acceptance of the new
order by previous elites. For example, in Argentina the release of
members of the junta (perhaps in the face of the threat of yet another
golpe de estado), left the sense that full justice was not done.' And in
Uruguay, there may well have been a complete amnesia masquerading
as a full amnesty, albeit as the product of the democratically-expressed
will of the Uruguayan people in a popular referendum.' Arguably, both
cases failed because they initially treated the question of transitional
justice as a binary proposition: either justice was to be done, though the
heavens may fall,' and the guilty would be brought to the bar; or perpetrators and victims alike would dip themselves in Lethe's forgetful waters. 7 Certainly, either moral absolutism or moral indifference would

that the U.S. openness today may have been the fruit of the willingness of an earlier Democratic administration headed by President Carter to break with the past. See id. at 25
(describing Guatemala's refusal in 1977 to accept U.S. aid conditioned on compliance with
human rights norms).
33. See WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND
ENLARGEMENT 2 (Feb. 1995) ("democracy must be at once the foundation and the purpose
of the international structures [the United States builds) through this constructive diplomacy").
34. See Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 20, at 858. Nonetheless, the Argentine
legislature subsequently repealed the amnesty law, although with arguably little effect
since most major offenses had already been addressed under the law. See id. at 859.
Judge Garzon, who initiated the Pinochet case, has recently stepped into this void as well,
issuing an international arrest warrant in Madrid for former Argentine military leaders
who escaped justice in Argentina. See Anthony Faoila, Spanish Judge Indicts Leaders of
Argentina's 'Dirty War, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1999 at A29; see also Maria Del Carmen et
al., Case Note: Spanish National Court CriminalDivision (PlenarySession), Case 19/97,
November 4, 1998; Case 1/98, November 5, 1998, AM. J. INT'L. L. 690 (1999) (reporting
proceedings under the direction of Judge Garcia-Castellon concerning Argentine human
rights violations).
35. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTs. Q. 597, 616 (1994).
36. Fiatjustitia ruat coelum is the ancient maxim expressing this idea, attributed to
Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninas, quoted in JOHN BARTLETr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
133 (15th ed. 1980) [hereinafter BARTLETr'S].
37. The connection between historical denial and perdition's flames runs deep in the
Western tradition and certainly precedes the Holocaust: "Far off from there as low and
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have been impolitic as well as unjustified, because as opportunity for
transitional justice passes, the seeds are sown for private vengeance by
the victims or future challenges against democracy by the former perpetrators.' As Sartre put it, for all these members of transitional societies, hell would indeed be other people,39 meaning the others with whom
each side would continue to share their countries, while each side fully
believes that justice was not done.
Intermediate precedents are also available, however. Chile followed a different pattern, whereby the successor government respected
the self-amnesty proclaimed by the Pinochet regime but avoided most of
the moral and prudential perils of historical denial by establishing a
TRC that has uncovered much of the horrors of Chile's painful antidemocratic interregnum. ° South Africa embarked on another, perhaps
more promising course, because the amnesty originated in an agreement among the factions prior to the transition, where the victors embraced the vanquished, holding out the olive branch of amnesty, asking
only for the truth in return. Under Archbishop Desmond Tutu's leadership, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission offered
amnesty in return for truth, not only for the victors but also for the
vanquished. "
Consider the possible implications of the Pinochet case on the
silent stream) Lethe the River of Oblivion rouls/ Her watrie Labyrinth, whereof who
drinks/ Forthwith his former state and being forgetsJ Forgets both joy and grief, pleasure
and pain." JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Bk. II, 11. 583-86, reprintedin THE COMPLETE
POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN MILTON (Shawcross ed., 1971).
38. See Mendez, supra note 2, at 8.
39. Jean-Paul Sartre, Huis-Clos (In-Camera), sc. v, quoted in BARTLETT'S, supra note
36, at 865.
40. See Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 20, at 846-49; see also Robert J. Quinn,
Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of A PriorRegime: Chile'sNew Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 905 (1994).
41. See Dugard, supra note 10, at 290-301. A measure of the integrity of the South
African TRC is its recent decision not to grant amnesty to certain government members of
the ANC who refused to apply individually. See Truth Panel Will Not PardonANC Members, WASH. POST, April 7, 1999, at A15. Another, as yet untested example in Africa following the South African model of general amnesty coupled with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is the settlement of the civil war and regional conflict in Sierra Leone,
although U.S. Secretary of State Madelaine Albright has left open the possibility that international participation in that settlement may ultimately entail some form of international prosecution. See Karl Vick, SierraLeone's Unjust Peace:At Sobering Stop Albright
Defends Amnesty for Rebels, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1999 at A12 (Secretary Albright "voiced
support for an international tribunal only in principle, however, saying she prefers to
'keep that as something that we might come to.'"). But see Steven Mufson, U.S. Backs
Role for Rebels in W. Africa: Sierra Leone Amnesty Pushed in Peace Talks, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 1999 at A13 (quoting David Wippman, a Cornell Law Professor and former National Security Council staff member, as saying "It is appalling that these people are not
subject to criminal prosecution but are rewarded with roles in government. It is really a
dilemma created by the lack of international will to commit resources and troops needed
to restore peace without having to accept the demands of these rebel forces.").
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South African solution. In theory, the crime of apartheid may be one
for which there is universal jurisdiction, so that any country that gains
custody of one of the perpetrators of apartheid in South Africa could
plausibly assert authority to prosecute, notwithstanding the amnesty
granted under South African law to such offenders.
A similar risk
might even obtain for some members of the African National Congress
(ANC), who may have committed murder and torture in ANC camps in
the Front-line states during the apartheid era, either in violation of the
formal law of those states or applicable international law obligations.43
Nonetheless, the TRCs work has opened the door to a new South Africa.
It was thought that the Biblical generation would need to pass before
the people of Israel could enter the Promised Land." If the TRC accelerates that process, it will achieve far more than was ever thought possible. By parity of reasoning, partial justice for the victims and the
preservation of social peace in an increasingly democratic political system may well be the best that can be expected in Chile. The question
arises: what right enables a third state, absent the consent of the state
in transition,48 to intervene unilaterally to substitute its judgment?
This is not to say that individual states and the world community
as a whole do not have an interest in effective deterrence of human
rights violations everywhere, since each state's social stability gains
from the threat that its own human rights violators will be prosecuted
someday. Indeed, the international human rights movement has thus
ushered in a new era of deterrence addressing the long-standing problem of under-enforcement of human rights norms, for there is no doubt
that tyrants do calculate the risk that they will face the prospect of accountability for their actions. 6 Moreover, even governments claiming
42. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 12, art. 7(1)(j) (including "apartheid" as a crime
within the ICC's jurisdiction).
43. See Lynne Duke, ANC Leaders'Amnesty Bid Blocked: S. African Truth PanelRuling May Leave Mbeki, 26 Others Open to Charges, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1999, at A28 (reporting TRC rejection of ANC request for amnesty, because applicants refused to "profess
guilt for any specific human rights abuses and did not seek amnesty as individuals, as
required by law.").
44. Numbers 14:20 (King James).
45. In the Chilean case, it should be noted that the United States has insisted on the
full resolution of the Chilean involvement in the 1976 assassination in Washington of
former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier, as well as others. Indeed, Elliot Abrams
maintains that the United States would be justified in pursuing Pinochet if he were
proved to have directly conspired in this heinous act. See Abrams, supra note 6 at 45.
Although the United States could rely on the objective territoriality principle as a jurisdictional shield, thereby obviating the concern over use of universal jurisdiction as a jurisdictional sword, it might still be accused of destabilizing the Chilean transition, but for
the fact that, at U.S. insistence, this case was specifically excluded from Chilean amnesty.
See Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 20 at 849 n.32; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (exempting
assassination in the U.S. from foreign sovereign immunity).
46. See Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of
War, 86 CAL. L. REv. 939, 1019 n.317 (1998) [hereinafter Obeying Orders] (reporting that
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altruistic motives make similar calculations. For example, in explaining its decision not to support the new ICC Statute, the U.S. did not object to the general principle that human rights violations should be
prosecuted. Rather, the U.S. raised concerns about unfairness in selective and unjustified prosecution of U.S. nationals, particularly in the
case of U.S. persons on peacekeeping missions deployed on the territory
of a State Party to the ICC Statute, thus arguably satisfying the ICC
The premise of the U.S. legal
Statute's jurisdictional preconditions.
objection is merely that an international institution may not exercise
universal jurisdiction against a national of a non-party, even when a
state could exercise jurisdiction under international law." Whatever
the merit of this particular jurisdictional contention,49 there appears to
be no general danger that the ICC will over-enforce international human rights norms or that the extensive procedural guarantees in the
ICC Statute will not work to assure that the truly innocent will have
nothing to fear.5 Moreover, the general presumption of the legality of
international exercise of jurisdiction reflected in the Lotus Case" makes
it difficult to argue that the mere destabilizing effect of asserting universal jurisdiction on a political settlement in the transitioning state
amounts to impermissible intervention in that state's internal affairs.52
"Minutes of one meeting of the first Argentine junta explicitly refer to the need to avoid
an Argentine Nuremberg").
47. ICC statute, supra note 12, art. 12(2)(a).
48. Professor John Norton Moore, Address Before the ABA Standing Committee on
Law and National Security Conference, Eighth Annual Review of the Field of National
Security Law, Washington, DC (Nov. 12-13, 1998). But see Michael P. Scharf, Remarks in
Panel: The Rome Treaty: Is the InternationalCriminal Court Viable?, 21 NAT'L. SEC. L.
REP. 2 at 25 (June 1999) (arguing that U.S. interests in asserting universal jurisdiction in
terrorist cases such as that of Fawaz yunis would be undermined by arguing that the ICC
may not exercise universal jurisdiction on a non-party).
49. See Scheffer, supra note 25 (presenting State Department defense).
50. See, e.g., ICC statute, supra note 12, art. 55 ("Rights of persons during an investigation"), art. 66 ("Presumption of innocence"), art. 67 ("Rights of the accused"), art. 70
("Offenses against the administration of justice"), art. 101 ("Rule of Speciality"). One author has already considered on the merits possible challenges to U.S. conduct and concluded that U.S. military action in the context of U.N. authorized peacekeeping or enforcement actions would not likely expose U.S. personnel to legal jeopardy. See generally
David Marcella, Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to InternationalCriminal
Court and the Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 337, 373-403
(1999).
51. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7) (holding, among
other things, that a state is presumed to act lawfully in the absence of a prohibitory rule
of international law). But see ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 809, 866 (Judge Shahabuddeen, dissenting)
(calling this premise into question for fundamental questions regarding the relation of
states to the international community).
52. See generally Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States, G.A_ Res. 2131(XX) (1965), reprinted in LOUIS L. HENKIN ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 905 (3d ed. 1993); see also U.N. CHARTER, art. 2,
para. 7 (domestic jurisdiction principle).
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Rather, the question is whether states exercising universal jurisdiction, unilaterally or through the ICC as a proxy, should do so in light
of its potential consequences for the political stability of the transitioning state. The Pinochet case, regardless of its ultimate resolution, may
well make this a question of ever more pressing significance, both for
states asserting universal jurisdiction and for states that have yet to
achieve the happy circumstances of those states that are sufficiently
comfortable in their own stability to be willing to assert universal jurisdiction.
III. THE PERILS OF PINOCHET-A HARD CASE THAT COULD PROMOTE
SUPRANATIONAL POLICY-MAKING?
Ex PartePinochet may well signal the dawn of a new era in human
rights enforcement. But, even if it proves the exception rather than the
rule, the calculations of officials responsible for human rights violations
can never be the same. At the heart of the matter is that Spain's request did not focus, except initially, on any harm Pinochet may have
caused directly to Spain or Spanish nationals. Rather, it was a claim to
vindicate the rights of humanity as a whole.
The case did not have to follow such a path, except for the vagaries
of British extradition law and practice. In a series of appearances at
the House of Lords, British law and the factual posture of the case
drove a majority of the Lords on each reviewing panel to refuse to apply
Head of State immunity principles to a defined set of crimes within universal jurisdiction, but serendipitously for an increasingly sophisticated
set of reasons that ultimately strengthened the precedential value of
the House of Lords' final decision. Because the House of Lords in Ex
Parte Pinochet II granted Pinochet's petition to set aside the ruling of
the House of Lords' initial ruling on November 25, 1998 solely on the
ground of the appearance of impropriety suggested by the indirect connection between Lord Hoffman, who cast the decisive vote, and intervener Amnesty International, it may be that the legal reasoning employed in Ex Parte Pinochet continues to be relevant and will be relied
upon by other states facing the question. In any event, a precise understanding of the conclusions of the larger panel of Lords', which convened in Ex Parte Pinochet III, and on March 24, 1999, essentially confirmed the holdings but substantially narrowed the effect of Ex Parte
Pinochet, requires detailed analysis of the House of Lords' initial reasoning.
In brief, it appears the Lords in Ex Parte Pinochet III more thoroughly addressed issues highlighted in the dissenting opinions in Ex
Parte Pinochet concerning the scope of U.K. extradition law and the
need for clarity in constructing a basis for overturning Head of State
immunity. By addressing the weaknesses in the earlier set of opinions,
the Lords may well have increased the precedental force of their argua-
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bly revolutionary legal conclusion stripping Pinochet of former Head of
State immunity. More important, by developing better answers to the
political-process related objections that surfaced in Ex Parte Pinochet,
the Lords properly limited the judicial role by inviting legal policymaking from domestic and transnational political actors.
A. Ex Parte Pinochet - JurisdictionalFoundationsand Untested
Assumptions
Spain's first request for Pinochet's extradition was grounded on direct Spanish interests in the vindication of rights held by its national.
However, Spain did not assert the usual claim that the defendant committed an offense on its territory or, under the objective theory, that the
defendant had direct and substantial effects on Spanish territory.' Instead, Spain's initial request was grounded in the arguably problematical ground of passive personality jurisdiction,' that is to say, the right
to prosecute Pinochet for the murder of Spanish nationals anywhere in
the world, including Chile.' Arguably, Spain may have avoided the potentially exorbitant character of passive personality-based jurisdiction
applied to the general case of "ordinary torts or crimes" against foreign
nationals if it had been able to argue that its nationals were singled out
as part of a general program of domestic repression.' However, in asserting passive personality in the broader form, Spain unfortunately
initially chose a theory that would not have afforded British authorities
the right to prosecute in equivalent circumstances under British law.5"

53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 402 (1) (c). The so-called effects
principle, although derived from the territoriality principle, is considered applicable by
some states even where no actual effects are shown, such as in the case of conspiracy, or a
failed attempt, to kill Spanish nationals in Spain. See id. § 402 cmt. d ("When the intent
to commit the prescribed act is clear and demonstrated by some activity, and the effect to
be produced by the activity is substantial and foreseeable the fact that a plan or conspiracy was thwarted does not deprive the target state of jurisdiction to make its law applicable.").
54. See id. § 402 cmt. g ("The passive personality principle asserts that a state may
apply law-particularly criminal law-to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national. The principle has not
been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representatives or other officials.").
55. Ex PartePinochet, supra note 11, at 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1317 (Lord Lloyd of Berwick,
dissenting) ("The murder of Spanish citizens in Chile is not an extradition crime under
section 2(1)(b) of the Extradition Act for which Senator Pinochet could be extradited, for
the simple reason that the murder of a British citizen in Chile would not be an offense
against our law.").
56. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 402 cmt. g (recognizing the extension of passive to cases in which foreign nationals are targeted because of their nationality).
57. See id.
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The applicable Extradition Treaty required reciprocity,5 or what is
sometimes called in the extradition context "double criminality"-that
is, that the request is for conduct that would be a prosecutable offense
under the laws of both countries. 9 Thus, the absence in these circumstances of passive personality jurisdiction under U.K. law placed in
jeopardy Spain's efforts to secure British cooperation in the assertion of
that basis of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Spain made a second request for extradition asserting
the broader ground of universal jurisdiction based on international
treaties to which the U.K. is a party and customary international law,
which would be binding on the U.K. and Spain, and therefore, would afford British authorities equivalent jurisdiction under U.K. law.' Thus,
Spain's legal strategy for overcoming the reciprocity objection made Ex
PartePinochet a test case for a much more expansive role by individual
states using extradition to enforce international human rights norms.
If Pinochet could be extradited to Spain solely to answer for offenses for
which Spain could assert only universal jurisdiction, then the usual
limitation on the exercise of universal jurisdiction-namely, that the
offender be "found" on the territory of the state exercising jurisdiction 6'-would be pulled up from the roots. Extradition would then be-

58. See id. ("The underlying principle of all extradition agreements between states,
including the European Extradition Convention of 1957, is reciprocity.").
59. It is not clear, however, that this view reflects general international practice,
since some states seem to explicitly provide for "dual criminality" in extradition treaties,
thereby suggesting that reciprocity of this kind is not a baseline assumption of every extradition arrangement. Compare Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Italy, art. II, para. 1, reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 813 ("[aln offense, however denominated,
shall be an extraditable offense only if it is punishable under the laws of both Contracting
Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a more severe
penalty"), with U.S.-U.K. Treaty of Extradition, art. III, para. 1(b), reprinted in CARTER &
TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 337-38 (1995) (providing for an

additional criterion for extraditability stating that "the offense is extraditable under the
relevant law.... ."). This is because, some states, such as the United States, take "dual
criminality" to mean only that the substantive conduct, if undertaken within the jurisdiction of the requested, would be criminal; that is to say, the House of Lords construction of
the European Treaty is not a "dual criminality" requirement, but is rather a "dual jurisdiction" provision.
60. See Ex Parte Pinochet, Dissenting Opinion of Lord Lloyd of Berwick, supra note
11, 37 I.L.M. at 1318 ("Meanwhile the flaw in the first provisional arrest warrant must
have become apparent to the Crown Prosecution Service, acting on behalf of the State of
Spain. At all events, Judge Garzon in Madrid issued a second international warrant of
arrest dated 18 October, alleging crimes of genocide and terrorism."). In addition to hostage-taking, genocide, and terrorism, the second warrant included torture allegations;
thus, Lord Lloyd of Berwick presciently observed that, "unlike murder, torture is an offence under English law wherever the act of torture is committed." Id.
61. It is not clear whether the House of Lords' opinions here necessarily reach this
question, since Lord Slynn of Hadley's opinion observed that the "sole question is whether
[Pinochet] is entitled to immunity as a former Head of State from arrest and extradition
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come a vehicle for bootstrapping the exercise of universal jurisdiction
into a much more powerful tool of unilateral law enforcement, where
each nation on its own," or perhaps with a slight assist from the rendering state, could become an international policeman." The United States
has, in many recent cases, asserted such rights, albeit irregularly and
not without serious diplomatic costs.' The regularization of this approach, based on the Pinochet case, would reduce the attendant diplomatic costs and thus increase the likelihood of its use.
This broadening of universal jurisdiction may well be Ex Parte Pinochet I's principal doctrinal achievement. The specific grounds that
formed the basis of Spain's second request thus focused on acts committed primarily against non-nationals of Spain outside of Spain's territorial jurisdiction, but would nonetheless constitute specific conduct for
which both Spanish and U.K. law, in accordance with international law,
arguably would provide universal jurisdiction to prosecute. These
grounds included terrorism, genocide, torture, "and not merely in respect of Spanish victims."" Perhaps sensing the revolutionary significance of their findings, however, the Lords left open the issue of
whether the specific charges in toto amounted to extradition crimes under applicable U.K. law." Nonetheless, the allegations, and the particu-

proceedings in the United Kingdom in respect of acts alleged to have been committed
whilst he was Head of State." Ex PartePinochet, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1302.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (rejecting Yunis's jurisdictional arguments that,
among other things, universal jurisdiction even for hostage-taking did not extend to his
capture on the high seas when he was lured out of the jurisdiction of a foreign state by
U.S. authorities).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (capture of torturer of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency agent in Mexico effected through cooperation with
local Mexican police in violation of Mexican and, arguably, customary international law).
While U.S. jurisdiction might have been founded on passive personality and protective
jurisdictional principles, it might be argued that, although those directly responsible for
the torture and murder were sub-state entities, Mexican governmental acquiescence in,
and perhaps even support for, the conduct may have been sufficient under principles of
attribution to find state responsibility that would implicate customary international law
norms against governmental torture and thereby support universal jurisdiction as well.
64. See generally CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 25, at 808-11 (surveying foreign
reaction).
65. Ex PartePinochet, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1305.
66. As Lord Slynn pointed out, the Divisional Court did not specifically address this
question. See id. at 1304. Nonetheless, Lord Slynn added: "The Court did not rule at that
stage on the respondent's argument that the acts alleged did not constitute crimes in the
United Kingdom at the time they were done, but added that it was not necessary that the
conduct alleged did constitute a crime here at the time the alleged crime was committed
abroad." Id. Thus, even Lord Slynn might be read to assume that the double criminality
or "reciprocity" criterion would be interpreted under the more relaxed standard of current
conceptions of universal jurisdiction than the arguably stricter views that held sway
nearly a quarter-century ago when the relevant acts were committed. See infra text accompanying notes 100-11 (discussing Ex PartePinochetIl's analysis of this issue).
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lar acts they describe, 7 on their face fell within even the most narrowlydefined concept of erga omnes violations of international human rights
norms.'
While the traditional view of international crimes derived
from the historic paradigm of piracy, which did not involve conduct attributable to a state but rather consisted precisely of conduct not sanctioned by states but rather committed by hostis humanis generis,' these
new crimes focus on conduct that is attributable to the state itself. 70
This applies notwithstanding the ordinary assumption in municipal law
that a principal, here the state, is not responsible for the criminal acts
of its agents, here a Head of State.7"
The effects of this conceptual shift are refashioning international

67. See Ex PartePinochet, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1303 (that Pinochet "conspired
with persons unknown to intentionally inflict severe pain or suffering on another," "detained [and] conspired to detain other persons ('the hostages') and in order to compel such
persons to do or to abstain from doing any act, threatened to kill, injure or continue to detain the hostages," and "conspired ... to commit murder in a [Torture] Convention country.").
68. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 28, § 702(a)("genocide"), (c)("the murder or causing the disappearance of a person"), (dX)"torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment"), (e)("prolonged or arbitrary detention").
69. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), art.101 (a), UN Doc. A/CONF.
62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (defining piracy, in pertinent part, as: "Any illegal acts of
violence, detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or
the passengers of a private ship); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 746 (9u' ed.,
Jennings & Watts eds., 1992) (defining piracy in terms of intent to plunder (animo furandi) by an outlaw or enemy of mankind (hostis humanis generis) in violation of the law
of peoples (juregentium)].
70. See generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 69, at 533-36 (citing the International Law
Commission's Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind (the
Draft Code] as authority for emerging consensus that, inter alia, genocide and apartheid
entail criminal state responsibility); cf Ex PartePinochetIII, Opinion of Lord Hutton, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1306 (citing Article III of the Draft Code as early authority for
the absence of Head of State immunity for international crimes as a matter of customary
international law).
71. A criminal act by an agent even in the performance of duties owed to the principal
is ordinarily considered a breach of the agent's fiduciary duties. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 348 n.4 (3d ed. 1999). Ordinarily, that conduct would not be attributable to
the principal. Thus, private conduct of a state official is ordinarily not attributable to the
state. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 69, at 542. One might therefore take the position that
criminal conduct by a Head of State would not be attributable to the state for purposes of
state responsibility. In the Head of State case, however, given the close relation between
the principal and the agent, both historically in conceptions of sovereignty and practically
from the standpoint of state behavior, noted British international law scholars Jennings
and Watts take the view that "a State should bear responsibility for internationally injurious acts committed by its Head of State in private life." Id. at 541. Presumably, this
would include even the form of international injury attached to international crimes for
which there is universal jurisdiction, notwithstanding ordinary principles of nonattribution. In sum, criminal responsibility of the Head of State need not be inconsistent
with ordinary international civil responsibility for the state for whom the Head of State
acted.
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criminal law.72 For example, the extension of universal crimes into
clearly political behavior finds recognition implicitly in the recent practice of narrowing the political offense exception in extradition treaties,
to exclude a range of acts that are now regarded as terrorist, so that in
certain cases political motivation may no longer serve as a ground for
denial of extradition. 7' Thus, increased protection of human rights of
victims has encouraged and enhanced international law enforcement.
At the same time, increased respect for human rights has more recently
begun to address the need to assure that strengthened international legal cooperation remains subordinate to what has been coined by John
Dugard as a "two-tier system of legal obligation that recognizes the
higher status of human rights norms arising from notions ofjus cogens,
and the superiority of multilateral human rights conventions that form
part of the ordre public of the international community or of a particular region."7' If Dugard's principle, analogizing to the political offense
exception for so-called terrorist offenses, is to be taken seriously then it
may be argued that extradition of even former Heads of State and other
state officials guilty of universal crimes would further support enforcement of those rights and cohere with Dugard's conception of the emerging international morality. In sum, the Lords' reasoning with respect to
universal jurisdiction may well reflect the underlying premise of an
emerging international civil society and the moral basis buttressing its
governance.
B.

Ex Parte Pinochet - A Head of State Immunity Advisory Opinion?

It is largely in the context of claims of universal jurisdiction that
the House of Lords opinions in Ex Parte Pinochetfocus primarily on the
72. See generally PAUST ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(1996) (first casebook dedicated wholly to canvassing developments in this recentlyexpanding field); but see also Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenia of International
Criminal Law, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 237 (1998) (describing inconsistencies and apparent
manifest injustices in this emerging body of law).
73. See generally Samual M. Witten, The InternationalConvention for the Suppression of TerroristBombings, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 774, 774-75 (1998) (identifying the relevant
treaties and locating the most recent international effort to address terrorist bombings in
that context).
74. John Dugard, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187,
195 (1998). Dugard details the rights that may not be violated in the extradition context
to include torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. See id. at 197-202.
Some authors may have already read the House of Lords opinions to reflect this broader,
non-positivist conception of international law. See, e.g., Cristine Chinkin, Case Note:
United Kingdom House of Lords, (SpanishRequest for Extradition),REGINA v. BOW, Regina v. Bow Street StipendiaryMagistrate,Ex PartePinochet Ugarte(no. 3) [19991, 93 AM.
I. INT'L. L. (1999) (the question of former Head of State immunity for "official acts of torture represented a choice between two visions of international law: a horizontal system
based upon sovereign equality of states and a vertical system that upholds norms of jus

cogens such as those guaranteeing fundamental human rights").
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important issue of Head of State Immunity. The majority of the panel,
taking the view most cogently articulated in Lord Nicholls's opinion, rejected the notion that the functional immunity of a former Head of
State, within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and implementing legislation of the U.K., could encompass torture or hostage-taking.75 Specifically, Section 20 of the State
Immunity Act of 1978, provides that: "[slubject to... any necessary
modifications, the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 shall apply to -- (a)
a sovereign or other head of State." 76 In turn, the U.K. Diplomatic
Privileges Act of 1964, incorporates by reference into U.K. domestic law,
the provisions of the VCDR,77which define the scope of immunity for
current and former diplomats.78 Accordingly, the Lords agreed that
U.K. law concerning former Head of State immunity required them to
apply Article 39(2) of the VCDR, which in turn provides for functional
immunity only,79 as a "necessary modification" under Section 20 of the
State Immunity Act with respect to "former" Heads of State.0 This
framed the question, as a matter of U.K. law, as whether Pinochet's
conduct for which Spain sought to prosecute him should be deemed to
be within the scope of the Head of State's functions. More narrowly
stated, the question was whether functional immunity should extend to
crimes for which there is universal jurisdiction to prosecute.
Thus, Ex Parte Pinochet had an abstract quality, since it did not
closely analyze the particular crimes alleged to determine whether they
fit within the criterion of dual criminality that, as a matter of applicable
treaty and domestic law, were assumed to control the Spanish request.
Indeed, Lord Lloyd of Berwick's dissent specifically noted that at the
Divisional Court "[it was argued that torture and hostage-taking only
became extradition crimes after 1988 (torture) and 1982 (hostagetaking) since neither section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988,
75. See Ex PartePinochet, Opinion of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 1330, 1334; see also id. Opinion of Lords Steyn, at 1335, 1338 (finding no statutory immunity whatsoever and rejecting the argument that customary international law
might separately provide immunity); id. at 1339 (Lord Hoffman concurring with Lord
Nicholls). Thus, only Lord Steyn's opinion might be read to reach charges of murder pure
and simple. See id. at 1338 ("murdering his gardener").
76. Id. at 1336 (cited by, among others, Lord Steyn).
77. Id. at 1307 (Lord Slynn of Hadley).
78. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna on April 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force April 24, 1964) [hereinafter VCDR].
79. Article 39(2) of the VCDR provides: "When the functions of a person enjoying
privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall
normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable
period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in a case of armed conflict.
However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions
as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist." Id. at art. 39(2).
80. See, e.g., Ex Parte Pinochet, supra note 11, at 37 I.L.M. 1307 (Lord Slynn) and
1336 (Lord Steyn).
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nor section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 [is] retrospective.8 1
Although Lord Lloyd himself rejected the argument as a matter of
statutory interpretation,82 this argument undoubtedly planted the seed
for closer attention to U.K. law in Ex Parte PinochetIII and, thus, for a
more restrained exercise of judicial power to trump Head of State Immunity.'
That said, the precedents set by Ex Parte Pinochet, which arguably
remain relevant to current Heads of State, including the tyrants who
might fear transitional justice, as well as the international lawyers who
advise them," were arguably over-broad in at least two ways. The first
relates to persons who could become subject to the effects of the new interpretation. Framed in terms of functional immunity, Ex Parte Pinochet's implications may extend beyond the narrow question of former
Head of State immunity into a potentially much broader class of cases.
This expansive effect may occur because British law domestically implemented the customary law principle of Head of State Immunity
through a statute governing the ordinary privileges and immunities of
diplomats under the VCDR.8 Thus, the Lords' ruling may well shed
light on the application in British courts, as well perhaps internationally, of the principle of subsistence of immunity for former diplomats."
The Lords' opinions on this issue might be questionable, as it appears
they equate former Head of State immunity with former diplomatic
immunity simply because of the idiosyncrasies of U.K. implementing
legislation and without reasoned consideration of the potentially differing rationales for the two kinds of immunity.87 Yet functional immunity
might seem warranted in view of the general perception that Head of
State immunity can no longer reasonably be conceived as flowing from
81. Id. at 1318 (Dissenting Opinion of Lord Lloyd of Berwick).

82. See id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 98-105.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 61-65 (explaining the broad holdings of Ex
PartePinochet I).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 75-80 (describing statutory analysis).
86. If so, the functional limits of former Head of State Immunity may shed light as
well on the functional limits of immunity for former diplomats, a point of relevance to all
states which use their diplomats as cover for their espionage activities. See generally W.
MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES,
CONTEXTS AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN

LAW (1992).

87. If, for example, Head of State immunity is more closely related to the historic doctrine of state immunity, then it may still be that, unlike the case where the historic doctrine of absolute state immunity seems to have been compromised by the development of
a commercial activity exception, then the Latin American position that state immunity
remains absolute, see PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (1997), should have been part of the Lords's analysis, for they

might have construed the applicable U.K. statute so as not to conflict with customary international law where applicable, in particular recognizing the persistent objector principle's application to the question of Head of State immunity.
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the location of sovereignty in the Head of State. In a democratic era,
where popular sovereignty would call for respect for the dignity of the
Head of State only insofar as he acts within the outer perimeter of authority or functions delegated to him through authoritative domestic
law," a functional limitation on sovereign immunity would seem to follow 89-even in the U.K. where, in theory at least, constitutional theory
provides for sovereignty in "the Crown-in-Parliament."o Regardless of
the thoroughness of its reasoning, however, if the U.K. interpretation of
the scope of former Head of State immunity is extended to former diplomats, it may encourage other states to take a similar legal position in
respect of former diplomats in order to support their view of internationally-recognized human rights. Indeed, because a Head of State's
functions are almost certain to be defined more broadly than the functions of diplomats, it may well be that the most significant applications
of Ex Parte Pinochet will be found in prosecutions of former diplomats.
Second, the types of offenses that form the basis of exceptions to
functional immunity may also be over-broad. Ordinarily, immunity
principles are limited by treaty obligations between the interested
states. In such situations, treaties should be construed where possible
to be consistent with each other. 9' Thus, if the U.K. purports to respect
the principle of Head of State immunity on the ground that it is required to do so by the VCDR, then it would seem clear that other treaties creating bases of jurisdiction recognized as permissible under international law, such as human rights treaties recognizing universal
jurisdiction, might be read not to overturn the VCDR unless they ex-

88. Cf Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1997) (describing the civil immunity of the
president of the United States while in office as grounded in the nature of "the function"
performed rather than "the identity" of the actor).
89. Cf W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 866 (1990) [hereinafter Sovereignty and Human Rights]
(reconstructing the Tinoco Claims Arbitration Case in light of modem conceptions of
popular sovereignty). A similar point applies to the modern conception of the general basis for diplomatic immunity as a transformation of the outdated conception of extraterritorialism. See HENKIN ETAL., supra note 52, at 1201.
90. See TUSHNET ET AL, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358, 360-61
(1999)(citations omitted). Indeed, Ex PartePinochet maybe evidence of the transformation of the theory of sovereignty in the U.K to conform with the requirements of U.K. adherence to the EU. By this I mean that the supremacy of EU law in the U.K. may require
a refashioning of the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty, since under the terms of the

applicable EU treaties the U.K. may not withdraw from certain obligations. See J.H.H.
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991)(describing the emerging

constitutional character of European Union law).
91. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 30 (3)(applying earlier treaties to the extent
.compatible" with later treaties), art. 31(3)(a)("taking into account" subsequent agreements in the interpretation of an agreement)[VCLTI. Together with the general principle

of performance in good faith, see id., art. 27, the relevant provisions of the VCLT thus imply a search for interpretations that where possible avoid incompatibilities.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY

VOL. 28:2

pressly so provide. 92 Evidence for such an inference might be found in
the decision of the drafters of the ICC Statute expressly to provide that
Head of State immunity shall not be available for the crimes within the
ICC's jurisdiction. ' Indeed, Lord Slynn of Hadley cited as evidence of
the international community's cautious stance on this question that the
ICC Statute's exclusion of Head of State immunity was prospective
only." The argument for restraint would seem to be even stronger in
the case where merely customary law grounds supervene to provide the
basis for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, even if theory and general principles support limiting former Head of State immunity under a
functional approach.95
In principle, however, one could more narrowly reinterpret Ex
Parte Pinoche'sreading of the U.K. decision to implement Head of State
immunity through its domestic law implementing the VCDR. Rather,
Head of State immunity is grounded solely in customary international
law principles, which can be supervened by treaty law directly. If that
is so, even assuming the absence of well-developed customary law orjus
cogens permitting the prosecution of former Heads of State on universal
jurisdiction grounds,' then Ex Parte Pinochet, could be narrowed to the
case of specific violations of treaty-based norms. Under this reading, a
state transitioning from dictatorship to democracy would have the option of withdrawing from treaties concerning human rights affording
universal jurisdiction with any potential sanctuary state for the former
dictator, in order to provide a past dictator assurances of freedom from

92. Cf. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch ) 64, 118 (1804) (holding that "an Act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains").
93. See ICC Statute, supra note 12, art. 27 ("official capacity as Head of State or
Government... or a government official... shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground
for reduction of sentence.").
94. Ex PartePinochet, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1312 (Lord Slynn of Hadley).
95. See supra text accompanying note 89 (citing Reisman, Sovereignty and Human
Rights).
96. Given the ICC Statute's refusal to overturn immunity principles retroactively, it
might be questioned whether a jus cogens norm permitting prosecution has arisen. See
supra note 12. Arguably, the ICC statute's cautious drafting on this point would seem to
establish that ajus cogens norm requiring prosecution for former dictators has not arisen,
unless the ICC Statute on this point is to be deemed inoperative. See VCLT, supra note
91, art. 53 ("A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of international law."). Also, under the VCDR as it relates to the functional immunity of diplomats and, to the extent the VCDR encompasses it, to Head of State immunity
as well, any emergingjus cogens-based right to prosecute would not affect "any right, obligation or legal situation.., created through the execution of the treaty prior to termination." See VCLT, supra note 91 art. 71(2)(b). Arguably, diplomatic or Head of State immunities that accrue for former diplomats or Heads of State would attach at the time the
acts occurred when those persons were in the status from which rights of immunity would
flow under the treaty.
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prosecution both domestically and internationally. This may well be a
relatively small price to pay in order to facilitate a transition. It is not
so clear, however, that Ex PartePinochet need be read as having such a
limited effect.' Nonetheless, in time it may be that the Lords' subsequent engagement in this issue will have greater influence on the legal
analysis that other states will undertake when faced with similar situations.
C. Ex PartePinochetIII - Synthesizing the Domestic and International
The new panel of Lords, convened after Ex Parte Pinochet II held
that the appearance of impropriety suggested by Lord Hoffman's decisive vote in Ex Parte Pinochet I compelled substantive reconsideration,
took advantage of the opportunity to build upon and refine the reasoning suggested by Ex Parte Pinochet. The Lords were able to reassess
the scope of the underlying applicable extradition law of the U.K., narrowing its potential applicability to Pinochet himself in respect of torture only to offenses that occurred, serendipitously perhaps, roughly after the Chilean transition was initiated." One might suspect that the
Chilean Government's decision to make an appearance in Ex Parte Pinochet III to confirm that it did not waive Pinochet's former Head of
State immunity, whatever that might be held to include, concentrated
the panel's thinking on this question." Accordingly, and of significance
for the wider implications of their decisions, this opportunity also afforded the Lords a vehicle for framing a more sharply focused precedent
with respect to Head of State Immunity, one that in some ways may
well exacerbate for current and future Heads of State the potential impact of Ex Parte Pinochet III's holding by eliminating the option of dismissing Ex Parte Pinochet's abstract and inadequately reasoned conclusions.
This sharpening of the precedent occurred in a two-step process, refocusing the definition of extradition crime and narrowing the lifting of
former Head of State immunity. With respect to the U.K. definition of
an extradition crime, Lord Browne-Wilkinson's lead opinion gave more
extended consideration to the temporal argument concerning "dual
criminality" that was summarily rejected by Lord Lloyd in Ex Parte Pi-

97. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
98. The Chilean transition effectively was triggered in 1988, when the Pinochet Government lost a popular referendum on its preferred constitutional settlement. See RohtArriaza & Gibson, Developing Jurisprudence,supra note 20, at 858. This time frame obviously coincides with the dates upon which, under U.K- law, the Lords found Pinochet's
former Head of State immunity had terminated in respect of torture. See infra note 114.
Judicial mind-readers might make a case for a connection, but this analysis of the opinions addresses their precedental force and therefore eschews that hermeneutic method.
99. See Ex Parte PinochetIII, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. 581, 639 (1999) (noting Chilean intervention).
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nochet.'O' In a detailed analysis of the temporal requirements of U.K.
extradition law, °1 whether or not as applied to a request from a European Convention country, Lord Browne-Wilkinson concluded that dual
criminality meant, in effect, that U.K. law must provide for jurisdiction
to prosecute the actual offenses for which the extraditee is sought by
the Requesting State.'02 Applying this principle to the specific facts, and
excluding the murder charges based on pure passive personality
grounds for jurisdiction, which had fallen out of the case after Ex Parte
Pinochet," it was clear that counts of murder and conspiracy to commit
murder in Spain survived under objective territoriality, 0 since they involved conduct that would be punishable in the U.K. if it had occurred
in the U.K." Lord Browne-Wilkinson further found that the precise
charges relating to hostage-taking did not prima facie constitute offenses under the applicable treaty or U.K. law, because the only conduct
charged alleged "that a person detained (the so-called hostage) was to
be forced to do something by reason of threats to injure other nonhostages which is the exact converse of the offense."1t In the case of the
crimes of torture and conspiracy to commit torture, however, the Lords
faced an explicit statutory incorporation of universal jurisdiction for
torture through Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act, which came
into effect on September 29, 1988 and was intended to implement the
Torture Convention.0
T

100. See id. at 586-87 (citing Lord Lloyd's statement at [19981 3 W.L.R. 1481).
101. See supra text accompanying note 60 (noting Lord Berwick's reliance on treaty
law as requiring dual criminality).
102. See Ex PartePinochet III, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M., at 639.
103. Based on the ruling in Ex Parte Pinochet, the British Home Secretary Jack Straw
determined on December 11, 1998 to authorize the continuation of extradition proceedings and, accordingly, limited this authorization to the extradition crimes encompassed by
a majority of the Lords' opinions. See Ex PartePinochetII, supra note 11, at 588.
104. Cf. RESTATEMENT(THIRD), supra note 28, § 402(1)(c) ("[A] state has jurisdiction to
prescribe it law with respect to... conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory"). The European Community has also adopted
the so-called "effects principle" in the Wood Pulp Case. See Joined Cases 89, 104, 116, 117
& 125-29/85, Ahlstrom Osakeyhito v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R 5193.
105. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 639; see also Opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead, id. ("Murder is a common law
crime which, before it became an extra-territorial offence if committed in a Convention
country under Section 4 of the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978 could not be prosecuted
in the United Kingdom if it was committed abroad except in the case of a murder committed abroad by a British citizen."). Interestingly, Lord Millet drew on the doctrine of common-law crimes to even broader effect. He stated: "The jurisdiction of English criminal
courts is usually statutory, but it is supplemented by the common law. Customary international law is part of the common law, and accordingly I consider the English courts
have and always have had extra-territorial jurisdiction in respect of crimes of universal
jurisdiction under customary international law." Id. at 650 (Opinion of Lord Millet).
106. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 588.
107. See id. at 590; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
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Conceivably, the Lords might have found that this judgment of the
U.K. political process in favor of asserting universal jurisdiction over
torture was sufficient to dispose of the immunity issue. Lord Hutton
concluded that on September 29, 1988, when the Criminal Justice Act
entered into force and thus provided domestic jurisdiction to prosecute,
as a matter of customary international law, Head of State immunity
was lifted in the U.K. with respect to torture and conspiracy to commit
torture." Admittedly, even Lord Browne-Wilkinson recognized that the
interpretation of U.K. law to confer Head of State immunity through
implementation of the VCDR, particularly with respect to the functional
immunity of former diplomats, was a somewhat tortured theory.' °9 Accordingly, he also explicitly found that Head of State immunity was afforded under U.K. law through the incorporation of customary international law as part of U.K. law.' Arguably, then, just as Head of State
immunity was better grounded, as a matter of U.K. law, in the incorporation of customary international law, so too as a matter of U.K. law,
customary international law might yield limitations on that immunity."' However, this view did not command a majority of the Lords.
Instead, the Lords addressed the question of immunity as a separate, conceptually independent issue. Focusing on the absence of clear
state practice in stripping even former Heads of State of immunity in
criminal proceedings, the need for a separate political decision on Head
of State immunity loomed in overarching importance to the controlling
voices on this panel of Lords."2 Thus, treaty, not custom, assured the
Lords that they did not overstep the boundaries prescribed by the international political process. Lords Browne-Wilkinson, Hope of Craighead, and Saville of Newdigate concluded that it was only when the
Torture Convention entered into force for the U.K. on December 9,
1988, giving the U.K. treaty-based rights against Spain and Chile, that
any functional Head of State immunity for torture and conspiracy to
commit torture disappeared, as a matter of international law incorporated into domestic law."3 Lord Browne-Wilkinson's lead opinion ening Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535
(1985).
108. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Hutton, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M. at
637-38.
109. See Ex PartePinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 592-93. Indeed, the preeminent U.K authorities would not consider Head of
State Immunity in any way derivative of diplomatic immunity principles.
See
OPPENHEIM, supra note 69, at 1031-1126 (treating the topics in two separate chapters).
110. See Ex PartePinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 594-95.
111. See, e.g., Ex PartePinochetIII, Opinion of Lord Millet, supra note 11, at 594-95.
112. See Ex Parte Pinochet III, Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37
I.L.M. at 595 (citing, in particular, Lord Slynn of Hadley's concern in Ex PartePinochet
over the absence of state practice, [19881 3 W.L.R. 1456).
113. Ex PartePinochetIII, Opinion of Lord Brown-Wilkinson, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M.
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gaged in a detailed and plausible exercise of treaty interpretation, locating his judgment concerning the relation of former Head of State immunity and the Torture Convention in materials that reflected the
probable intentions of the states that had adhered to the Torture Convention."4
Thus, at the heart of Ex Parte PinochetIIrs findings was the majority of the Lords' insistence on locating their authority for lifting Head of
State immunity not only on positive law enacted by the political organs
of the U.K., but also on the positive international law the U.K. joined
with the rest of the international community to make through the Torture Convention itself. Indeed, the House of Lords found its way to a
restrained exercise of judicial power, through treaty law that largely
cabined limitations of former Head of State immunity, rather than
through an arguably diffuse customary international criminal and human rights law relating to Head of State immunity. Clearly, a majority
of the Lords were not prepared to strip Pinochet of former Head of State
immunity, even on the limited basis permitted by the statutory analysis
of the dual criminality requirement for extradition crimes, without a
second, independent analysis of legislative intention on the immunity
issue itself. This approach better allowed the Lords to avoid the criticism that, in engaging in an open-ended process of interpreting customary international law, they were - as perhaps Lord Hoffman was accused in Ex Parte Pinochet II of doing in Ex Parte Pinochet subordinating their legal analysis to their preferred moral positions.
As a consequence, however, Ex Parte PinochetIII raises more quesat 582-85 (rejecting arguments that no exception from Head of State immunity should be
inferred from the Torture Convention on the theory that retention of immunity would in
effect defeat the very object and purpose of the treaty); cf VCLT, supra note 41, art. 31
(requiring interpretation in accordance with a treaty's "object and purpose").
114. See Ex Parte Pinochet. at 595 (Opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 627 (Opinion
of Lord Hope of Craighead), and 643 (Opinion of Lord Saville of Newdigate). Lord Goff of
Chieveley's dissent, which would have dismissed the appeal from the Appellate Division's
finding of immunity, thus formed a majority of the panel of seven Lords for this narrower
definition of extradition crimes. See Dissenting Opinion of Lord Goff, id. at 595-608. The
House of Lords' insistence on authorization both from domestic and international lawmaking processes finds support in the practice of other states as well. See Brigitte Stern,
Case Note: In Re Pinochet-FrenchTribunal de Grande Instance, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 696,
698 (1999) (refusing to indict because "such an indictment could be based on neither national law nor on a self-executing international convention or international customary
rule"). See also Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Pinochet and InternationalHuman
Rights Litigation,97 MICH. L. REv. 2129 (1999) (arguing that for constitutional due process and separation of powers reasons the Pinochet case does not suggest that international human rights norms will have increased applications in U.S. courts, permitting actions against foreign nationals who violate international human rights); but see Luc
Reydams, Case Note: In Re Pinochet - Belgian Tribunal First Instance of Brussels, November 8, 1998, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 700, 703 (1999) (reporting Belgian tribunal's reliance
on the concept thatjus cogens norms require no additional domestic legislation to be applicable as a source of authority to prosecute).
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tions than it answers. By defining the scope of extraditable offenses
primarily in terms of U.K. legislation, the decision leaves room for U.K.
political decision-makers to correct the Lords' work. Moreover, it invites the international community to revisit the proper definition of the
political offense exception found in extradition treaties. The international community could also determine whether the Lords' interpretation of the Torture Convention's effect on Head of State immunity
should be revised, in particular, so as to not undermine the jus cogens
character of the ban against torture, but perhaps to reconsider the modalities for deterring torture so as to include both subsequent punishment and international amnesty. As Lord Goff observed in dissent,
"torture may, for compelling political reasons, be the subject of an amnesty, or some other form of settlement, in the state where it has been,
or is alleged to have been, committed.""' In a sense, Ex PartePinochet
III poses a question to the international political community."6 A
sustainable answer from the international community to the questions
posed by Ex PartePinochet III thus requires reasoned assessment of the
considerations raised by Lord Goff's observation in light of the institutional capacities of the current international system.
IV. INTERNATIONALIZED AMNESTY

A workable framework for dealing with the tension between transitional justice and transitional democracy requires, first, an assessment
of the comparative policy interests and, second, an appreciation of the
institutional possibilities for coordinated action.
A.

Policy Rationalesfor a SupranationalLegal Solution

The threat of prosecution by a third party of human rights violations committed by anyone anywhere poses ethical and practical dilemmas for states indirectly involved in the transition process. This is
because, from the standpoint of the transitioning states, there may now
be a danger of over-enforcement of international human rights norms
through multiple channels without the international community's consideration of broader political factors that might be implicated. In addition to the option of individual state prosecution along the lines of

115. Ex PartePinochet III, Opinion of Lord Goff of Chieveley, supra note 11, 37 I.L.M.
at 594; see also Ex Parte Pinochet, Dissenting Opinion of Lord Lloyd of Berwick, supra
note 11, 37 I.L.M. at 1325 ("It has not been argued [in this proceeding] that such amnesties are as such contrary to international law by reason of the failure to prosecute the individual perpetrators."); but see Duty to Prosecute,supra note 10.
116. See generally Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro.
DialogicAbstention by the InternationalCourt of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399 (1997)
(describing the ICJ as operating, especially recently, in this question-posing mode in its
relations with the international political process).
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Spain's attempt to pursue Pinochet, an investigation at the ICC could
be initiated at the request of a state.11 Thus, one might even imagine
that an ICC prosecution, just as much as a unilateral state prosecution,
could conflict with an amnesty produced through a domestic truth and
reconciliation process, although the complementarity provision in the
ICC Statute might be read to preclude this result."' Regardless of the
ultimate disposition of this question, states acting individually and outside the ICC might now take matters into their hands, following the Pinochet precedent, rather than wait for the ICC to resolve the complementarity issue.

The case of South Africa illustrates the dangers. Would states concerned that members of the ANC were able to avoid accountability be
well-advised to rely on the Pinochet precedent to prosecute those who
had escaped South African justice? Arguably, the intervening states
would be fulfilling a moral imperative, in the narrow sense, of assuring
equal treatment of dissidents as well as governmental violators of internationally-recognized human rights by combatants in a noninternational armed conflict." 9 This type of prosecution could rectify a
117. See ICC Statute supra note 12, art. 13(a), 14.
118. See id. art. 17(1)(a) (a "case is inadmissible where... [it] is being investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution."). No doubt Article 17(1)(a)'s
qualification to the principle of complementarity (that is, deference to state-initiated investigations and prosecutions) was designed to address the problem of bad faith prosecution, such as Libya's assertion of a right to prosecute under the Montreal Anti-Sabotage
Convention, rather than to extradite the perpetrators to the U.S. or U.K.. See generally
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), 1992
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Apr. 14). But whether it applies to, and thus excludes, an "investigation"
initiated with the object of avoiding prosecution, such as one under a TRC, is not answered by the text and appears to have been avoided during the negotiations leading to
the ICC. See Mahnoush Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 22, 28 (1999) (report of U.N. Legal Officer serving as Secretary
of the Committee of the Whole of the Rome Conference that determining the meaning of
"inability or unwillingness" of a state to prosecute or investigate were considered "thorny"
issues in the negotiation); see also Jonathan Charney, EditorialComment: Progressin International Criminal Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 452, 459 (1999) (asserting that the ICC
Statute does not explicitly resolve the tension between furthering national reconciliation
and the prosecution of international wrongs); see also Bartram Brown, Primacy or Complementarity:Reconciling the Jurisdictionof National Courts and InternationalCriminal
Tribunals,23 YALE J. INT'L. L. 383, 417-18 (1999) (noting that complementarity was not
well defined by the draft statute and not further clarified by the subsequent Preparatory
Commission).
119. This analysis sets aside, for the moment, the question of whether treaty law, and
perhaps even customary law, would afford a basis for international or third state prosecution. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted
June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978). Even though certain
major states, such as the United States, are not party to Protocol II, it has been deemed
relevant by the United States in particular contexts. See generally James O'Brien, The
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past injustice and would not require morally-problematic distinctions to
justify why some wrongdoers but not others have reached a degree of
culpability that would require prosecution." The likeliest general defense for ANC human rights violators may be that they were victims
rather than persecutors - and that would not seem to be a tenable distinction, especially where the atrocities were committed well outside of
the zone of combat in ANC camps in the Front-Line states. Thus, there
is at the outside risk that the need to avoid problematic distinctions
may well cause intervening states to paint with too broad a prosecutorial brush.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which states may have a larger responsibility - arguably either to act or refrain from acting, as the
case requires - in order to further democratic values in transitional societies. This may be especially true for states that may already retain
some responsibility for the transitional societies, such as might be the
case for the United States with respect to Cuba, or in which their citizens having claimed a historical interest, as Spain might with respect
to Chile. Even when the intervening state's motives are oriented toward complying with international law obligations, rather than selectively prosecuting former tyrants for merely domestic political satisfaction or unrelated foreign policy desiderata, the competing value of
furthering democratic transitions also may be at stake."
Finally, as
InternationalTribunal for Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw in the Former
Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 647 (1993) (noting the relevance of Protocol II given
Yugoslavia's own adherence to that treaty).
120. Selective prosecution concerns flow from the possibility that the amnesty program
of a transitioning state impermissibly discriminates between classes of offenders depending on their views or their status, not only in relation to the old but also the new regime.
Thus, distinctions drawn by the prior regime concerning the kind of conduct that may
warrant amnesty should not in principle receive broad deference from the international
community in addressing selective prosecution concern, since often the moral framework
for assessing personal accountability in respect of criminal acts has eroded and the typical
strategy of the governing elites is to make as many in the society as possible complicit in
the state's violation of human rights. See Osiel, Obeying Orders, supra note 46, at 101220 (describing the Argentine "dirty war"); see also Ruti Teitel, TransitionalJurisprudence:
The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2040-41. ("Selective
prosecutions targeting high officials threaten the liberal principle of individual responsibility. . ."). Accordingly, the basis for making the fine-grain distinctions to implement a
selective prosecution may be problematic and may raise serious questions about amnesties that extend to past conduct of those who play a key role in the new order.
121. See Ricardo Lagos & Heraldo Munoz, The Pinochet Dilemma, FOREIGN POL'Y 26,
32 (Spring 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet Dilemma] ("Much of the international community
has resigned itself to the notion that the state may forgive under some circumstances in
order to safeguard values-such as democracy and stability-that are as important to society as justice."). Arguably, democracy and stability may be as important to society as
justice because, like justice, they are moral goods. Thus, a moral calculus that accepts the
"lesser moral evil" may be deemed permissible, even in such predominantly Catholic
countries as Chile, if "choice is unavoidable." See GERMAIN GRIsEz, 2 THE WAY OF THE
LORD JESUS: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 291 (1993) (a neo-Thomist Catholic argument rul-
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the responsibility for dealing with past violations in international human rights is shifted to international venues, democratic forces in transitioning states will be discouraged from addressing the question in a
way that might further the consolidation of the principle of accountability in the political culture of the transitioning state.1 22 Are third-states
free to disregard these concerns?
These ethical considerations need to be evaluated with as much
foresight as is practicable. Generally, the question of the selective overenforcement of human rights in a transitional context could draw lessons from the study of transitional justice in relation to economic rights.
In that context, as any state that has moved from the more conventional case of regulation to deregulation of property and contractrelated rights could testify, fully rectifying past wrongs may undercut
transition.!
Rulemaking concerning ex post compensation arrangements must always, in a transitional context, take into account the risk
of changing incentives ex ante in ways that worsen the defects of the
pre-transition situation or reduce the likelihood of welfare-enhancing
transitions. 2 Transitions toward greater liberty and democracy are arguably amenable to similar analysis. That is to say, in finding the preferred trade off between maintaining "justice" in respect of past wrongs
and maximizing "justice" in the future, economic reasoning counsels renewed attention to the effect that pursuing one kind of justice has on
the production of the resources necessary to produce another kind of
justice. 25 For example, to the extent that a TRC can assist the national
ing out the balancing of merely prudential concerns against moral demands).
122. See Lagos & Munoz, Pinochet Dilemma, supra note 121, at 36 (citing the example
of the potential effect on Chilean democracy of Pinochet's return to Chile). Given the
charges that have emerged in the proceeding in the U.K_, it may be that Pinochet has
committed offenses that would not be covered by the 1978 Chilean Amnesty Law. See id.
123. Jim Rossi writes in the deregulatory context: "the optimal compensation scheme
from an economic efficiency perspective may provide for only partial indemnification of
expectation or reliance losses from changes in regulation." See Rossi, The Irony ofRegulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297, 318 (1998) (reviewing J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F.
SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIE
TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES) (citing Steve Shavell,
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principaland Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON.
55, 59-60) (1979)).
124. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 537 (1986) [hereinafter Economic Analysis] (relating this proposition to the "moral
hazard" problem in law and economics analysis of insurance problems).
125. Arguably, however, there is no justification for protecting the reliance interest of
former human rights violators when their context did not entitle them to have a legitimate reliance interest. See generally Jill Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change:An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997) (arguing that only situations of "stable
equilibria" - that is, circumstances in which background legal principles that form the
basis of choice are not likely to change - generate reliance interests that merit compensation after transition). Fisch argues that an equilibrium is stable when "the applicable legal rules are clear, have been promulgated by a higher legal authority, have persisted
over time and in a variety of specific cases, and have not been widely criticized or ques-
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healing process by assuring full investigations of the truth, including
the fate of the individual victims, the possibility that this information
will be used in a prosecutorial context later, even if in another country,
dramatically increases the likelihood that such information will not be
presented.'2
However, a caveat is in order, for as much as the risk of prosecution, the fear of assassination after exile weighs on the mind of the departing dictator and those who supported him. One might wonder
whether even the least Machiavallian of princes would ever believe that
the mere parchment barrier erected through amnesty could guarantee

tioned by lawmakers with comparable authority...." Id. at 1102. She acknowledges,
however, that the "stability of a regulatory context is a matter of degree, and, in any given
case, individual factors may point in opposite directions." Id. at 1103. Application of this
analysis to the case of transitional justice may be difficult, particularly where, as in the
case of selective prosecution, it implicates the "potentially serious concern.., that the
government might-arbitrarily or intentionally-single out particular individuals or
groups, either as direct targets of punishment or as undeserving of equal consideration."
Economic Analysis, supra note 124, at 574; cf Osiel, Obeying Orders, supra note 46, at
1012-16 (noting the weakness of positivist justifications for subsequent punishment of
unlawful orders issued in a fundamentally immoral legal order).
126. Of course, the point could be extended as well to the vindication of economic
rights that, as a corollary of the suppression of political or civil rights, were in the past
denied in transitional regimes. By this I mean that in the special case of transitional justice, domestic claims for vindication of property and contract rights may not be accorded
their full weight in light of the common interest of victims in securing additional gains.
See Sophia von Rundstedt, The Restitution of PropertyAfter Communism: Germany, the
Czech Republic and Poland, 4 PARKER SCH. J.E. EUR. L. 261, 324 (1997) ("Some of the basic legislative decisions made in the restitution context conflict with international legal
principles... [because of the] diverse motives that have prompted policy-makers to ignore
legal problems in order to devise a politically, economically and socially acceptable compromise.").

See generally INGA MARKOVITS, IMPERFECT JUSTICE (1995) (detailing GDR

accommodation with accountability for the past and reconstruction and staffing of new
institutions in the former GDR consistent with FRG norms). This may well restate the
concept of "average reciprocity of advantage" underlying U.S. takings doctrine. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (described by Justice Brandeis, in
dissent, as an implicit premise of Justice Holmes's majority opinion). Arguably, to the
extent third parties also benefit from a transition in which they do not obtain full compensation, there may be room for extending the "average reciprocity of advantage" concept
to international takings where the class of foreign investor interests, albeit not individual
interests in the particular country, are ultimately better served by a successful transition
than by full compensation. To state now the obvious, to achieve overall gains, international human rights and international economic values sometimes may require balancing,
just as must other relevant policies. See, e.g., Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 358-81 (1998) [hereinafter WTO and U.N. Law] (for conflicts that may arise between trade interests and security
interests at an international level, arguing for a policy-balancing approach in the developing of WTO jurisprudence); see also Antonio F. Perez, To Judge Between the Nations:Post
Cold War Transformationsin National Security and Separation of Powers, 20 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 331, 383-401 (1997) (analyzing relative approaches of domestic
governmental institutions in balancing trade, privatization and arms control concerns in
an international law context).
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his physical survival. If so, then amnesty would leave the bitter taste of
impunity without the sweet aroma of democracy. On balance, however,
it seems that the risk of independent state prosecution may undermine
the larger purposes of human rights law enforcement in a way that
gives new, ironic meaning to the classic Prisoner's Dilemma.'27
Accordingly, it seems essential that to come to a reasoned accommodation of potentially competing international interests, the international community cannot entirely forgo the policy option of international amnesty for international crimes.'2 The essential question,
however, is how to structure a decision-making process that permits effective employment of this policy option.
B.

InstitutionalConsiderationsand Choices

Management of these risks cannot be effected, however, without international coordination. Institutional options run the gamut from
starting afresh to building on existing, related international organizations.
In theory, at least, one option might be to construct a counterpart
to the ICC, which might dispense amnesty.'
Yet an international convention, analogous to the ICC Statute, could very well take years to negotiate. In the meantime, the Ex PartePinochet and Ex PartePinochet
III decisions, and the jurisprudence they may well spawn, will have
immediate effects in undercutting transitional democracy. More to the
point, even assuming an international TRC could be negotiated from
the beginning, it is quite likely that domestic political considerations
will prevent adherence for many states. This is because, for leaderships
in stable democracies, a TRC counterpart to the ICC will not appear to
be a high priority. For ruling elites in politically-unstable states, adherence to a TRC regime might well undercut domestic legitimacy by
127. See, e.g., Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners'Dilemma: Implications
for InternationalCooperation,79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 923 (1985).
128. See W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Viola.
tions of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 75 (1996) (including amnesty in the
policy options mix). The next question suggested by Reisman's insight is the "how" question. Recognizing the possibly anarchic implications of the Pinochet case, the international interests in offenses against the international community as a whole and a state's
interest in national reconciliation "should be taken into account through some established
international process, but this issue has not yet been resolved." Charney, supra note 118,
at 458-59. See also Richard Falk, Telfotd Taylor and the Legacy of Nuremberg, 37 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 693, 721 (1999) (recognizing the potential policy conflict between international rule of law concerns and transitional democracy, and proposing as a resolution a
legal rule of thumb, namely: "a presumption of extraditability and subsequent criminal
jurisdiction that could only be overcome by a convincing showing that the implementation
of international law would constitute a 'clear and present danger' for the country of the
objecting government").
129. See Scharf, supra note 19, at 375.
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conceding, perhaps, the need for such an option. Even more important,
unless adherence to a multilateral TRC regime is universal, any rights
or duties to prosecute that might survive for non-participating states
will continue to have the effect of destabilizing amnesties conferred by
the international TRC. Finally, to the extent a TRC regime is negotiable and enforceable, or at least able to reduce the level of exposure to
the risk of third-party prosecution, such a TRC regime would likely
commit the international community as a whole to a Procrustean set of
standards and procedures in precisely the kind of exercise that, to
achieve the goals of national reconciliation through internally negotiated accommodations, would require flexible international standards
and procedures. It would, moreover, require the exercise of political
discretion by international authorities, both in whether to defer to local
preference and how to relate amnesty to other policy tools the international community might employ to advance its overall interests. An international counterpart to the ICC arguably would lack the political
sensitivity to accomplish these objectives. Thus, perhaps an argument
can be made for accepting the judicialization of the international prosecutorial function, particularly for furthering international judicial cooperation and the consolidation of rule of law principles in the legal cultures of emerging democracies (and even democracies such as Spain,
where the task of consolidating democracy continues). 130 Yet, judicializing the amnesty function internationally would either divorce international amnesty from its broader political objectives or enable the exercise of political discretion by institutions unsuited to the task and
lacking the political credibility that flows from accountability to the
13 1
sources of power and experience in the international political process.
Indeed, in the short term at the very least and perhaps as far as
the eye can see, an international amnesty binding on all states that
could exercise universal jurisdiction for relevant human rights violations would be achievable only through the Security Council. Only the
Security Council has the power under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
to make binding "decisions" in circumstances where it finds "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.1 32 The Members of the United Nations further "agree to accept
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with
the present Charter," both "directly and through their actions in the

130. See Ann-Marie Slaughter, The Long Arm of the Law, FOREIGN POLY 1999, at 3435.
131. Cf. Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 109
(1996)(assessing the relevance of power to the formation of rules of customary international law).
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
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appropriate international agencies of which they are members." 3' The
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda situations would seem to suggest that if
the Security Council could make the prudential finding that the prosecution of human rights violations was warranted as a measure to prevent a "threat to the peace," then it might be reasonable for the Security
Council to make the judgment that amnesty would be equally related to
avoiding an eruption of international violence arising out of a transition
to democracy.
There might be limits on the Security Council's exercise of discretion. For example, it appears that the Security Council has even
considered creating an Ad Hoc Tribunal to address humanitarian law
violations by the Khmer Rouge that occurred as far back as their reign
of terror between 1975-79, although the Khmer Rouge is no longer a serious contender for power in Cambodia. Thus, the precise relation between punishment for offenses that were committed over a generation
ago and existing "threats to the peace" might need to be articulated.'3
Yet any doubts that purely retrospective measures by the Security
Council would be within Chapter VII, would not apply to the establishment of a regime conferring amnesty if such amnesty is deemed by the
Security Council to be related to the success of a transitional regime
and that regime's stability in turn furthers international peace and security. The relation between domestic stability, given the risks of regional destabilization through, among other things, and refugee flows is
now a settled basis for Council action.1 6 Indeed, the ICC Statute's deference to recommendations of the Security Council, which must also
137
under Chapter VII satisfy the standard required for binding decisions,

134. U.N. CHARTER art. 48(2). Whether the ICC would be an "agency" for these purposes would seem beside the point, given the broad commandments of Articles 2(5) and
2(6) respecting cooperation with UN purposes and principles in their conduct both with
respect to targets of UN enforcement action and non-Member states of the UN. But cf
Arsanjani, supra note 118, at 28 (arguing that if a state prosecution or investigation satisfies the complementarity criteria of Article 17 of the ICC Statute, then the ICC would be
required to defer to the state, notwithstanding Article 103 of the Charter, because Article
103 "binds the state but not the court").
135. Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 462, 463
(1998) ("One of the issues before the Council regarding this proposal will be whether its
powers under [chapter VII] encompass punishing members of a defunct regime for crimes
committed two decades ago.").
136. See generally Perez, On the Way to the Forum, supra note 21. One might reasonably disagree whether international criminal tribunals really do cause the restoration
of peace and security, so that their establishment would be rationally related to achieving
the purposes for which the Security Council would be authorized to create them. See e.g.,
Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace:Reflections on the Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics,6 TUL. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 5,

46-9 (1998) (calling into question whether international criminal tribunals and the prosecution of war criminals further promotes stability rather than merely reflecting stability
by the commitment of other human and material international resources).
137. U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
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manifests international recognition of the Council's broad powers to at
least delay criminal prosecutions if international peace and security so
require.
Such a judgment would arguably be binding on Member States,
since Article 103 of the United Nations Charter provides, "[Iun the event
of a conflict between the obligations of Members of the United Nations
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail."" Although subject to the theoretical caveats that in certain
cases a duty to prosecute will arise from jus cogens or even customary
international law, 139 so that a general amnesty would exceed the powers
of the Security Council,'O the Security Council mandated amnesty
would provide the legal basis for credible international guarantees
against subsequent prosecution of an amnesty beneficiary in a case of
transitional justice. At the same time, to the extent the exercise of universal jurisdiction by a state unilaterally would constitute impermissible intervention in the internal affairs of the transitioning state,"" collective intervention under explicit UN authority would largely address
such concerns.4
Indeed, the formal legality of the Security Council's
138. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
139. Technically, the effect of Article 103 of the Charter is limited to other treaties of
Member States, leaving open the theoretical possibility that supervening customary international law, which is ordinarily regarded as operating at the same level as treaty law.
See STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38, para. 1(a) & (b). Nonetheless, most arguments concerning the so-called duty to prosecute seem to be based on multilateral treaties. See Orentlicher, Duty to Prosecute, supra note 10. Accordingly, it may
be reasonable to conclude that no international customary law independent of treatybased norms could survive the Supremacy Clause effect of Article 103 of the Charter with
respect to Chapter VII decisions of the Council concerning amnesty.
140. Setting aside natural law-like norms such asjus cogens and the theoretical claim
that supervening custom could trump the law-creating powers of the United Nations Organization, the Security Council is limited, at a minimum, by the "purposes and principles" of the UN. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1 and 2. The limiting effect of this language
has not been authoritatively determined as yet, and one suspects that the International
Court of Justice, even though it has concluded that it has jurisdiction to consider the merits of Libya's claims, will somehow avoid reaching this issue now that the two Libyan suspects in the Lockerbie matter have arrived in the Netherlands to stand trial and the Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya have been lifted. See Peter Bekker, The
ICJ Upholds its Jurisdictionin Lockerbie Cases, ASIL NEWSLETTER, Mar.- Apr. 1998 at 2;
see U.N. Security Council PresidentialStatement on Lockerbie Suspects, 38 I. L. M. 949
(1999) (reporting suspension of sanctions pursuant to Secretary-General report of April 5
and Security Council Resolutions 883 and 1192).
141. See supra note 45. In a separate context, Robert Post has written: "Individual
citizens can identify with the creation of a collective will only if they believe that collective
decision making is in some way connected to their own individual self-determination."
Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1517,1524 (1997) (book review). Much the same can be said about the relationship
between individual states and the global community.
142. Cf. Lori F. Damrosch, ChangingConceptions of Intervention in InternationalLaw,
in EMERGING NORMS OF JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 91 (Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysen eds.,
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exercise of its authority might minimize moral objections to international intervention and in a state's exercise of its sovereign right to deown destiny through choosing its own transitional justice
termine14 its
3
policies.
The institutional vehicle for implementing an internationallyauthorized and mandated amnesty would still need to be determined,
however. One might still look to the ICC Statute for authority to exercise the kind of prosecutorial discretion that would be necessary to further a transition in a particular situation. The ICC Statute does not,
however, as currently drafted, authorize the granting of an internationally-binding amnesty. First, Article 20's provisions relating to double
jeopardy do not apply unless the person has been actually "convicted or
acquitted" by the ICC.'" Second, a close reading of the provisions relating to the prosecutor's functions suggest the Prosecutor arguably would
not be authorized to employ the procedures of the ICC and the authorities of the Prosecutor's office to facilitate an internationally-sponsored
investigation of facts for the purpose of establishing truth and achieving
reconciliation, rather than imposing punishment. The Prosecutor of the
ICC is authorized to terminate a prosecution only if "[the] prosecution is
not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances,
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of the victims and the
age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime."" Admittedly, the Prosecutor's discretion not to prosecute
is broad, for it allows consideration of "all the circumstances." Moreover, the illustrative list of grounds for exercise of prosecutorial discretion allows arguments concerning the "interests of the victims," which
could include truth and reconciliation that flow from an appropriately
structured procedure for the conferral of amnesty. A referral by a state
of a situation to the ICC, however, must "request the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or
more specific persons should be charged with the commission of such
crimes. " " More importantly, the Prosecutor's exercise of discretion not
to prosecute may be exercised only "upon investigation. 4 7 Reading
these two provisions together, it is difficult to conclude that the Prosecutor could initiate an investigation for any purpose other than ultimately to prosecute specific allegations, for the better reading is that
discretionary grounds exist for declining to prosecute specific cases only
1993) (distinguishing collective use of force under Security Council authority from unilateral use of force).
143. See Lea Brilmayer, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE
SUPERPOWER WORLD 157 (1994) (arguing that even errors of substantive morality by the

Security Council might be acceptable if procedural regularity were observed).
144. ICC Statute, supra note 12, art. 20(2).
145. Id. art. 53(2)(c).
146. Id. art. 14(1).
147. Id. art. 53(2).
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when a particularized inquiry yields the conclusion that the interests of
justice would be better served by not prosecuting even when the facts
would otherwise satisfy applicable legal and evidentiary standards.
Third, and finally, the ICC Statute explicitly bars jurisdiction
with respect to offenses committed prior to its entry into force." 8 It
would be a particularly challenging task for the ICC to interpret flexibly
its authorities so as to permit investigation, even if not for the ultimate
purpose of prosecution, of even specific allegations concerning events
that preceded the ICC's establishment. This would be even more problematic for situations in which no specific allegations can be marshaled
prior to the initiation of an investigation but an internationallyapproved amnesty commitment is deemed necessary to facilitate a transition.
All this is not to say that there is no room for expansion of the
Prosecutor's powers through a process of authoritative interpretation
that is customary for international organizations. At the request of the
Security Council, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) participated in the implementation of the arms control verification regime established by Security Council Resolution 687 with respect
to Iraq, 9 even though the IAEA Statute nowhere explicitly provided for
IAEA authority to monitor anything other than the peaceful use of nuclear material in IAEA member states, such as Iraq." However, the
better view would seem to be that the special claims of legitimacy in the
sensitive area of international criminal responsibility and amnesty
would be better served by express and unambiguous international lawmaking. Thus, if the ICC were deemed to be the appropriate institution
for a particular international truth and reconciliation commission, then
it would be possible for the Security Council to request the ICC to undertake investigative functions related to violations of human rights
within the scope of its competence to prosecute. While the ICC may ultimately be able to conform its existing powers to participate in a broad
range of possible cases at the request of the Security Council, an appro148. Id. art. 11(1).
149. S.C. Res 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991).
150. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 29, 1957) ["IAEA Statute"].
The IAEA traditionally had interpreted its own mandate not to permit an IAEA role in
the monitoring of even non-nuclear weapons related yet military uses, such as for nuclear
power production in nuclear submarines, of nuclear material. See para. 14 of The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection
with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153
(June 1972) (the model for all IAEA Agreements with non-nuclear weapon state parties to
the NPT, such as Iraq). Nonetheless, the IAEA appears to have concluded that its own
powers under the IAEA Statute could be extended to respond to the Security Council's
request, notwithstanding the technical argument that it was not authorized to do so under its treaty relationship with Iraq or explicitly by the IAEA Statute.
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priately cautious estimate of the ICC's capacities suggests that additional institutional structures or an explicit amendment to the ICC
Statute may be necessary to deal with all possible transitional contingencies requiring internationally-binding amnesty.
That said, even if the Security Council were able to employ the ICC
ad hoc to conduct the kind of factual investigations that would provide
the meat for a South African-style TRC, there are serious doubts
whether the Council should take direct responsibility for granting clemency. True, the political judgment of the Council may be instrumental
in making the determination whether to trigger a TRC, for precisely the
reason that amnesty should be available only when the competing demands for peaceful transition and accountability can best be reconciled
in this fashion. This is a uniquely prudential judgment requiring assessment of political facts that are intrinsically beyond the competence
of judicial authorities or of any likely set of international civil servants
that might staff a TRC (or the ICC functioning as a pseudo-TRC).
However, too deep Security Council involvement creating rules governing particular cases will appear to take the form of selective and perhaps unjust prosecution, just as too little UN supervision and local accountability have in the case of UN-authorized prosecution raised the
specter of the same dangers.'
Principles of neutrality and generality
in the administration of justice would call for as limited an exercise of
political discretion as possible by the Security Council. Moreover, recent use by the Security Council of its chapter VII authorities in a wide
range of cases has served in5 2the eyes of many to de-legitimize Security
Council enforcement action.

151. See Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States, Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24
YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999) (arguing that the Rwanda Criminal Court established by the
Security Council has failed adequately to take into account the needs of Rwandan society
by focusing alone on accountability for high-level perpetrators).
152. See, e.g., David Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security
Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1993) (critiquing the so-called "reverse" veto, under which
once the Security Council authorization is given for enforcement action, such as with respect to Iraq, the veto of one of the Permanent Members, such as the United States, prevents the international community from revoking authorization for the enforcement action). Still other instances of potential abuse of power by a Permanent Member of the
Security Council have raised questions concerning the legitimacy of Security Council activities. See, e.g., John M. Goshko, Chief U.N. Arms InspectorSees Trouble in Spy Charge:
Butler Says He Did Not Know of Espionage, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1999, A2 (reporting
admission by USG that, without knowledge of UN Special Commission on Inspections
(UNSCOM) for Iraq established under Security Council Resolution 687, U.S. intelligence
agents used UNSCOM special inspection teams for espionage activities in Iraq unrelated
to legitimate weapons monitoring information collection activities). This evidence merely
reinforced the long-brewing doubts spawned by the continuing U.S./U.K. use of force
against Iraq since the end of the Gulf War. See generally Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner,
Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-fires and
the Iraqi InspectionRegime, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 124 (1999). The perception that the great
powers use the Security Council solely when it suits them and evade its strictures when it
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It thus must be feared by many states that the reposing power in
the Security Council would simply enable the most powerful states to
assure themselves that their own leaders could evade prosecution for
international crimes for which there would be universal jurisdiction, including Security Council authorized use of force. Indeed, it might be
feared that the Council would go farther by seeking to immunize the
Heads of State of the five permanent Security Council seats - let us
suppose, for example Presidents Clinton or Bush - for U.S. sponsored
humanitarian intervention in Iraq or Yugoslavia. While these may be
red herring arguments, for surely no reasonable prosecution could be
brought against the authors of these kinds of uses of force, fear of this
possibility could undermine the confidence that would be necessary for
the Security Council to perform the discretionary political function of
conferring amnesty.
Therefore, accomplishing the legitimate ends of using prosecutorial
discretion to achieve the larger goal of transitional justice may require
the Council to turn the reins over to an authoritative agent capable of
wisely exercising discretion. Arguably, only a Secretary General commanding the respect of both the members of the Security Council and
the General Assembly, and serving at their joint pleasure, would be in a
practical position to exercise such authority.
But would the Security Council ever delegate this power? Arguably, it would be preferable for the Council not to make a general grant
of authority to any delegee, even the Secretary General, without first
testing the concept in particular cases, much as experience with the
UN-authorized Yugoslavia and Rwanda Criminal Courts may have created momentum towards an ICC. On the other hand, the transitionpromoting effect of establishing a mechanism for international amnesty
calls for immediate action that would have, at a minimum, demonstrative effects countering the Pinochet precedent for the current crop of
human rights violators masquerading as Heads of State. In the short
term, immediate action could be taken internationalizing the amnesties
conferred by qualifying current TRCs, such as the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. However, for the long haul, the test
case for Security Council-authorized internationalized amnesty, rather
than a multilateral solution suggested by the ICC model, would be one
does not was further buttressed by the recent NATO decision to use force in Kosovo without explicit U.N. authority. This, in turn, spawned a debate concerning the continuing
validity of the legal framework for the management of collective security set forth in U.N.
Charter. Compare Michael Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search for Just InternationalLaw, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1999) (arguing that the Kosovo intervention signals
the irrelevance of the Charter and emergence of a new legal framework) with Thomas
Franck, Sidelined in Kosovo?: The United Nations' Demise Has Been Exaggerated- Break
It, Don't Fake It, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1999) (maintaining that the Charter legal system is
still adequate to the task and that the Kosovo action is an aberration rather than an example of an emerging new set of rules).
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where the legitimacy of Security Council judgments would be most
problematic - that is to say, a case like Cuba, where transition to democracy would directly affect the interests of a member of the Security
Council itself.
V.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FOR CUBA UNDER INTERNATIONALIZED
AMNESTY

Cuba's transition will require international attention, and not only
from the United States. Much as the Pinochet case has resurrected
some cold and hard questions about American complicity in the overthrow of Salvador Allende," among other things that only time will reveal, Castro's political demise will reopen old wounds for the United
States. Many still react viscerally to the very mention of Pinochet's
name, and are willing to go to great lengths, including perhaps even destabilizing the Chilean Government's continuing efforts to construct a
stable democracy in a still deeply divided society, many outside the
United States and Cuba will go to extraordinary lengths to bring both
Castro and the United States to account. The risk of judicial action, including, questions of civil liability,"5 against either Castro and his successors, and even against those on the American side of the Florida
Straits who might be in legal jeopardy, would profoundly complicate
any Cuban-American rapprochement.
Cuban-American relations over the past century have been, as
Churchill said of Russia, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an
enigma. "155 From the 1898 sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor, precipitating the Spanish-American War,"" to the 1996 shoot-down of two
Brothers to the Rescue planes above the Florida Straits, which lead to
153. For an official defense of the U.S. role, the authoritative account may be found in
HENRY KISSINGER, PHILOSOPHY AND REALITY IN YEARS OF UPHEAVAL 374-413 (1982); by

contrast, the most pervasively critical account shaping public understanding of the U.S.
role might be found in the film MISSING (1982).
154. See Alexandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (lifting
state sovereign immunity under terrorist offense exception); see also Cuba's Repressive
Machinery, supra note 1, at 200-01 (reporting actions against Castro already initiated in
France and Spain in the aftermath of the Pinochet case). See generally John Murphy,
Civil Liability of the Commission of InternationalCrimes as an Alternative to Criminal
Prosecution, 12 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 1, 47-55 (1999) (arguing that given barrier to implementation of the International Criminal Court, international civil liability for human
rights violations, particularly through lawsuits in the United States, may offer a likelier
method of deterrence than international criminal prosecutions, and recommending a multilateral approach for assuring the enforcement of such judgments); but cf Bradley, supra
note 113.
155. See Winston Churchill, Radio Broadcast [Oct. 1, 1939], quoted in BARTLETr'S, supra note 36, at 620.
156. See Thomas B. Allen, Remember the Maine, 193 NA'L GEO. 91 (1998) [hereinafter
Remember the Maine] (reviewing latest findings on the sinking of the Maine); Rafael E.
Tarrrago, The Thwarting of CubanAutonomy, 42 ORBIS 517 (Fall 1998).
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the enactment of the Helms-Burton sanctions legislation and a near
trade war between the United States and its key allies,"7 too many
questions of fact and doubts about the interpretation even of agreed
facts have plagued the troubled Cuban-American relationship.
At one end, was exploding and sinking of the Maine an American
plot to instigate an imperialist war, to obtain control of Cuba before it
won independence on its own from Spain? At the other end, could U.S.
forces have intervened to prevent the deaths of the two Brothers to the
Rescue pilots, or was the U.S. government itself complicit in an attempt
to deter the Brothers to the Rescue from embarrassing the Cuban government and thereby promoting the destabilization of the regime? Or
worse yet, did elements of the U.S. government hope to provoke a Cuban overreaction that might compel the U.S. government to take even
more extreme measures than the enactment of merely an additional
economic sanctions bill? In between, did the United States drive Castro
into the arms of the Soviet Union, or was separation from the United
States the inevitable and strategically-necessary choice of any new Cuban leadership committed to nationalism during the height of the Cold
War? As for U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro, how high up was this
policy decided, and for how long was it maintained? How close did we
come to nuclear war with the Soviet Union during the October 1962
missile crisis, and what did Fidel Castro, fearing assassination or invasion, do to instigate or exacerbate the crisis? Is there any truth to the
long held belief by many U.S. citizens, and even by some U.S. officials
including perhaps even Lyndon Johnson himself, that Castro may have
had something to do with John F. Kennedy's assassination in November
1963?"5
Many of these questions reflect simple ignorance of recent historical research. For example, it now seems quite clear that the sinking of
the Maine was not an imperialist plot,' 59 even if that new fact does not
make the U.S. declaration of war against Spain any less self-interested.
Some of the questions, with all due respect to the legendarily high quality of the Cuban intelligence services, reflect Martryoshka doll narratives of mind-numbing Machiavellian sophistication smacking of dime
store novels of Cold War vintage. Could even the Cubans pull off the
Kennedy assassination without ultimately being discovered by the U.S.
government? And if the U.S. government could prove such a thing,
could that secret ever really be preserved in our post-Watergate political culture? But all these questions reflect a deep, and almost certainly

157. See generally Perez, WTO and U.N. Law, supra note 126, at 302-05.
158. WALTER CRONKITE, A REPORTER'S LIFE 307-08 (1996) (suggesting, remarkably for
a person of Cronkite's status as a member of the U.S. elite, that President Lyndon Johnson in fact did fear that Kennedy's assassination was connected to Cuba and prior U.S.
efforts to assassinate Castro).
159. See Allen, Remember the Maine, supra note 156.
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dysfunctional, obsession of virtually all Cubans and all too many
Americans with the Cuban-American relationship; and not only with
the facts of that relationship but also with its myths. A series of repressed memories will break through to complicate present policymaking. What is worse, the Cuban transition to democracy and the United
States's own engagement in that process will be burdened with the dead
hand of a false past as well-for imagined violations will be as, if not
more, disturbing than any truths that could be remembered. Somehow
these memories, both true and false, need to be confronted if Cuba and
the United States are to emerge, each whole and together free.
Castro is not immortal, though like Spain's own Francisco Franco,
this Cuban also of Gallego stock may well linger far longer than most
think possible. Yet transition is inevitable. The new leadership, even if
the transition is orderly and gradual, will need to make some kind of
break with the old order to establish its bona fides and confirm its legitimacy. But the likelier scenario is a wholesale repudiation of key
dimensions of Cuba's past. Thus, assuming any plausible transition
scenario, but especially in the case of a radical break that directly repudiates Castro or his surviving successors, U.S. political elites will insist
on answers to many of these questions that have bedeviled U.S.-Cuban
relations. Even if U.S. political elites do not insist on a full accountability, the Cuban-American political community will insist on some measure of vindication of the moral superiority of their struggle and their
version of history. That political voice has been, and likely will continue make itself, heard in the corridors of power in Washington.
Thus, any new government probably will be asked to cooperate in
investigating the past sins of the Castro regime. Quite possibly, as a
condition of U.S. assistance, it will be asked even to do justice by punishing the guilty and compensating the victims. Already, current U.S.
legislation requires forms of compensation, and litigation pending in
U.S. courts may even generate enforceable obligations in the short
term. Whether this agenda reflects maximum demands that will be
sated by Castro's departure, or the first pangs of an ever-increasing
hunger for vengeance once the appetizer is served, remains to be determined. But, however great or small the demand for a public accountability, it seems clear that some members of the old regime will
have to answer in some way for their past conduct. This will be necessary not only to meet the external demands for justice, flowing from the
United States as well as advocates of justice throughout the world, but
also to address the need Cubans in Cuba will have to come to terms
with their past. In addition to the historical myths that will plague
Cuba's relationship with the outside world, real memories will complicate the tasks of the survivors of Castro's failed experiment. The collaborators and profiteers will fear the resentment of those who resisted
and suffered. Individualists who could not abide socialism's effort to
share the burdens and benefits of community life will thrive through
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the new order's accommodation with market society and economic and
social competition. The victors will include Cubans remaining in Cuba,
as much as the exiles whose willingness to invest in a new Cuba will be
an offer any new Cuban government will be unable completely to refuse. Envy of the new coupled with the victors' remembrance of their
privations and deprivations will fuel an instinct for revenge in a society
whose moral fabric is no longer sewn with the fibers of ideological conviction -the Marxist god having failed. And it is doubtful that traditional religions, particularly in a country only beginning to open the
door to transcendental ethics through institutionalized religion, could
fill the gap necessary to establish forgiveness and mercy as public values.
Thus, some measure of Cuba's past truths will of necessity emerge
through the trial, in one form or another, of the perpetrators of past injustices. Yet, in the course of defending themselves, no doubt Castro or
his successors will themselves have a story to tell, a tale that few
Americans and Cuban exiles will want to hear. It will include claims
about Cuban-American and even U.S. government actions that may
have seemed far more morally tolerable when undertaken during the
middle of a struggle against the "focus of evil in the modern world," just
as the U.S. bombing of Dresden now takes on a different moral character when the need to eradicate a government bent on such evils as the
Holocaust has begun to recede in memory. How would the CubanAmerican community or the U.S. government fare in the light that
would shine then? Would the failure to charge those responsible for excesses on the American side problematicize prosecutions of human
rights violations and war crimes on the Cuban-Castroite side, much as
the failure to prosecute those Soviets responsible for the Katyn forest
massacres of Polish anti-Communists called into question the judgment
at Nuremberg?
The devil of course would be in the details. Possibly, however, the
body could be modeled on the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. Conditions relating to the handling of classified information could be negotiated so as to link the effectiveness of any amnesty
offered to some degree of compliance with the requirements to divulge
relevant information for the purposes of making an effective determination regarding amnesty; at the same time, there might be public dissemination of only the essential truths at stake subject to protection of
legitimate national security concerns in intelligence-related and other
relevant areas. Some limited carve-out from the grant of amnesty
might be necessary, for acts so beyond the pale that no moral calculus
could find that the scales of justice would tilt toward the claim of necessity, even when balanced against the moral weight attached to the formation of a new Cuban democracy and the establishment of a just and
lasting peace between Cuba and the United States. And perhaps even
some limited form of a superior orders defense would need to be in-
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cluded, to take account of the extraordinary context for choice Cubans
in Cuba faced after two generations of de-moralized life.
But reasonable people could differ about the answers to these questions. The immediate, necessary task is to begin a trans-Caribbean dialogue between Washington, Miami, and Havana. That is, both Havanas, the one still in power and the one that is emerging in the new civil
society that is taking shape as the old Havana moves to adjust itself to
an inevitable future. Foreign intermediaries, particularly Spanish,
Mexican and Canadian investors, will be instrumental here. In fact,
the dialogue may already have begun as the old elites work with the
new investors to achieve a modus vivendi, a soft landing in the postCommunist terra incognita. Unfortunately, that dialogue may well
raise false hopes of a seamless, commercially-driven transition in which
the old elites replicate their power in new institutions, as may have
been the case in the old Soviet Union. This is not a stable vision of
Cuba's future; rather, it may even be calculated to place Cuba back on
path leading it to repeat its history of cycles of dependence followed by
rebellion succeeded by dependence again-repetitions of tragedy and
perhaps of farce. Instead, the dialogue must seek real reform through
genuine reconciliation. If the Security Council is to speak ex cathedra
and use its power to restrain interested third parties from prosecuting
either Castro or his coterie of followers (and perhaps Cuban-Americans
and others who might have strayed), then moral authority must be
brought to bear. Is the Vatican a candidate? That remains to be seen,
but the possibility should not yet be foreclosed of a substantial Papal
role in facilitating a transition. But the new international legal reality
created by Ex Parte Pinochet makes clear that moral authority may not
be enough to do all the necessary work. Rather, the Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII, must be involved; and, because the United
States is itself a deeply interested party in any Cuban transition, it
would be better if the Council could act in a way that removed an appearance of impropriety. In this case, more than any other, it will be
necessary for the Council truly to act as a P-5 rather than de facto as
m
the P-1.'6
In sum, Cuba and the United States must learn not only the lessons of their own past but also the lessons from the tragic pasts of other
transitional societies. Without justice there cannot be peace; and without peace there cannot be justice. But without a minimal level of reconciliation - at least at the level of the capacity to engage in a continuing
conversation about the meaning of the past, 16' but if possible through a
160. See W. Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisis of the United Nations, 87 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 83, 97 ("Within the Council, the P-5 meet privately to coordinate policy and,
within the P-5, the P-3 meet privately to coordinate policy. There is no question about the
identity of P-i.").
161. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 151, at 483 (citing Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders:
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new founding of civil and political society in Cuba, reflecting a broad
consensus - there can be neither peace nor justice. Ex Parte Pinochet
thus, fails to grasp this essential reality. By contrast, Ex PartePinochet
III might be read, as I have argued, to perceive, even if dimly, the outlines of the wedded truths that national reconciliation must proceed in
tandem with international reconciliation and, for this to occur, there
will be no substitute for supranational governance. If transitional justice is wholly legalized or wholly politicized, then it will be neither just
nor effective. As Grant Gilmore reminded us: "In Heaven there will be
no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb... In Hell there will be
nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed."1 6 Yet
on earth, for the lion to lie down with the lamb, it must both fear and
love the law.

Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939 (1998), for a "civil
dissensus" model of national reconciliation in which, by assumption, national reconciliation is not predicated on social consensus over foundational values or even a shared assessment of the legitimacy of the acts of the prior regime). The limited, "civil dissensus"
model of national reconciliation bears some resemblance to the use of constructivist social
theory, which posits the transformation of participants in dialogue through dialogical engagement as an account for the reconciliation of national policy with international obligations. See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992) (articulating constructivist approach in international context).
162. PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 184 (1982)
(quoting Gilmore's Holmes Lecture at the Harvard Law School).

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO SAY I'M SORRY?
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S APOLOGY TO
GUATEMALA AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
MARK GIBNEY
I.

& DR. DAVID WARNER*
INTRODUCTION

President Clinton's recent apology for the role of the United States
in supporting the Guatemalan military during Guatemala's brutal civil
war should have enormous consequences for both international and
domestic law. In large part responding to the findings of an independent Guatemalan truth commission,' Clinton was unequivocal in his
condemnation of U.S. policy during Guatemala's decades-long conflict
that cost upwards of 200,000 civilian lives:
For the United States, it is important that I state clearly that support
for military forces and intelligence units which engaged in violence and
widespread repression was wrong, and the United States must not repeat that mistake. We must, and we will, instead,2 continue to support
the peace and reconciliation process in Guatemala.
At a press conference at the end of the summit, Clinton reiterated
the apology in the following manner.
[Wihat I apologized for has nothing to do with the fact that there was a
difference between the policy of the administration and the Congress in
previous years, going back for decades, and including administrations
of both parties. It is that the policy of the Executive Branch was
wrong. And what we're doing here is in the open, it's not a secret.

. Professor Mark Gibney, Belk Distinguished Professor of Humanities, University
of North Caroline at Asheville. N.C. Dr. David Warner, Deputy to the Director for External Relations and Special Programs, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.
1. Mireya Navarro, Guatemala Study Accuses the Army and Cites U.S. Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1999, at Al.
2. Remarks by the President in Roundtable Discussion on Peace Efforts, National
Palace of Culture, Guatemala City, Guatemala, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 395 (March
10, 1999).
3. Remarks by the President at Signing Ceremony and Summit Closing Statements,
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This comment begins with the notion of state responsibility across
borders, and asks what effect, if any, the Clinton apology might have to
that end in international law. This comment then examines United
States domestic law to see how President Clinton's admission of wrongdoing might effect potential claims that could be brought by Guatemalans in U.S. courts.

II. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
A.

TransnationalState Responsibility'

Since World War II, there have been enormous changes in the notion of "state sovereignty." Prior to this time, events taking place
within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular state - no matter how
gruesome these policies and practices happened to be - were seen and
treated as mainly "internal affairs". After World War II, this particularly limited conception of state sovereignty has evolved, and we now
hold states responsible for violations of international law that they have
committed, at least theoretically. This responsibility is notwithstanding the fact that the violations have occurred solely within the territorial boundaries of the state.
State sovereignty still serves to protect against many forms of state
responsibility. However, now it is far more likely that countries will invoke the sovereignty of another state in order to remove themselves
from any and all responsibility for causing an act or for assisting an
outlaw state.5 For example, a state that provides security and military
aid to a country that engages in human rights violations may argue
that it is not violating international law because it never actually "pulls
the trigger". To put this another way, the state that provides the aid
maintains that it cannot be held responsible for the actions of the receiving state.
This extremely limited notion of transnational state responsibility
is evident in the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) decision in Nicaragua v United States, as well as in the work of the International Law
Commission.
The Nicaraguacase addressed two forms of transnational state responsibility. The first was whether the United States was responsible

Casa Santo Domingo, Convention Center, Antigua, Guatemala, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC 403 (March 11, 1999).
4. Although transnational usually refers to non-state activities, this note will use it
to refer to relations between States as well.
5. See generally, Mark Gibney et al., TransnationalState Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267 (1999).

6. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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for its own actions in Nicaragua that contravened international law,
and the second was whether the United States was responsible for the
contra rebels' acts. The ICJ readily answered the first question in the
affirmative.7 As to the second question, the ICJ refused to hold the U.S.
government responsible for violations committed by the contra rebel
forces, a paramilitary group that had received substantial support from
the United States. In terms of responsibility, the Court focused on the
question of "control" and arrived at the following conclusion: "In light of
the evidence and material available to it, the Court is not satisfied that
all the operations launched by the contra force, at every stage of the
conflict, reflected strategy and tactics wholly devised by the United
States."s
The Nicaraguacase seems to set the bar so high concerning operational control that it is nearly impossible to imagine a situation where a
state that provides military and security assistance to another state, or
to an entity such as a guerrilla force, would be held legally responsible
for the manner in which such aid was used.
The International Law Commission takes a slightly different approach, but the results are similar. Article 27 of the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility entitled "Aid or assistance by a State to another
State for the commission of an internationally wrongful act" reads:
Aid or assistance by a State to another State, if it is established that it
is rendered for the commission of an internationally wrongful act, carried out by the latter, itself constitutes an internationally wrongful act,
even if, taken alone, such aid or assistance would not constitute the
breach of an international obligation.9
In the commentary accompanying the article, the authors stress
that in order for there to be legal responsibility for aiding or assisting
another state, the sending state must intend that the receiving state
engage in internationally wrongful conduct.
[Ilt is not sufficient that aid or assistance provided without such inten7. The International Court of Justice held that the United States breached a number of customary international law obligations. Among these violations were the following: By training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra rebel forces the
United States had violated the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of another state.

Through its actions in armed attacks at various locations in Nicaragua, the U.S. had
breached its obligation not to use force against another State. And in laying mines in the

internal or territorial waters of Nicaragua, the United States was in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful maritime
commerce. Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. at 194.
8. Id. 1 106 (emphases added).
9. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on its Thirtieth Session [19781 V.11,

pt. 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 99.
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tion could be used by the recipient State for unlawful purposes, or that
the State providing aid or assistance should be aware of the eventual
possibility of such use. The aid or assistance must in fact be rendered
with a view to its use in committing the principal internationally
wrongful act. Nor is it sufficient that this intention be "presumed," as
the article emphasizes, it must be "established."0
In sum, the status of transnational state responsibility as it presently stands requires that a state that provides aid and assistance to
another state must exercise almost complete control over the receiving
state in order to be held responsible for any human rights violations
carried out by the second state. Under the changes proposed by the International Law Commission, the law would only change slightly, with
state responsibility arising when the sending state intends that the receiving state will use this assistance in order to carry out internationally wrongful acts.
B.

PresidentClinton'sApology and InternationalLaw

Notwithstanding the very close that existed relationship between
the United States and the various military dictatorships in Guatemala," the U.S. was seemingly not in violation of international law - at
least as it stands at present. This is because there is no indication that
the U.S. government exercised anywhere near the level of "control" over
the Guatemalan government seemingly demanded by the ICJ in the
Nicaragua case. Similarly, notwithstanding the egregious human
rights record of the Guatemalan government and its military, there is
absolutely no indication that the intent behind the practice of providing
military and security assistance was such that Guatemala would use
this material to commit internationally wrongful acts.
Still, the President's statement that the policy of the United States
was "wrong" is an unequivocal condemnation of actions taken by the
U.S. government in the past. This begs the question, what effect does
the apology have under international law?
In the Nuclear Tests Judgment, the ICJ held that declaratory
statements by Government officials can have the force of legal obligation.12 In addition, it is well recognized that declarations made by way
of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the
effect of creating legal obligations: "When it is the intention of the State
making the declaration that it should become bound according to its
terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal

10. Id. at 104.
11. See Susanne Jonas, Dangerous Liaisons: The U.S. in Guatemala, FOREIGN POLVY
144 (1996).
12. Nuclear Test Cases (Australia vs. France), 1974 I.C.J., 253 1 43.
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undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a
course of conduct consistent with the declaration." 3
It is clear from the President's statement that he is speaking for
the United States, as opposed to speaking in a personal capacity. His
apology about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, for example, was
obviously a personal statement." On the other hand, his apology for the
syphilis study done in Tuskegee was clearly an apology for past Governmental actions with specific future steps outlined by the Government. 5 Both the apologies for the Tuskegee incident and the United
States' actions in Guatemala were policy statements.
What is not so clear in the Guatemala apology, however, is whether
or not he considers his statement to have a binding effect, creating a legal obligation on the United States, or whether the statement is some
kind of moral pronouncement. Our reading of the President's statement
is that the apology was intended to have both legal and moral implications. The moral implications of the mea culpa are self-evident and
need no further discussion. But there wouldn't be any moral implications if there was no force of law behind them. Otherwise, the President could simply declare U.S. actions "wrong", but then continue to
carry out these very same actions without any concern with the legal
implications of doing so. This would not only be a very strained (and
strange) version of morality, but it would constitute a very odd conception of law as well.16 The very purpose of the President's statement
must be more than just a personal or national apology; there is more going on here. Simply because he stated moral responsibility does not
void the apology of legal consequences.
Assuming, then, that President Clinton truly intended to issue a
serious apology, several questions remain about the implications of the
apology. One is specific to Guatemala. If U.S. policy constituted a violation of international law, is a mere apology sufficient? What kinds of
13. Id.

14. See e.g. Dan Balz & Guy Gugliotta, Even Critics Are Cautious in Wake of President's Speech, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1999, at A12.

15. See Remarks by the President in Apology for Study Done in Tuskegee, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 719 (May 16, 1997).

(A)nd finally say on behalf of the American people, what the United States
government did was shameful, and I am sorry... The legacy of the study at
Tuskegee has reached far and deep, in ways that hurt our progress and divide our nation. We cannot be one American when a whole segment of our
nation has no trust in America. An apology is the first step, and we take it
with a commitment to rebuild that broken trust. We can begin by making
sure that there is never again another episode like this one.. .Today I would
like to announce several steps to help us achieve those goals." \
Id.
16. On the relationship between moral and law in terms of responsibility, see generally DANIEL WARNER, AN ETHIc OF RESPONSIBILITY ININTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 61-81
(1991).
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obligations does the apology entail? Another question is where else in
the world is an apology (or more) by the United States warranted? The
President's apology was for past U.S. policy decisions, but are there
analogous practices in any other countries at present? And how will
this change the conduct of American foreign policy in the future? Apart
from the United States, will the President's apology have any influence
upon the practices of any other state for purposes of establishing customary international law concerning the recognition of aiding and assisting a wrongdoer? And finally, what will the President's apology
mean in terms of the recent development of transnational state responsibility more generally?
III. UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
In addition to its importance for international law, President Clinton's apology also has enormous implications in terms of U.S. domestic
law. In particular, the admission of wrongdoing should play a key, and
likely dispositive, role in lawsuits attempting to hold the U.S. government liable for its actions in Guatemala. What weighs against this liability, of course, is the lack of real success foreign nationals have had
in United States courts on human rights issues. Notwithstanding the
apparent willingness of the American judiciary to hear suits brought by
foreign nationals against other foreign nationals for human rights
abuses occurring in other countries,17 many of these same courts have
readily dismissed such suits brought by foreign nationals alleging human rights abuses by the U.S. government and top ranking government
officials. 18 Whether alleging direct or indirect harm, the results have all
been the same. The U.S. has shown a strong domestic tendency to reduce state immunity and the Act of State doctrine when agents of foreign governments or, in some cases, foreign governments themselves,
are brought before U.S. Courts on the basis that they have violated international human rights law. However, these same courts still give
absolute import to the Act of State doctrine when an act of the U.S. government is in question. The question we raise is the extent to which the
President's admission of wrongdoing in Guatemala will change the law
in this area.
17. The line of cases that have been developed are generally known as Filartiga
cases, named after the case that first enunciated this principle, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Jurisdiction in these cases is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
a statute passed by the very first Congress in 1789. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789). See also BETH STEPHENS
& MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 20-24
(1996).
18. See generally, Mark Gibney, U.S. Courts and the Selectiue Protection of Human
Rights, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS: MYTH OR REALITY? (Mark Gibney &

Stanislaw Frankowski eds., 1999).
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Avoiding State Liability in United States Courts

One of the first cases that sought to hold the United States responsible for the human consequences of American foreign policy was Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan.19 In this case there were three groups of
plaintiffs: twelve Nicaraguan civilians, twelve members of the U.S.
House of Representatives, and two residents of the state of Florida. The
Nicaraguan civilians based their suit on allegations that the United
States was providing support for the contra rebels who, in turn, were
committing terrorist activities in Nicaragua. Despite recognizing the
"gravity and complexity of the plaintiffs' claims,"20 the district court dismissed the case on the basis of the political question doctrine. The
court stated, "[in order to adjudicate the tort claims of the Nicaraguan
plaintiffs, we would have to determine the precise nature of the United
States government's involvement in the affairs of several Central
American nations, namely, Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador and
Nicaragua."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal, but on
the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In the words of thenJudge Scalia, "[ilt would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity if federal courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin, by
judgments nominally against present or former Executive officers, actions that are, concededly and as a jurisdictionalnecessity, official actions of the United States."2
Notwithstanding the protections of sovereign immunity, Judge
Scalia suggested that the plaintiffs might receive some compensation.
However, in his view, any relief would have to come from the political
branches and not from the judiciary.
Saltany v. Reagan' was a suit brought by a group of fifty-three
Libyan plaintiffs (all civilians), who sued for personal and property
damage from the U.S. military air strikes in April, 1986. The U.S. air
strikes were in retaliation for the alleged Libyan bombing of a disco in
West Berlin earlier that month that had killed two American servicemen. The district court readily conceded that the conduct would have
been "tortuous" if it were judged by civil law standards. However, the
court did not employ any legal standards. Instead, it justified dismissal
of the case on the basis that the defendants had exercised "discretion in
a myriad of contexts of utmost complexity and gravity, not to mention

19. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983) afrd, 770 F. 2d 202
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
20. Id. at 601.
21. Id.
22. Sanchez-Espinoza,770 F. 2d at 207 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
23. Saltany v. Reagan, 707 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988).
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danger. " 24 And in a manner just as curious, the district court further
noted that the defendants had "acted, as duty required, in accordance
with the orders of the commander-in-chief or a superior order."2 Apparently, based on the reasoning that the operation involved great complexity and danger, and that it was carried out through the government's chain of command, the district court held that the defendants
were immune from suit.
What was obviously irksome to the court was the mere fact that the
suit was brought in the first place. Taking particular aim at the plaintiffs' attorney, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, the court
described the case as "audacious."2 , Yet, in its haste to dismiss this audacious lawsuit, the court overlooked several things. First, there was,
and continues to be, serious dispute as to whether the Libyan government was behind the West Berlin bombing. That is, Libyan civilians
were killed based on evidence that many of our allies questioned. Second, the retaliatory raids violated international law. Article 25 of the
Hague Regulations of 1907 states: "The attack or bombardment, by
whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are
undefended, is prohibited."2 Third, the court never explained why the
lawsuit - based on harm to innocent civilians - was not warranted.
The December, 1989 invasion of Panama brought about the deaths
of between 200 and 2000 civilians. Yet, all attempts to seek compensation have so far proven unsuccessful. In McFarlandv. Cheney,2 a lawsuit was brought on behalf of a group of Panamanian civilians who suffered personal injury, property loss and the death of loved ones during
the American invasion. It is interesting to note that many of the
petitioners in the case had filed administrative service claims with the
U.S. Army Claims Service seeking compensation for their losses and
injuries, attempting to rely upon a precedent used to compensate
civilians harmed in the 1983 invasion of Grenada.' However, the Army
Claims Service rejected all of the Panamanian compensation claims on
the ground that the various injuries occurred during U.S. combat operations (although this was true in Grenada as well). The district court
upheld this administrative finding and the judgment was affirmed on
appeal. While the Panamanian government has received assistance
from the United States, none of these funds have been set aside for the
victims of the invasion.
24. Id. at 322.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Annex to the Convention, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Art. 25, Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS No. 539, 205 Parry's TS 277.
28. McFarland v. Cheney, 1991 WL 43262 (D.D.C. 1991) afrd, 971 F. 2d 766 (D.C.Cir.
1992) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1053 (1993).
29. Jeffrey Harris, Grenada- A Claims Perspective, 1986 ARMY LAW. 7.
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Finally, the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 over the Persian Gulf by
missile fire from the U.S.S. Vincennes, killing all of the passengers and
crew aboard, has also been the subject of litigation in the United States.
In Nejad v. United States,"' the plaintiffs were the families and economic dependents of four passengers. The defendants were the U.S.
government and twelve defense contractors that had supplied the ship
with military equipment. The district court quickly and easily dismissed the plaintiffs' case, evincing complete deference to the political
branches (as well as spurious reasoning) that has seemingly become the
norm in this area. "It is indubitably clear that the plaintiffs' claim calls
into question the Navy's decisions and actions in execution of those decisions. The conduct of such affairs are [sic] constitutionally committed
to the President as Commander in Chief and to his military and naval
subordinates."3'
Koohi v. United States' was based upon the same set of facts, and
the disposition of the case - dismissal - was predictable enough. There
are, however, a number of noteworthy (and disturbing) aspects of this
case on appeal. The most noteworthy is that the court went out of its
way to hold that the case was justiciable.33 The defendants had tried to
argue for dismissal on the basis of the political question doctrine, but
the court held that government operations are traditional subjects of
damage actions.' Furthermore, the court held that the judiciary is "capable of reviewing military decisions, particularly when those decisions
cause injury to civilians." Finally, the court took note of the fact that
the plaintiffs were merely seeking money damages, and not any form of
injunctive relief, which might prove to be far more intrusive into ongoing government operations.
Yet, despite all this, the court then upheld dismissal of the case on
the basis of the Federal Tort Claims Act,' which makes an exception to
the waiver of sovereign immunity for "[a]ny claim arising out of combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard,
during time of war."37 Notwithstanding the fact that there had been no
declaration of war, and although the events in question had long preceded what eventually came to be the Persian Gulf War, the court felt

30. Nejad v. United States, 724 F. Supp. 753 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
31. Id. at 755.
32. Koohi v. United States, 967 F. 2d 1328 (9' Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928
(1993).
33. Id. at 1331.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 28. U.S.C. § 1346(b). The Federal Tort Claims Act gives jurisdiction to federal
district courts for claims against the United States for personal injury or death caused by
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of any employee of the government while acting
within the scope of his or her office or employment.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (j).
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that there were important policy considerations for maintaining sovereign immunity. More specifically, the court held that tort liability is
based on the theory that the prospect of liability makes an actor more
careful. However, in the court's view, Congress did not want U.S. service personnel to exercise great caution "when bold and imaginative
measures might be necessary to overcome enemy forces.' And, in the
most extreme language to be found in any of these cases protecting
against liability of the U.S. government, the court held that "the result
would be no different if the downing of the
3 9 civilian plane had been deliberative rather than the result of error.
B.

The Apology and Domestic Law

What effect, if any, will President Clinton's apology have in terms
of domestic law, particularly with respect to claims that might be
brought by Guatemalan civilians? Notwithstanding the enormous degree of judicial deference exhibited above, it is difficult to believe that
the apology will not have any legal effect. After all, to use a criminal
law analogy, the apology is similar to an admission of guilt. How, then,
could domestic courts deny relief to Guatemalans after the President of
the United States has publicly admitted that the American policy in
Guatemala was "wrong?"'
Other questions remain. What about situations where U.S. policy
was similar to the Guatemalan policy - longstanding support for a government that carried out gross and systematic human rights abuses
against its civilian population - but where no Presidential apology has
been forthcoming? How should the American judiciary (or Congress, for
that matter) respond to these kinds of situations, particularly now that
the fighting in a number of countries has ended? In other words, wha'
is the difference between an admission of wrongdoing and actual
wrongdoing?

38. Koohi, 967 F.2d. at 1334-35.
39. Id. at 1335.
40. Remarks by the President in Roundtable Discussion on Peace Efforts, supra note
2 (emphasis added). But never underestimate the deference of the American judiciary in
matters pertaining to foreign affairs. In justifying dismissal of the plaintiffs' case in
Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, the District Court
for the District of Columbia indicated the level of abuse it might take to involve the judiciary: If Congress adopted a foreign policy that resulted in the enslavement of our citizens
or of other individuals, that policy might well be subject to challenge in domestic court
under international law. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F. 2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis added).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Despite the collective shrug that it has been met with so far,4'
President Clinton's apology for the role played by the U.S. in Guatemala's civil war should not be viewed as mere political rhetoric. Nor
should the apology be treated as a theoretical issue in terms of law.
Rather, the President is publicly admitting that the government that he
represents was complicit in the brutal practices of another government.
From the perspective of international law, this apology should serve to
substantially change the manner in which transnational state responsibility has been treated. No longer should a government be able to absolve itself from responsibility and liability merely because it was not
the entity that ultimately "pulled the trigger."
What the Clinton apology does is to lower the bar of responsibility
established in the Nicaragua case. The actions of the United States
were wrong not because the U.S. was somehow able to "control" the actions of the Guatemalan government, nor because it provided aid and
assistance with the "intent" that the Guatemalan government would
use it to commit internationally wrongful acts. Instead, the actions of
the U.S. government were wrong, and presumably illegal, simply because the U.S. was aware of the gross and systematic human rights
abuses that were being carried out in Guatemala, yet the U.S. persisted
in supporting this government.
Similarly, President Clinton's apology should also have enormous
consequences in terms of domestic law. U.S. courts have rushed to offer
a wild assortment of defenses whenever foreign plaintiffs have sought
compensation for the human consequences of American foreign policy.
Most of those defenses have given tremendous deference to executive
policy. But it remains to be seen whether the judiciary can continue to
deny justice now that the President has publicly admitted wrongdoing
for helping and abetting Guatemalan military and intelligence forces
engaged in widespread repression.

41. For example, the New York Times carried the story on page 12, see John M.
Broder, Clinton Apologizes for U.S. Support for Guatemalan Rightists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 1999, at A12.

